Narrative:

This event involved an engine fire during taxi out. 4 engine start was normal. Taxi out of ramp was normal. A distraction on taxi to runway xxl was a radar malfunction. The captain used ramp to get out of the traffic flow and diagnose the problem. Engines #1 and #4 were shut down for fuel considerations. The radar became operative and the captain re-entered the taxi stream. The before takeoff checklist was initiated from the top; again. Engine starts on engines #1 and #4 were normal. As we sat at the #1 position for takeoff; another aircraft reported an engine fire on an aircraft at runway xxl. The captain queried the transmission to determine if our aircraft was the one being referred to. It was; and the other aircraft suggested that the 'torch' was about 3-4 ft long and on the right inboard engine. During this time our crew and the maintenance supervisors on board could see no unusual indications of engine malfunction or fire. After engine #3 was shut down and fire agent discharged; the other aircraft crew confirmed that the 'torch' still existed. The captain decided that an emergency evacuate/evacuation was appropriate and was accomplished. All equipment worked normally; the evacuate/evacuation was smooth and there were no injuries. We accounted for everyone (7 souls) and gathered in front of the aircraft until emergency services arrived. Even though I had reviewed operations limits and emergency procedures on the commute to work; I should have tested for fire detection system failure during the incident. Also; I found myself uncomfortable when firing the fire agent and I should have been better at challenge; response; response although it may not have been that important on the ground. The crew performed well together; the captain made good well considered decisions and the maintenance supervisors were helpful and followed directions well. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this was a night flight with rain falling at the airport. The reporter indicated that they had made the turn to hold short of the runway; and the reporting aircraft was still on the parallel taxiway. As a result; the reporting aircraft was looking down the wing and actually reported a fire for the wrong engine. The #4 engine was actually producing the flame. A defective fuel/oil heat exchanger was discovered. This resulted in a mixture of fuel and oil being distributed to the engine bearings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HEAVY FREIGHT ACFT WAS AWAITING TKOF CLRNC AND ANOTHER ACFT REPORTED AN ENG FIRE ON THE FREIGHTER. AFTER THE ENG FIRE PROCEDURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED; FIRE WAS STILL REPORTED; SO THE FLT CREW EVACUATED THE ACFT.

Narrative: THIS EVENT INVOLVED AN ENG FIRE DURING TAXI OUT. 4 ENG START WAS NORMAL. TAXI OUT OF RAMP WAS NORMAL. A DISTR ON TAXI TO RWY XXL WAS A RADAR MALFUNCTION. THE CAPT USED RAMP TO GET OUT OF THE TFC FLOW AND DIAGNOSE THE PROB. ENGS #1 AND #4 WERE SHUT DOWN FOR FUEL CONSIDERATIONS. THE RADAR BECAME OPERATIVE AND THE CAPT RE-ENTERED THE TAXI STREAM. THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS INITIATED FROM THE TOP; AGAIN. ENG STARTS ON ENGS #1 AND #4 WERE NORMAL. AS WE SAT AT THE #1 POS FOR TKOF; ANOTHER ACFT RPTED AN ENG FIRE ON AN ACFT AT RWY XXL. THE CAPT QUERIED THE XMISSION TO DETERMINE IF OUR ACFT WAS THE ONE BEING REFERRED TO. IT WAS; AND THE OTHER ACFT SUGGESTED THAT THE 'TORCH' WAS ABOUT 3-4 FT LONG AND ON THE R INBOARD ENG. DURING THIS TIME OUR CREW AND THE MAINT SUPVRS ON BOARD COULD SEE NO UNUSUAL INDICATIONS OF ENG MALFUNCTION OR FIRE. AFTER ENG #3 WAS SHUT DOWN AND FIRE AGENT DISCHARGED; THE OTHER ACFT CREW CONFIRMED THAT THE 'TORCH' STILL EXISTED. THE CAPT DECIDED THAT AN EMER EVAC WAS APPROPRIATE AND WAS ACCOMPLISHED. ALL EQUIP WORKED NORMALLY; THE EVAC WAS SMOOTH AND THERE WERE NO INJURIES. WE ACCOUNTED FOR EVERYONE (7 SOULS) AND GATHERED IN FRONT OF THE ACFT UNTIL EMER SVCS ARRIVED. EVEN THOUGH I HAD REVIEWED OPS LIMITS AND EMER PROCS ON THE COMMUTE TO WORK; I SHOULD HAVE TESTED FOR FIRE DETECTION SYS FAILURE DURING THE INCIDENT. ALSO; I FOUND MYSELF UNCOMFORTABLE WHEN FIRING THE FIRE AGENT AND I SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER AT CHALLENGE; RESPONSE; RESPONSE ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THAT IMPORTANT ON THE GND. THE CREW PERFORMED WELL TOGETHER; THE CAPT MADE GOOD WELL CONSIDERED DECISIONS AND THE MAINT SUPVRS WERE HELPFUL AND FOLLOWED DIRECTIONS WELL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS WAS A NIGHT FLT WITH RAIN FALLING AT THE ARPT. THE REPORTER INDICATED THAT THEY HAD MADE THE TURN TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY; AND THE REPORTING ACFT WAS STILL ON THE PARALLEL TXWY. AS A RESULT; THE REPORTING ACFT WAS LOOKING DOWN THE WING AND ACTUALLY REPORTED A FIRE FOR THE WRONG ENG. THE #4 ENG WAS ACTUALLY PRODUCING THE FLAME. A DEFECTIVE FUEL/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER WAS DISCOVERED. THIS RESULTED IN A MIXTURE OF FUEL AND OIL BEING DISTRIBUTED TO THE ENG BEARINGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.