Narrative:

All normal preflight checks were performed; as well as a planned reduced thrust takeoff due to light planned takeoff weight. Loads were light today; around 120 passenger planned (final 112 + 13 crew total 125 souls on board). Our clearance; pushback; and dispatch went as expected and on time without any events. After initial taxi and once takeoff flaps 5 degrees were selected; I called for before takeoff check. All but final items were completed before entering taxiway B. Taxiway north northbound just east of control tower has a very slight uphill but not what you expect needing extra thrust to maintain a comfortable and safe taxi speed. I did mention in brief to my flying partners it appeared to take a bit more thrust to keep aircraft moving forward. I was targeting approximately 15-18 KTS taxi at the time. Up to this point; everything was setting up to be a clean and expeditious departure. At no time during our taxi did we receive any aircraft status; EICAS or any other indications cluing us to what was beginning to occur outside our aircraft and beyond our control. I believe it was as we made our turn east onto taxiway B tower called and made an unclr transmission to us referencing something about 'metal' and to amend our taxi clearance. Still unsure as to problem or what ATC was trying to communicate to us; we eventually made a turn away from entryway Y11 and onto taxiway Q. My crew and I had some brief conversation as to what ATC was trying to convey to us. At this time first officer made a call to company to see if they had some information for us. I stopped aircraft short of Y12 facing east on taxiway Q to begin to sort out the situation. At first thought; first officer and I believed there may be either metal FOD near Y11 preventing our use; or that there may be some panel or such loose item off our aircraft. Now clear of entryway Y11 for runway 27L; we began to receive more facts that led to our decision to evacuate/evacuation aircraft. After his call to company; first officer informed us a van or truck was on its way to assist us. Just as this was occurring; another aircraft now short of runway 27L and positioned just behind us by several hundred yards; made an open call over ATC; 'air carrier X B777 you have flames; fire coming from your right wheel assembly.' personnel from operations also reaching our hold spot at this time were pointing toward right side of our aircraft. We made a return call to confirm that fire was in fact from our B777 holding short of runway 27L. It was at this time I concluded this situation had become more serious than ATC had led us to believe. In interest of time and safety of my crew; passenger; and aircraft; I elected to make a decision to have our aircraft evacuate/evacuationed. I call for first officer to begin the evacuate/evacuation qrc checklist. In my thought process I considered making changes to how aircraft was to be evacuate/evacuationed; but feeling slides are all clear of wheel assembly; light passenger load; time critical and confusion if I made an announcement not to use some of the exits on right side; I elected not to pick up PA. First officer (relief pilot on this return trip) opened the cockpit door; proceeded into the cabin; and verbally confirmed that we wanted everyone off the aircraft. As our cockpit windows and main cabin doors opened; I could smell a burning odor what appeared as acrid or rubber. All 8 exit doors and slides were used; and full evacuate/evacuation took no more than 30-35 seconds. As I left the cockpit; I proceeded down left aisle throughout the cabin to confirm that all passenger and crew had exited aircraft. I then proceeded back to the front and decided to exit out 1L. Once on the ramp; I began to assess the condition of aircraft; location of all my passenger and crew. Noticing my first officer's had gathered with group on the left side; I proceeded toward the group gathered on the grassy area clear of txwys on the right side. By the time I exited; crash fire rescue equipment had approached aircraft and began to extend hoses to spray landing gear assembly. I began my assessment of my passenger and crew once in their location and saw to it that everyone's needs were taken care of and that what comfort I could provide was given. Supplemental information from acn 772815: somewhere on taxiway B; ground control called us and said something about a 'piece of metal' and issued different taxi instructions to prevent us from going out to the hold point for runway 27L. Due to his broken english; we had difficulty understanding exactly what he was saying; so we had to ask him to repeat a couple of times. At first we were thinking he was referring to a piece of metal on a taxiway along our route that he simply wanted us to avoid; but then he mentioned something about operations picking up a piece of metal and driving it out to our aircraft. Meanwhile; first officer was calling back to operations and they said that a piece had fallen off our airplane and that operations personnel had picked it up and they were driving out to the airplane. By this time we had made a right turn onto taxiway Q and we were fully stopped with the parking brake set awaiting further instruction. Then an air carrier pilot (who was behind us at the time) made a call on ground frequency that flames were coming off the right landing gear on our B777. We quickly verified that he was in fact talking to us. Meanwhile; the operations van pulled up in front of us and the driver immediately got out and pointed towards the right gear assembly and made a 'flames' signal with his outstretched arms. We quickly decided it was time to evacuate/evacuation and captain called for the evacuate/evacuation qrc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 WAS EVACUATED DURING TAXI OUT AFTER AN ACFT COMPONENT FELL OFF OF THE ACFT AND A LNDG GEAR FIRE ERUPTED.

Narrative: ALL NORMAL PREFLT CHKS WERE PERFORMED; AS WELL AS A PLANNED REDUCED THRUST TKOF DUE TO LIGHT PLANNED TKOF WT. LOADS WERE LIGHT TODAY; AROUND 120 PAX PLANNED (FINAL 112 + 13 CREW TOTAL 125 SOULS ON BOARD). OUR CLRNC; PUSHBACK; AND DISPATCH WENT AS EXPECTED AND ON TIME WITHOUT ANY EVENTS. AFTER INITIAL TAXI AND ONCE TKOF FLAPS 5 DEGS WERE SELECTED; I CALLED FOR BEFORE TKOF CHK. ALL BUT FINAL ITEMS WERE COMPLETED BEFORE ENTERING TXWY B. TXWY N NBOUND JUST E OF CTL TWR HAS A VERY SLIGHT UPHILL BUT NOT WHAT YOU EXPECT NEEDING EXTRA THRUST TO MAINTAIN A COMFORTABLE AND SAFE TAXI SPD. I DID MENTION IN BRIEF TO MY FLYING PARTNERS IT APPEARED TO TAKE A BIT MORE THRUST TO KEEP ACFT MOVING FORWARD. I WAS TARGETING APPROX 15-18 KTS TAXI AT THE TIME. UP TO THIS POINT; EVERYTHING WAS SETTING UP TO BE A CLEAN AND EXPEDITIOUS DEP. AT NO TIME DURING OUR TAXI DID WE RECEIVE ANY ACFT STATUS; EICAS OR ANY OTHER INDICATIONS CLUING US TO WHAT WAS BEGINNING TO OCCUR OUTSIDE OUR ACFT AND BEYOND OUR CTL. I BELIEVE IT WAS AS WE MADE OUR TURN E ONTO TXWY B TWR CALLED AND MADE AN UNCLR XMISSION TO US REFING SOMETHING ABOUT 'METAL' AND TO AMEND OUR TAXI CLRNC. STILL UNSURE AS TO PROB OR WHAT ATC WAS TRYING TO COMMUNICATE TO US; WE EVENTUALLY MADE A TURN AWAY FROM ENTRYWAY Y11 AND ONTO TXWY Q. MY CREW AND I HAD SOME BRIEF CONVERSATION AS TO WHAT ATC WAS TRYING TO CONVEY TO US. AT THIS TIME FO MADE A CALL TO COMPANY TO SEE IF THEY HAD SOME INFO FOR US. I STOPPED ACFT SHORT OF Y12 FACING E ON TXWY Q TO BEGIN TO SORT OUT THE SITUATION. AT FIRST THOUGHT; FO AND I BELIEVED THERE MAY BE EITHER METAL FOD NEAR Y11 PREVENTING OUR USE; OR THAT THERE MAY BE SOME PANEL OR SUCH LOOSE ITEM OFF OUR ACFT. NOW CLR OF ENTRYWAY Y11 FOR RWY 27L; WE BEGAN TO RECEIVE MORE FACTS THAT LED TO OUR DECISION TO EVAC ACFT. AFTER HIS CALL TO COMPANY; FO INFORMED US A VAN OR TRUCK WAS ON ITS WAY TO ASSIST US. JUST AS THIS WAS OCCURRING; ANOTHER ACFT NOW SHORT OF RWY 27L AND POSITIONED JUST BEHIND US BY SEVERAL HUNDRED YARDS; MADE AN OPEN CALL OVER ATC; 'ACR X B777 YOU HAVE FLAMES; FIRE COMING FROM YOUR R WHEEL ASSEMBLY.' PERSONNEL FROM OPS ALSO REACHING OUR HOLD SPOT AT THIS TIME WERE POINTING TOWARD R SIDE OF OUR ACFT. WE MADE A RETURN CALL TO CONFIRM THAT FIRE WAS IN FACT FROM OUR B777 HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 27L. IT WAS AT THIS TIME I CONCLUDED THIS SITUATION HAD BECOME MORE SERIOUS THAN ATC HAD LED US TO BELIEVE. IN INTEREST OF TIME AND SAFETY OF MY CREW; PAX; AND ACFT; I ELECTED TO MAKE A DECISION TO HAVE OUR ACFT EVACED. I CALL FOR FO TO BEGIN THE EVAC QRC CHKLIST. IN MY THOUGHT PROCESS I CONSIDERED MAKING CHANGES TO HOW ACFT WAS TO BE EVACED; BUT FEELING SLIDES ARE ALL CLR OF WHEEL ASSEMBLY; LIGHT PAX LOAD; TIME CRITICAL AND CONFUSION IF I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT NOT TO USE SOME OF THE EXITS ON R SIDE; I ELECTED NOT TO PICK UP PA. FO (RELIEF PLT ON THIS RETURN TRIP) OPENED THE COCKPIT DOOR; PROCEEDED INTO THE CABIN; AND VERBALLY CONFIRMED THAT WE WANTED EVERYONE OFF THE ACFT. AS OUR COCKPIT WINDOWS AND MAIN CABIN DOORS OPENED; I COULD SMELL A BURNING ODOR WHAT APPEARED AS ACRID OR RUBBER. ALL 8 EXIT DOORS AND SLIDES WERE USED; AND FULL EVAC TOOK NO MORE THAN 30-35 SECONDS. AS I LEFT THE COCKPIT; I PROCEEDED DOWN L AISLE THROUGHOUT THE CABIN TO CONFIRM THAT ALL PAX AND CREW HAD EXITED ACFT. I THEN PROCEEDED BACK TO THE FRONT AND DECIDED TO EXIT OUT 1L. ONCE ON THE RAMP; I BEGAN TO ASSESS THE CONDITION OF ACFT; LOCATION OF ALL MY PAX AND CREW. NOTICING MY FO'S HAD GATHERED WITH GROUP ON THE L SIDE; I PROCEEDED TOWARD THE GROUP GATHERED ON THE GRASSY AREA CLR OF TXWYS ON THE R SIDE. BY THE TIME I EXITED; CFR HAD APCHED ACFT AND BEGAN TO EXTEND HOSES TO SPRAY LNDG GEAR ASSEMBLY. I BEGAN MY ASSESSMENT OF MY PAX AND CREW ONCE IN THEIR LOCATION AND SAW TO IT THAT EVERYONE'S NEEDS WERE TAKEN CARE OF AND THAT WHAT COMFORT I COULD PROVIDE WAS GIVEN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 772815: SOMEWHERE ON TXWY B; GND CTL CALLED US AND SAID SOMETHING ABOUT A 'PIECE OF METAL' AND ISSUED DIFFERENT TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO PREVENT US FROM GOING OUT TO THE HOLD POINT FOR RWY 27L. DUE TO HIS BROKEN ENGLISH; WE HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING EXACTLY WHAT HE WAS SAYING; SO WE HAD TO ASK HIM TO REPEAT A COUPLE OF TIMES. AT FIRST WE WERE THINKING HE WAS REFERRING TO A PIECE OF METAL ON A TXWY ALONG OUR RTE THAT HE SIMPLY WANTED US TO AVOID; BUT THEN HE MENTIONED SOMETHING ABOUT OPS PICKING UP A PIECE OF METAL AND DRIVING IT OUT TO OUR ACFT. MEANWHILE; FO WAS CALLING BACK TO OPS AND THEY SAID THAT A PIECE HAD FALLEN OFF OUR AIRPLANE AND THAT OPS PERSONNEL HAD PICKED IT UP AND THEY WERE DRIVING OUT TO THE AIRPLANE. BY THIS TIME WE HAD MADE A R TURN ONTO TXWY Q AND WE WERE FULLY STOPPED WITH THE PARKING BRAKE SET AWAITING FURTHER INSTRUCTION. THEN AN ACR PLT (WHO WAS BEHIND US AT THE TIME) MADE A CALL ON GND FREQ THAT FLAMES WERE COMING OFF THE R LNDG GEAR ON OUR B777. WE QUICKLY VERIFIED THAT HE WAS IN FACT TALKING TO US. MEANWHILE; THE OPS VAN PULLED UP IN FRONT OF US AND THE DRIVER IMMEDIATELY GOT OUT AND POINTED TOWARDS THE R GEAR ASSEMBLY AND MADE A 'FLAMES' SIGNAL WITH HIS OUTSTRETCHED ARMS. WE QUICKLY DECIDED IT WAS TIME TO EVAC AND CAPT CALLED FOR THE EVAC QRC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.