Narrative:

During extended vectoring due to a late runway change; we were assigned IAS 170. (Neither one of us heard '...to the marker' or anything similar; and we went through several controllers during the course of the approach.) immediately outside taffs I called for gear down; flaps 30 degrees (we had automatic spdbrakes deferred and a very wet runway) and called for target speed as well. The frequency was congested and it was just about impossible to make any transmission not anticipated by the controller. The ord approach monitor suddenly called us and engaged in extended questioning: what was our speed? What speed had we been assigned? Had we been assigned 170 to the marker? Again; what speed were we flying? Eventually; the persistent questioning stopped; and we were allowed to continue flying the approach. We heard nothing further about the matter from tower or ground. The incident bothered me because in my opinion the questioning was inappropriate. Eventually we all have to slow in order to land; and by now this shouldn't be much of a secret! Further; we were solidly IMC; with heavy rain and occasional lightning; and additionally were right at the edge of my approach minima. I'm a high-mins captain (1 month on the airplane) and was using the autoplt to ensure compliance with the regulations; the crosswind was just shy of 15 KTS; stabilized approach limits require gear down and final descent check completed by 1500 RA/FAF; whichever is later; and target airspeed not later than 1000 ft IMC; but there is no requirement to arrange for these requirements to be just barely met at the very last min! In my opinion; I had my hands full: new in type; a short runway and a spoiler deferral; WX approaching minimums; heavy rain showers and lightning on the approach; and multiple reports of deteriorating WX over a wide swath of the midwest. Frankly; I wanted to fly the approach right the first time; clear the runway expeditiously and vacate the ATC system as gracefully as possible. To do this I flew as professionally as I knew how; did what seemed most prudent; and with all of this ended up not 'leading' the fom stabilized approach limits by all that much. It is perhaps unfortunate; in this context; that I was light and my target speed under the circumstances was rather low (133 KTS). I can readily appreciate that this isn't something calculated to please a controller trying to get as many aircraft through the chute as he can. At the same time; I am primarily concerned with maximizing the safety of just 1 aircraft; the one I signed for. Further; in my opinion there perhaps should be the presumption that when a captain chooses a particular course of action he likely has a good reason for doing so -- whether or not it results in some minor inconvenience to some other individual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 PILOT WAS CHASTISED BY THE APPROACH CONTROLLER FOR SLOWING TOO EARLY ON THE APPROACH.

Narrative: DURING EXTENDED VECTORING DUE TO A LATE RWY CHANGE; WE WERE ASSIGNED IAS 170. (NEITHER ONE OF US HEARD '...TO THE MARKER' OR ANYTHING SIMILAR; AND WE WENT THROUGH SEVERAL CTLRS DURING THE COURSE OF THE APCH.) IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE TAFFS I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 30 DEGS (WE HAD AUTO SPDBRAKES DEFERRED AND A VERY WET RWY) AND CALLED FOR TARGET SPD AS WELL. THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED AND IT WAS JUST ABOUT IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE ANY XMISSION NOT ANTICIPATED BY THE CTLR. THE ORD APCH MONITOR SUDDENLY CALLED US AND ENGAGED IN EXTENDED QUESTIONING: WHAT WAS OUR SPD? WHAT SPD HAD WE BEEN ASSIGNED? HAD WE BEEN ASSIGNED 170 TO THE MARKER? AGAIN; WHAT SPD WERE WE FLYING? EVENTUALLY; THE PERSISTENT QUESTIONING STOPPED; AND WE WERE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE FLYING THE APCH. WE HEARD NOTHING FURTHER ABOUT THE MATTER FROM TWR OR GND. THE INCIDENT BOTHERED ME BECAUSE IN MY OPINION THE QUESTIONING WAS INAPPROPRIATE. EVENTUALLY WE ALL HAVE TO SLOW IN ORDER TO LAND; AND BY NOW THIS SHOULDN'T BE MUCH OF A SECRET! FURTHER; WE WERE SOLIDLY IMC; WITH HVY RAIN AND OCCASIONAL LIGHTNING; AND ADDITIONALLY WERE RIGHT AT THE EDGE OF MY APCH MINIMA. I'M A HIGH-MINS CAPT (1 MONTH ON THE AIRPLANE) AND WAS USING THE AUTOPLT TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGS; THE XWIND WAS JUST SHY OF 15 KTS; STABILIZED APCH LIMITS REQUIRE GEAR DOWN AND FINAL DSCNT CHK COMPLETED BY 1500 RA/FAF; WHICHEVER IS LATER; AND TARGET AIRSPD NOT LATER THAN 1000 FT IMC; BUT THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO ARRANGE FOR THESE REQUIREMENTS TO BE JUST BARELY MET AT THE VERY LAST MIN! IN MY OPINION; I HAD MY HANDS FULL: NEW IN TYPE; A SHORT RWY AND A SPOILER DEFERRAL; WX APCHING MINIMUMS; HVY RAIN SHOWERS AND LIGHTNING ON THE APCH; AND MULTIPLE RPTS OF DETERIORATING WX OVER A WIDE SWATH OF THE MIDWEST. FRANKLY; I WANTED TO FLY THE APCH RIGHT THE FIRST TIME; CLR THE RWY EXPEDITIOUSLY AND VACATE THE ATC SYS AS GRACEFULLY AS POSSIBLE. TO DO THIS I FLEW AS PROFESSIONALLY AS I KNEW HOW; DID WHAT SEEMED MOST PRUDENT; AND WITH ALL OF THIS ENDED UP NOT 'LEADING' THE FOM STABILIZED APCH LIMITS BY ALL THAT MUCH. IT IS PERHAPS UNFORTUNATE; IN THIS CONTEXT; THAT I WAS LIGHT AND MY TARGET SPD UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WAS RATHER LOW (133 KTS). I CAN READILY APPRECIATE THAT THIS ISN'T SOMETHING CALCULATED TO PLEASE A CTLR TRYING TO GET AS MANY ACFT THROUGH THE CHUTE AS HE CAN. AT THE SAME TIME; I AM PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH MAXIMIZING THE SAFETY OF JUST 1 ACFT; THE ONE I SIGNED FOR. FURTHER; IN MY OPINION THERE PERHAPS SHOULD BE THE PRESUMPTION THAT WHEN A CAPT CHOOSES A PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION HE LIKELY HAS A GOOD REASON FOR DOING SO -- WHETHER OR NOT IT RESULTS IN SOME MINOR INCONVENIENCE TO SOME OTHER INDIVIDUAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.