Narrative:

I was assigned a return flight from las to the aircraft home base ZZZ. The flight was originally scheduled for an XF00 departure. I received a phone call around XA20 indicating that my passenger; one of which was the ceo of the company and I had never before flown; wanted to leave earlier; around XC00 instead. I was rushed getting checked out of my hotel room; arranging a ride to the airport; coordinating the pull-up of my aircraft; fueling; catering; etc; before XC00. The FBO and airport were very busy and they indicated to me I was #5 in line for fuel and they did not know when the plane would be pulled up; but I could not depart from where it was parked due to other aircraft in close proximity to mine. I received another call indicating my passenger had arrived at the FBO at XB45. I had received fuel at this point but nothing else for the aircraft (coffee; ice or newspapers) nor my IFR clearance. I had been trying to obtain the clearance for over 20 mins by then. I finally received the clearance while the aircraft was being towed to a better location as I rode inside. I asked the line service man for a gpu and to follow through with the other items requested while I went inside the FBO to greet the passenger. I returned to the aircraft with the passenger around XC15 and loaded their baggage. The passenger were visibly and verbally frustrated with the delay and I was trying to move quickly to minimize any further delay. The ceo chose to situation in the copilot's seat for the flight; as I was flying as a single pilot. I started the engines and was ready to taxi when I remember setting the altitude alerter as per the checklist. I then obtained a clearance to taxi to runway 1L bravo intersection via hotel. I commenced the taxi and reviewed the departure procedure (TRALR2 RNAV) while stopped multiple times en route to runway 1L due to other aircraft in front of us. I noted on the briefing strip the assigned altitude of FL190 and set FL190 in the altitude alerter. I don't remember what altitude was previously set in the alerter. Our airplane was cleared for takeoff around XC39; tower issued the instructions to maintain visual on preceding traffic and a right turn to 050 degrees. No mention was made about my assigned altitude; I still assumed FL190 as per the TRALR2 RNAV departure. Takeoff and initial departure were normal and uneventful. I was handed over to departure control and checked in '...4000 ft; climbing FL190 on a 050 degree heading.' ATC acknowledged and shortly after cleared my flight 'direct tralr.' I acknowledged direct tralr; programmed the FMS to comply and shortly thereafter noted our climb rate compared to our preceding traffic; we were out-climbing them. About that same time I received a TA from tcasi; I noted the traffic on the TCAS display and saw +900 next to the threat; indicating the traffic was 900 ft higher than our aircraft. It did not make sense for our preceding traffic to be above us; so I began scanning outside and acquired another aircraft on a collision course; though slightly higher; heading in the opposite direction. I noted the conflicting traffic to my right seat passenger and simultaneously decreased the aircraft's rate of climb possibly even descending slightly. From the moment I acquired the conflicting traffic until we had passed each other was no more than 4-5 seconds. I estimate passing below the conflict by 300-400 ft vertically. Departure control was still saturated with calls and my right seat passenger and I exchanged a few words about the conflict so another 20 seconds went by until I was able to tell ATC about the near midair collision. He asked to verify what altitude I was assigned and I read back FL190. He said I should have been assigned 7000 ft MSL. I immediately asked what altitude he would like us at now and he said continue the climb to FL190. The controller gave me a phone number to call upon landing; which I complied with. Like most accidents; there is usually a chain of events that add up and conspire against the unwary; this near accident is no different. I felt rushed from the beginning. I have been in similar situations before; however; seldom as a single pilot; I usually have had another pilot to help and divide the work with. I knew that coming in; and always arrive to the airport with ample time remaining before the passenger show. This time I did not have that luxury. I felt nervous having to 'prove' myself to the ceo that I was as capable as the chief pilot whom had flown the ceo before on numerous occasions. On obtaining my IFR clearance; I wrote down the assigned altitude of 7000 ft but second-guessed myself when I suddenly had too much time to study the departure on my multiple stops while taxiing and then set FL190 into the altitude alerter; thoughtlessly dismissing my original clearance. When assigning RNAV departures (or any departures); ATC should not deviate from the original text until after airborne to eliminate confusion. My understanding for RNAV sids/stars is to minimize controller input and allowing pilots/aircraft to comply with altitude and lateral navigation restrs independently; this does not seem to be the case. Also; if tower had verified my altitude when clearing us for takeoff it would have been 1 more check and 'wake-up' for myself or any other pilot in a similar situation. Finally; if departure control had truly heard my (incorrectly) assigned altitude; they would have had time to correct it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CJ3 SINGLE PILOT EXPERIENCES A TCAS TA ON DEPARTURE FROM LAS FOLLOWED BY A VISUAL ACQUISITION OF A SECOND AIRCRAFT ON A COLLISION COURSE. SINGLE PLT OVERSHOOTS HIS ASSIGNED ALTITUDE AND CITES NUMEROUS NON-STANDARD EVENTS AS CONTRIBUTING FACTORS.

Narrative: I WAS ASSIGNED A RETURN FLT FROM LAS TO THE ACFT HOME BASE ZZZ. THE FLT WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR AN XF00 DEP. I RECEIVED A PHONE CALL AROUND XA20 INDICATING THAT MY PAX; ONE OF WHICH WAS THE CEO OF THE COMPANY AND I HAD NEVER BEFORE FLOWN; WANTED TO LEAVE EARLIER; AROUND XC00 INSTEAD. I WAS RUSHED GETTING CHKED OUT OF MY HOTEL ROOM; ARRANGING A RIDE TO THE ARPT; COORDINATING THE PULL-UP OF MY ACFT; FUELING; CATERING; ETC; BEFORE XC00. THE FBO AND ARPT WERE VERY BUSY AND THEY INDICATED TO ME I WAS #5 IN LINE FOR FUEL AND THEY DID NOT KNOW WHEN THE PLANE WOULD BE PULLED UP; BUT I COULD NOT DEPART FROM WHERE IT WAS PARKED DUE TO OTHER ACFT IN CLOSE PROX TO MINE. I RECEIVED ANOTHER CALL INDICATING MY PAX HAD ARRIVED AT THE FBO AT XB45. I HAD RECEIVED FUEL AT THIS POINT BUT NOTHING ELSE FOR THE ACFT (COFFEE; ICE OR NEWSPAPERS) NOR MY IFR CLRNC. I HAD BEEN TRYING TO OBTAIN THE CLRNC FOR OVER 20 MINS BY THEN. I FINALLY RECEIVED THE CLRNC WHILE THE ACFT WAS BEING TOWED TO A BETTER LOCATION AS I RODE INSIDE. I ASKED THE LINE SVC MAN FOR A GPU AND TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THE OTHER ITEMS REQUESTED WHILE I WENT INSIDE THE FBO TO GREET THE PAX. I RETURNED TO THE ACFT WITH THE PAX AROUND XC15 AND LOADED THEIR BAGGAGE. THE PAX WERE VISIBLY AND VERBALLY FRUSTRATED WITH THE DELAY AND I WAS TRYING TO MOVE QUICKLY TO MINIMIZE ANY FURTHER DELAY. THE CEO CHOSE TO SIT IN THE COPLT'S SEAT FOR THE FLT; AS I WAS FLYING AS A SINGLE PLT. I STARTED THE ENGS AND WAS READY TO TAXI WHEN I REMEMBER SETTING THE ALT ALERTER AS PER THE CHKLIST. I THEN OBTAINED A CLRNC TO TAXI TO RWY 1L BRAVO INTXN VIA HOTEL. I COMMENCED THE TAXI AND REVIEWED THE DEP PROC (TRALR2 RNAV) WHILE STOPPED MULTIPLE TIMES ENRTE TO RWY 1L DUE TO OTHER ACFT IN FRONT OF US. I NOTED ON THE BRIEFING STRIP THE ASSIGNED ALT OF FL190 AND SET FL190 IN THE ALT ALERTER. I DON'T REMEMBER WHAT ALT WAS PREVIOUSLY SET IN THE ALERTER. OUR AIRPLANE WAS CLRED FOR TKOF AROUND XC39; TWR ISSUED THE INSTRUCTIONS TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON PRECEDING TFC AND A R TURN TO 050 DEGS. NO MENTION WAS MADE ABOUT MY ASSIGNED ALT; I STILL ASSUMED FL190 AS PER THE TRALR2 RNAV DEP. TKOF AND INITIAL DEP WERE NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. I WAS HANDED OVER TO DEP CTL AND CHKED IN '...4000 FT; CLBING FL190 ON A 050 DEG HDG.' ATC ACKNOWLEDGED AND SHORTLY AFTER CLRED MY FLT 'DIRECT TRALR.' I ACKNOWLEDGED DIRECT TRALR; PROGRAMMED THE FMS TO COMPLY AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER NOTED OUR CLB RATE COMPARED TO OUR PRECEDING TFC; WE WERE OUT-CLBING THEM. ABOUT THAT SAME TIME I RECEIVED A TA FROM TCASI; I NOTED THE TFC ON THE TCAS DISPLAY AND SAW +900 NEXT TO THE THREAT; INDICATING THE TFC WAS 900 FT HIGHER THAN OUR ACFT. IT DID NOT MAKE SENSE FOR OUR PRECEDING TFC TO BE ABOVE US; SO I BEGAN SCANNING OUTSIDE AND ACQUIRED ANOTHER ACFT ON A COLLISION COURSE; THOUGH SLIGHTLY HIGHER; HEADING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. I NOTED THE CONFLICTING TFC TO MY R SEAT PAX AND SIMULTANEOUSLY DECREASED THE ACFT'S RATE OF CLB POSSIBLY EVEN DSNDING SLIGHTLY. FROM THE MOMENT I ACQUIRED THE CONFLICTING TFC UNTIL WE HAD PASSED EACH OTHER WAS NO MORE THAN 4-5 SECONDS. I ESTIMATE PASSING BELOW THE CONFLICT BY 300-400 FT VERTICALLY. DEP CTL WAS STILL SATURATED WITH CALLS AND MY R SEAT PAX AND I EXCHANGED A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE CONFLICT SO ANOTHER 20 SECONDS WENT BY UNTIL I WAS ABLE TO TELL ATC ABOUT THE NMAC. HE ASKED TO VERIFY WHAT ALT I WAS ASSIGNED AND I READ BACK FL190. HE SAID I SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED 7000 FT MSL. I IMMEDIATELY ASKED WHAT ALT HE WOULD LIKE US AT NOW AND HE SAID CONTINUE THE CLB TO FL190. THE CTLR GAVE ME A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL UPON LNDG; WHICH I COMPLIED WITH. LIKE MOST ACCIDENTS; THERE IS USUALLY A CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT ADD UP AND CONSPIRE AGAINST THE UNWARY; THIS NEAR ACCIDENT IS NO DIFFERENT. I FELT RUSHED FROM THE BEGINNING. I HAVE BEEN IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS BEFORE; HOWEVER; SELDOM AS A SINGLE PLT; I USUALLY HAVE HAD ANOTHER PLT TO HELP AND DIVIDE THE WORK WITH. I KNEW THAT COMING IN; AND ALWAYS ARRIVE TO THE ARPT WITH AMPLE TIME REMAINING BEFORE THE PAX SHOW. THIS TIME I DID NOT HAVE THAT LUXURY. I FELT NERVOUS HAVING TO 'PROVE' MYSELF TO THE CEO THAT I WAS AS CAPABLE AS THE CHIEF PLT WHOM HAD FLOWN THE CEO BEFORE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. ON OBTAINING MY IFR CLRNC; I WROTE DOWN THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 7000 FT BUT SECOND-GUESSED MYSELF WHEN I SUDDENLY HAD TOO MUCH TIME TO STUDY THE DEP ON MY MULTIPLE STOPS WHILE TAXIING AND THEN SET FL190 INTO THE ALT ALERTER; THOUGHTLESSLY DISMISSING MY ORIGINAL CLRNC. WHEN ASSIGNING RNAV DEPS (OR ANY DEPS); ATC SHOULD NOT DEVIATE FROM THE ORIGINAL TEXT UNTIL AFTER AIRBORNE TO ELIMINATE CONFUSION. MY UNDERSTANDING FOR RNAV SIDS/STARS IS TO MINIMIZE CTLR INPUT AND ALLOWING PLTS/ACFT TO COMPLY WITH ALT AND LATERAL NAV RESTRS INDEPENDENTLY; THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO BE THE CASE. ALSO; IF TWR HAD VERIFIED MY ALT WHEN CLRING US FOR TKOF IT WOULD HAVE BEEN 1 MORE CHK AND 'WAKE-UP' FOR MYSELF OR ANY OTHER PLT IN A SIMILAR SITUATION. FINALLY; IF DEP CTL HAD TRULY HEARD MY (INCORRECTLY) ASSIGNED ALT; THEY WOULD HAVE HAD TIME TO CORRECT IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.