Narrative:

Both ground control and tower were combined with 1 controller working the 2 frequencys. After we completed deicing we were cleared to taxi to runway 23L via taxiway J; left on taxiway P runway 23L. I had turned on all of our lights crossing runway 32 and then turned them off after crossing leaving only the taxi light on. I looked both left and right down taxiway P as we approached it and saw no other aircraft. As we approached the intersection of taxiway J and taxiway P I turned on the runway turnoff lights to further illuminate the intersection for our turn. As I started the left turn I looked back again to our right and saw another carrier's MD80 bearing down on us at a high rate of speed. I brought our aircraft to an abrupt stop and the MD80's left wingtip passed approximately 30 ft from our windshield. There was no evidence of that aircraft slowing; either when I first saw it or as it passed. There is no way that they could have stopped had they even tried. The crew from the other airline was silent until I queried the controller about their presence and the pilot said; 'I was cleared to the runway; have a nice day;' or something very similar to that; insinuating that he had the right of way. The controller was a bit shaken and took responsibility for the conflict stating that he couldn't see either one of us due to the glare of the lights. My vision and the first officer's was further inhibited by the mist of deicing fluid on his windows and neither of us saw the MD80 until it nearly collided with us. During peak times such as the morning push; there should be separate controllers and frequencys in use. Our deicing crews shouldn't spray the windshields as heavily as they do. Other airlines shouldn't play chicken with competing carriers on the txwys. I looked and didn't see a thing the first time; possibly I should look harder or employ the first officer to validate what I'm not seeing. Vision impacted by deicing fluid on cockpit windows. Supplemental information from acn 778193: contributing to the conflict was the fact that the first officer's forward and side windows were covered with deicing fluid; which combined with the darkness; made it nearly impossible to see anything to the right. Approaching taxiway P; I was heads down for a moment; rechking our taxi route on the airport diagram. I would also point out that the captain was taxiing the aircraft in full compliance with recommended speeds in the fom. The ground controller had neglected to point out either aircraft to the other; nor did he give either of us instructions to follow the other. Extreme vigilance while taxiing is kind of the obvious thing. We had darkness and a blurred window to deal with; so I guess that makes it even more important. However; the staffing level in the control tower was obviously inadequate to handle the amount of traffic. Controllers working more than 1 position at a time; especially when it includes local control; is the perfect setup for an accident waiting to happen. There was a lot of chatter on the radio; and it quickly became obvious that the controller was not able to devote all of his attention to where it needed to be. This might be ok in the middle of the night when there is no traffic; but the morning push is not the time to spread a controller's responsibility too thin. I do not wish to get the controller in trouble over this; as I'm sure he was not the one who sets the staffing levels at this facility. The FAA needs to be aware that this practice will not be tolerated by pilots. Look at what happened in lexington. Until they get their staffing levels up; I guess we'll just have to continue to exercise extreme caution while taxiing; especially at night; and keep our attention focused outside the aircraft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 FLT CREW REPORTS CRITICAL CONFLICT WITH MD80 AT NIGHT AFTER DEICING; AT INTERSECTION OF TXWYS P AND J AT IND.

Narrative: BOTH GND CTL AND TWR WERE COMBINED WITH 1 CTLR WORKING THE 2 FREQS. AFTER WE COMPLETED DEICING WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 23L VIA TXWY J; L ON TXWY P RWY 23L. I HAD TURNED ON ALL OF OUR LIGHTS XING RWY 32 AND THEN TURNED THEM OFF AFTER XING LEAVING ONLY THE TAXI LIGHT ON. I LOOKED BOTH L AND R DOWN TXWY P AS WE APCHED IT AND SAW NO OTHER ACFT. AS WE APCHED THE INTXN OF TXWY J AND TXWY P I TURNED ON THE RWY TURNOFF LIGHTS TO FURTHER ILLUMINATE THE INTXN FOR OUR TURN. AS I STARTED THE L TURN I LOOKED BACK AGAIN TO OUR R AND SAW ANOTHER CARRIER'S MD80 BEARING DOWN ON US AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD. I BROUGHT OUR ACFT TO AN ABRUPT STOP AND THE MD80'S L WINGTIP PASSED APPROX 30 FT FROM OUR WINDSHIELD. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF THAT ACFT SLOWING; EITHER WHEN I FIRST SAW IT OR AS IT PASSED. THERE IS NO WAY THAT THEY COULD HAVE STOPPED HAD THEY EVEN TRIED. THE CREW FROM THE OTHER AIRLINE WAS SILENT UNTIL I QUERIED THE CTLR ABOUT THEIR PRESENCE AND THE PLT SAID; 'I WAS CLRED TO THE RWY; HAVE A NICE DAY;' OR SOMETHING VERY SIMILAR TO THAT; INSINUATING THAT HE HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY. THE CTLR WAS A BIT SHAKEN AND TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONFLICT STATING THAT HE COULDN'T SEE EITHER ONE OF US DUE TO THE GLARE OF THE LIGHTS. MY VISION AND THE FO'S WAS FURTHER INHIBITED BY THE MIST OF DEICING FLUID ON HIS WINDOWS AND NEITHER OF US SAW THE MD80 UNTIL IT NEARLY COLLIDED WITH US. DURING PEAK TIMES SUCH AS THE MORNING PUSH; THERE SHOULD BE SEPARATE CTLRS AND FREQS IN USE. OUR DEICING CREWS SHOULDN'T SPRAY THE WINDSHIELDS AS HEAVILY AS THEY DO. OTHER AIRLINES SHOULDN'T PLAY CHICKEN WITH COMPETING CARRIERS ON THE TXWYS. I LOOKED AND DIDN'T SEE A THING THE FIRST TIME; POSSIBLY I SHOULD LOOK HARDER OR EMPLOY THE FO TO VALIDATE WHAT I'M NOT SEEING. VISION IMPACTED BY DEICING FLUID ON COCKPIT WINDOWS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 778193: CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONFLICT WAS THE FACT THAT THE FO'S FORWARD AND SIDE WINDOWS WERE COVERED WITH DEICING FLUID; WHICH COMBINED WITH THE DARKNESS; MADE IT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE ANYTHING TO THE R. APCHING TXWY P; I WAS HEADS DOWN FOR A MOMENT; RECHKING OUR TAXI RTE ON THE ARPT DIAGRAM. I WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE CAPT WAS TAXIING THE ACFT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH RECOMMENDED SPDS IN THE FOM. THE GND CTLR HAD NEGLECTED TO POINT OUT EITHER ACFT TO THE OTHER; NOR DID HE GIVE EITHER OF US INSTRUCTIONS TO FOLLOW THE OTHER. EXTREME VIGILANCE WHILE TAXIING IS KIND OF THE OBVIOUS THING. WE HAD DARKNESS AND A BLURRED WINDOW TO DEAL WITH; SO I GUESS THAT MAKES IT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. HOWEVER; THE STAFFING LEVEL IN THE CTL TWR WAS OBVIOUSLY INADEQUATE TO HANDLE THE AMOUNT OF TFC. CTLRS WORKING MORE THAN 1 POS AT A TIME; ESPECIALLY WHEN IT INCLUDES LCL CTL; IS THE PERFECT SETUP FOR AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. THERE WAS A LOT OF CHATTER ON THE RADIO; AND IT QUICKLY BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE CTLR WAS NOT ABLE TO DEVOTE ALL OF HIS ATTN TO WHERE IT NEEDED TO BE. THIS MIGHT BE OK IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT WHEN THERE IS NO TFC; BUT THE MORNING PUSH IS NOT THE TIME TO SPREAD A CTLR'S RESPONSIBILITY TOO THIN. I DO NOT WISH TO GET THE CTLR IN TROUBLE OVER THIS; AS I'M SURE HE WAS NOT THE ONE WHO SETS THE STAFFING LEVELS AT THIS FACILITY. THE FAA NEEDS TO BE AWARE THAT THIS PRACTICE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED BY PLTS. LOOK AT WHAT HAPPENED IN LEXINGTON. UNTIL THEY GET THEIR STAFFING LEVELS UP; I GUESS WE'LL JUST HAVE TO CONTINUE TO EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION WHILE TAXIING; ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT; AND KEEP OUR ATTN FOCUSED OUTSIDE THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.