Narrative:

FAA central service area; terminal operations; metropolitan hub; grand rapids ATC tower (grr); air traffic manager was advised feb/xa/08 of a 4-DAY radar outage by grr technical operations personnel and failed to report the very large as of yet uncounted number of operrors and opdevs that occurred between aircraft in grr airspace the previous 2 days due to equipment failure -- local scip card 4a4a216 at the grr ASR-9 radar site. This equipment failure locked up control panels and failed to set off alarms; creating an unsafe condition due to ATC controllers using radar information they believed derived from primary and secondary radar; when there was no radar digitally processed for 4 days. The failure to use non radar separation or a back-up radar system endangered aircraft. The mode south beacon system failed to process through the digitizer; but the ibi beacon data from aircraft passed through the system non digitized and appeared on the radar display. The beacon targets alone cannot be used for separation purposes because beacon range accuracy could not be verified without a primary digitized target. The FAA management officials on duty verified the watch checklist complete each day on the logs; indicating they had checked the equipment and it was usable and satisfactory. The ATC controllers on duty were never advised that they were only receiving ibi beacon information from the grr ASR-9 radar site; were never advised the grr ATCT was actually ATC-zero by FAA mocc technical operations equipment monitors due to digitized radar processor failure; never advised they were not receiving digitized radar; were never trained on identing digitized radar malfunctions or local scip card failure freezing radar panel and alarms. Due to the data information ATC controllers believed displayed on the radar display to be digitized radar data; controllers provided FAA order 7110.65 chapter 5 radar separation to all aircraft. The correct separation for 4 days of radar processor failure should have been chapter 6; non radar separation. The air traffic manager is aware of the radar outage; has received specific information from technical operations via email and one-on-one briefings; and has failed to address the issue that all aircraft worked in those 4 days were worked in violation of the FAA order 7110.65 chapters 5 and 6. The FAA mocc failed to immediately notify grr ATCT that the facility was ATC-zero when the local scip card failed. The FAA mocc failed to notice the local scip card had failed and was alarming in their off-site location. I returned to duty on a night shift on feb/xb/08; and was assigned ATC control position when I observed the power failing twice in succession. At that time; there were no ATC alert status logged for grr ATCT. Due to the power failures; I initiated an ATC alert status with chicago en route center; notified the manager; and notified FAA mocc and logged the entry. I personally attempted to contact the technical operations manager via cell phone; and was unable to communicate with him. Even after this notification; FAA mocc failed to correctly identify and tie together the numerous equipment failures and provide notification to the grr ATCT that the facility status was ATC zero -- no radar. The FAA mocc was unable to communication with grr technical operations manager; or technical operations personnel; to commence immediate on-site repairs for massive equipment outages occurring in february. The FAA mocc has utilized non certified personnel; ATC controllers and supervisors to verbally state the process to reset equipment on site instead of obtaining certified off-duty technical operations personnel. This process was attempted on me; but I refused to reset equipment I was not certified nor insured to repair. The FAA mocc complained to me on the telephone that they could not reach the grr technical operations manager and were unable to get a technician to respond to the page they put out. I advised the mocc to call the regional or national offices; and extend the page to a state-wide or regional page. The FAA grr atm has no policy for grr air traffic personnel to log or maintain radar and related equipment and in resetting equipment with non qualified personnel decertified the accuracy of equipment used for live air traffic control purposes. Supervisory personnel on duty record via the daily facility log equipment reset in feb/08. The radar digital processor was still OTS and grr ASR-9 radar was not usable for separation purposes until late afternoon; when the technical operations radar technician repaired 1 channel for use of the 2-CHANNEL system and then advised air traffic there was a complete radar processing failure. The technical operations coordinator had to demand FAA mocc schedule a radar technician to come to the grr ASR-9 site; because even as of mid february was not scheduled to work on the grr ASR-9 until late feb/08.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GRR CTLR DESCRIBED ASR-9 PRIMARY RADAR FAILURE THAT WENT UNDETECTED FOR FOUR DAYS; ALLEGING MULTIPLE PROC/SEPARATION ERRORS.

Narrative: FAA CENTRAL SVC AREA; TERMINAL OPS; METRO HUB; GRAND RAPIDS ATC TWR (GRR); AIR TFC MGR WAS ADVISED FEB/XA/08 OF A 4-DAY RADAR OUTAGE BY GRR TECHNICAL OPS PERSONNEL AND FAILED TO RPT THE VERY LARGE AS OF YET UNCOUNTED NUMBER OF OPERRORS AND OPDEVS THAT OCCURRED BTWN ACFT IN GRR AIRSPACE THE PREVIOUS 2 DAYS DUE TO EQUIP FAILURE -- LCL SCIP CARD 4A4A216 AT THE GRR ASR-9 RADAR SITE. THIS EQUIP FAILURE LOCKED UP CTL PANELS AND FAILED TO SET OFF ALARMS; CREATING AN UNSAFE CONDITION DUE TO ATC CTLRS USING RADAR INFO THEY BELIEVED DERIVED FROM PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RADAR; WHEN THERE WAS NO RADAR DIGITALLY PROCESSED FOR 4 DAYS. THE FAILURE TO USE NON RADAR SEPARATION OR A BACK-UP RADAR SYS ENDANGERED ACFT. THE MODE S BEACON SYS FAILED TO PROCESS THROUGH THE DIGITIZER; BUT THE IBI BEACON DATA FROM ACFT PASSED THROUGH THE SYS NON DIGITIZED AND APPEARED ON THE RADAR DISPLAY. THE BEACON TARGETS ALONE CANNOT BE USED FOR SEPARATION PURPOSES BECAUSE BEACON RANGE ACCURACY COULD NOT BE VERIFIED WITHOUT A PRIMARY DIGITIZED TARGET. THE FAA MGMNT OFFICIALS ON DUTY VERIFIED THE WATCH CHKLIST COMPLETE EACH DAY ON THE LOGS; INDICATING THEY HAD CHKED THE EQUIP AND IT WAS USABLE AND SATISFACTORY. THE ATC CTLRS ON DUTY WERE NEVER ADVISED THAT THEY WERE ONLY RECEIVING IBI BEACON INFO FROM THE GRR ASR-9 RADAR SITE; WERE NEVER ADVISED THE GRR ATCT WAS ACTUALLY ATC-ZERO BY FAA MOCC TECHNICAL OPS EQUIP MONITORS DUE TO DIGITIZED RADAR PROCESSOR FAILURE; NEVER ADVISED THEY WERE NOT RECEIVING DIGITIZED RADAR; WERE NEVER TRAINED ON IDENTING DIGITIZED RADAR MALFUNCTIONS OR LCL SCIP CARD FAILURE FREEZING RADAR PANEL AND ALARMS. DUE TO THE DATA INFO ATC CTLRS BELIEVED DISPLAYED ON THE RADAR DISPLAY TO BE DIGITIZED RADAR DATA; CTLRS PROVIDED FAA ORDER 7110.65 CHAPTER 5 RADAR SEPARATION TO ALL ACFT. THE CORRECT SEPARATION FOR 4 DAYS OF RADAR PROCESSOR FAILURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHAPTER 6; NON RADAR SEPARATION. THE AIR TFC MGR IS AWARE OF THE RADAR OUTAGE; HAS RECEIVED SPECIFIC INFO FROM TECHNICAL OPS VIA EMAIL AND ONE-ON-ONE BRIEFINGS; AND HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE THAT ALL ACFT WORKED IN THOSE 4 DAYS WERE WORKED IN VIOLATION OF THE FAA ORDER 7110.65 CHAPTERS 5 AND 6. THE FAA MOCC FAILED TO IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY GRR ATCT THAT THE FACILITY WAS ATC-ZERO WHEN THE LCL SCIP CARD FAILED. THE FAA MOCC FAILED TO NOTICE THE LCL SCIP CARD HAD FAILED AND WAS ALARMING IN THEIR OFF-SITE LOCATION. I RETURNED TO DUTY ON A NIGHT SHIFT ON FEB/XB/08; AND WAS ASSIGNED ATC CTL POS WHEN I OBSERVED THE PWR FAILING TWICE IN SUCCESSION. AT THAT TIME; THERE WERE NO ATC ALERT STATUS LOGGED FOR GRR ATCT. DUE TO THE PWR FAILURES; I INITIATED AN ATC ALERT STATUS WITH CHICAGO ENRTE CTR; NOTIFIED THE MGR; AND NOTIFIED FAA MOCC AND LOGGED THE ENTRY. I PERSONALLY ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE TECHNICAL OPS MGR VIA CELL PHONE; AND WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIM. EVEN AFTER THIS NOTIFICATION; FAA MOCC FAILED TO CORRECTLY IDENT AND TIE TOGETHER THE NUMEROUS EQUIP FAILURES AND PROVIDE NOTIFICATION TO THE GRR ATCT THAT THE FACILITY STATUS WAS ATC ZERO -- NO RADAR. THE FAA MOCC WAS UNABLE TO COM WITH GRR TECHNICAL OPS MGR; OR TECHNICAL OPS PERSONNEL; TO COMMENCE IMMEDIATE ON-SITE REPAIRS FOR MASSIVE EQUIP OUTAGES OCCURRING IN FEBRUARY. THE FAA MOCC HAS UTILIZED NON CERTIFIED PERSONNEL; ATC CTLRS AND SUPVRS TO VERBALLY STATE THE PROCESS TO RESET EQUIP ON SITE INSTEAD OF OBTAINING CERTIFIED OFF-DUTY TECHNICAL OPS PERSONNEL. THIS PROCESS WAS ATTEMPTED ON ME; BUT I REFUSED TO RESET EQUIP I WAS NOT CERTIFIED NOR INSURED TO REPAIR. THE FAA MOCC COMPLAINED TO ME ON THE TELEPHONE THAT THEY COULD NOT REACH THE GRR TECHNICAL OPS MGR AND WERE UNABLE TO GET A TECHNICIAN TO RESPOND TO THE PAGE THEY PUT OUT. I ADVISED THE MOCC TO CALL THE REGIONAL OR NATIONAL OFFICES; AND EXTEND THE PAGE TO A STATE-WIDE OR REGIONAL PAGE. THE FAA GRR ATM HAS NO POLICY FOR GRR AIR TFC PERSONNEL TO LOG OR MAINTAIN RADAR AND RELATED EQUIP AND IN RESETTING EQUIP WITH NON QUALIFIED PERSONNEL DECERTIFIED THE ACCURACY OF EQUIP USED FOR LIVE AIR TFC CTL PURPOSES. SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ON DUTY RECORD VIA THE DAILY FACILITY LOG EQUIP RESET IN FEB/08. THE RADAR DIGITAL PROCESSOR WAS STILL OTS AND GRR ASR-9 RADAR WAS NOT USABLE FOR SEPARATION PURPOSES UNTIL LATE AFTERNOON; WHEN THE TECHNICAL OPS RADAR TECHNICIAN REPAIRED 1 CHANNEL FOR USE OF THE 2-CHANNEL SYS AND THEN ADVISED AIR TFC THERE WAS A COMPLETE RADAR PROCESSING FAILURE. THE TECHNICAL OPS COORDINATOR HAD TO DEMAND FAA MOCC SCHEDULE A RADAR TECHNICIAN TO COME TO THE GRR ASR-9 SITE; BECAUSE EVEN AS OF MID FEBRUARY WAS NOT SCHEDULED TO WORK ON THE GRR ASR-9 UNTIL LATE FEB/08.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.