Narrative:

1) departure instructions were fly runway heading and maintain 3000 ft. PIC took off and selected autoplt on. Captured. 2) next assigned altitude was to 5000 ft. PIC initiated climb (too steep at airspeed) and disengaged autoplt to prevent altitude overshoot. 3) ATC then assigned heading 220 degrees. PIC initiated turn to 220 degrees while still 'hand flying' and with the heading selected on the navigation system. PIC was in process of trimming the aircraft and never heard ATC instruct direct to 'X' intersection. Sic responded to ATC and selected the intersection and selected the navigation mode into navigation system without coordination with PIC. The command bars then began an indicated turn to left when PIC was actually in a right turn to the last heard assigned 220 degree heading. Confusion followed on the part of the PIC while still hand flying and trimming and trying to figure out why we were assigned the 220 degree heading but the command bars were indicating a turn in the opposite direction. PIC then began to focus on the 'problem' and forgot rule #1 -- fly the airplane first; then work on the problem. 4) with the PIC confused and concentrating on what he thought was a problem; the aircraft lost approximately 500 ft. Sic caught the deviation and the PIC returned to the 5000 ft assigned altitude and proceeded to the assigned intersection. 6) ATC then advised of deviation. Post incident analysis by the crew: a) both pilots tired due to flight schedule. B) lack of proper CRM. C) failure of PIC to properly monitor the aircraft in-flight. D) failure of the crew to adhere to departure briefing -- 'PIC to fly the aircraft and sic to sort out any problem and communicate with ATC' as necessary. Human performance considerations: 1) normal job pressure to accept flight in spite of inadequate crew rest. 2) failure of the crew to follow takeoff briefing. CRM! 3) failure of crew to communicate with each other. CRM! 4) failure of the PIC to simply fly the airplane and instruct the sic; 'handle' the situation observed by the PIC. Crew both 'typed' and experienced and have flown together for several yrs. Both current. Both fly the aircraft frequently. Supplemental information from acn 785216: we contacted departure leveling at 3000 ft. Soon we were told 'turn right 190 degrees (approximately); climb and maintain 5000 ft MSL.' captain/PF on autoplt; heading mode; initiated right turn and climb. Through 4400 ft MSL; I noticed a climb rate approximately 3500 FPM; mentally noting it would be an abrupt leveloff at 5000 ft. By 4600 ft MSL; I noticed the PF had made the same realization and began to react to it. About this time; ATC says 'turn right 220 degrees; direct intersection when able; contact center.' I read back this clearance as we both turned our own heading bugs right to 220 degrees. He began an immediate power reduction and placed both hands on the yoke; disconnecting the autoplt for a smoother leveloff transition. As we started to level off at 5000 ft; still hand flying the airplane in heading mode; I noticed the PF's attention was focused on something to the left. I punched in dto intersection on the FMS (still in heading mode) and realized intersection was by now a slight turn to the left. Normally the PF would handle the flight director mode; but I noticed he was preoccupied hand flying the airplane. So I said we are direct intersection and punched the navigation mode on the flight director. I switched frequency and called ATC. No response. Apparently; the PF had not heard the 'direct intersection when able;' nor my saying 'we are direct intersection.' last clearance he had heard was heading 220 degrees; still a slight right turn. The command bars now telling him to turn left. Now thinking his flight director was not giving the correct information; it got disconnected. I still had not made contact on the new frequency; so was switching back to the previous frequency for verification. As I start to call them back; I notice we are in a descent; and as I point this out to the PF; we get a TA. So I begin checking TCAS for traffic. I was not sure what the scale was on the TCAS screen; but the traffic was -500 and to the right. We were both now coordination and established at this point we were low; needed a left climbing turn to get back to 5000 ft and direct intersection. ATC said 'stay with me.' this all occurred in less than 15 seconds. Knowing the PF is discussing the issue with ATC/FSDO; I did not immediately complete a report. Realizing my responsibility as crew in this issue; I felt I needed to report my experience. We had too high of an airspeed and rate of climb for the situation. The PF became distraction. My effort to help him back on track apparently distraction him further. The ATC frequency I heard and read back was wrong. This caused me to become distraction as well. We will continue to work on better crew coordination and communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE40 FLT CREW REPORTS DIFFICULTIES COMPLYING WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS TO CLIMB AND TURN; RESULTING IN TCAS TA. INADEQUATE CREW REST IS IMPLICATED.

Narrative: 1) DEP INSTRUCTIONS WERE FLY RWY HDG AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT. PIC TOOK OFF AND SELECTED AUTOPLT ON. CAPTURED. 2) NEXT ASSIGNED ALT WAS TO 5000 FT. PIC INITIATED CLB (TOO STEEP AT AIRSPD) AND DISENGAGED AUTOPLT TO PREVENT ALT OVERSHOOT. 3) ATC THEN ASSIGNED HDG 220 DEGS. PIC INITIATED TURN TO 220 DEGS WHILE STILL 'HAND FLYING' AND WITH THE HDG SELECTED ON THE NAV SYS. PIC WAS IN PROCESS OF TRIMMING THE ACFT AND NEVER HEARD ATC INSTRUCT DIRECT TO 'X' INTXN. SIC RESPONDED TO ATC AND SELECTED THE INTXN AND SELECTED THE NAV MODE INTO NAV SYS WITHOUT COORD WITH PIC. THE COMMAND BARS THEN BEGAN AN INDICATED TURN TO L WHEN PIC WAS ACTUALLY IN A R TURN TO THE LAST HEARD ASSIGNED 220 DEG HDG. CONFUSION FOLLOWED ON THE PART OF THE PIC WHILE STILL HAND FLYING AND TRIMMING AND TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY WE WERE ASSIGNED THE 220 DEG HDG BUT THE COMMAND BARS WERE INDICATING A TURN IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. PIC THEN BEGAN TO FOCUS ON THE 'PROB' AND FORGOT RULE #1 -- FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST; THEN WORK ON THE PROB. 4) WITH THE PIC CONFUSED AND CONCENTRATING ON WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS A PROB; THE ACFT LOST APPROX 500 FT. SIC CAUGHT THE DEV AND THE PIC RETURNED TO THE 5000 FT ASSIGNED ALT AND PROCEEDED TO THE ASSIGNED INTXN. 6) ATC THEN ADVISED OF DEV. POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS BY THE CREW: A) BOTH PLTS TIRED DUE TO FLT SCHEDULE. B) LACK OF PROPER CRM. C) FAILURE OF PIC TO PROPERLY MONITOR THE ACFT INFLT. D) FAILURE OF THE CREW TO ADHERE TO DEP BRIEFING -- 'PIC TO FLY THE ACFT AND SIC TO SORT OUT ANY PROB AND COMMUNICATE WITH ATC' AS NECESSARY. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: 1) NORMAL JOB PRESSURE TO ACCEPT FLT IN SPITE OF INADEQUATE CREW REST. 2) FAILURE OF THE CREW TO FOLLOW TKOF BRIEFING. CRM! 3) FAILURE OF CREW TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER. CRM! 4) FAILURE OF THE PIC TO SIMPLY FLY THE AIRPLANE AND INSTRUCT THE SIC; 'HANDLE' THE SITUATION OBSERVED BY THE PIC. CREW BOTH 'TYPED' AND EXPERIENCED AND HAVE FLOWN TOGETHER FOR SEVERAL YRS. BOTH CURRENT. BOTH FLY THE ACFT FREQUENTLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 785216: WE CONTACTED DEP LEVELING AT 3000 FT. SOON WE WERE TOLD 'TURN R 190 DEGS (APPROX); CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000 FT MSL.' CAPT/PF ON AUTOPLT; HDG MODE; INITIATED R TURN AND CLB. THROUGH 4400 FT MSL; I NOTICED A CLB RATE APPROX 3500 FPM; MENTALLY NOTING IT WOULD BE AN ABRUPT LEVELOFF AT 5000 FT. BY 4600 FT MSL; I NOTICED THE PF HAD MADE THE SAME REALIZATION AND BEGAN TO REACT TO IT. ABOUT THIS TIME; ATC SAYS 'TURN R 220 DEGS; DIRECT INTXN WHEN ABLE; CONTACT CTR.' I READ BACK THIS CLRNC AS WE BOTH TURNED OUR OWN HDG BUGS R TO 220 DEGS. HE BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE PWR REDUCTION AND PLACED BOTH HANDS ON THE YOKE; DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT FOR A SMOOTHER LEVELOFF TRANSITION. AS WE STARTED TO LEVEL OFF AT 5000 FT; STILL HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE IN HDG MODE; I NOTICED THE PF'S ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON SOMETHING TO THE L. I PUNCHED IN DTO INTXN ON THE FMS (STILL IN HDG MODE) AND REALIZED INTXN WAS BY NOW A SLIGHT TURN TO THE L. NORMALLY THE PF WOULD HANDLE THE FLT DIRECTOR MODE; BUT I NOTICED HE WAS PREOCCUPIED HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE. SO I SAID WE ARE DIRECT INTXN AND PUNCHED THE NAV MODE ON THE FLT DIRECTOR. I SWITCHED FREQ AND CALLED ATC. NO RESPONSE. APPARENTLY; THE PF HAD NOT HEARD THE 'DIRECT INTXN WHEN ABLE;' NOR MY SAYING 'WE ARE DIRECT INTXN.' LAST CLRNC HE HAD HEARD WAS HDG 220 DEGS; STILL A SLIGHT R TURN. THE COMMAND BARS NOW TELLING HIM TO TURN L. NOW THINKING HIS FLT DIRECTOR WAS NOT GIVING THE CORRECT INFO; IT GOT DISCONNECTED. I STILL HAD NOT MADE CONTACT ON THE NEW FREQ; SO WAS SWITCHING BACK TO THE PREVIOUS FREQ FOR VERIFICATION. AS I START TO CALL THEM BACK; I NOTICE WE ARE IN A DSCNT; AND AS I POINT THIS OUT TO THE PF; WE GET A TA. SO I BEGIN CHKING TCAS FOR TFC. I WAS NOT SURE WHAT THE SCALE WAS ON THE TCAS SCREEN; BUT THE TFC WAS -500 AND TO THE R. WE WERE BOTH NOW COORD AND ESTABLISHED AT THIS POINT WE WERE LOW; NEEDED A L CLBING TURN TO GET BACK TO 5000 FT AND DIRECT INTXN. ATC SAID 'STAY WITH ME.' THIS ALL OCCURRED IN LESS THAN 15 SECONDS. KNOWING THE PF IS DISCUSSING THE ISSUE WITH ATC/FSDO; I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY COMPLETE A RPT. REALIZING MY RESPONSIBILITY AS CREW IN THIS ISSUE; I FELT I NEEDED TO RPT MY EXPERIENCE. WE HAD TOO HIGH OF AN AIRSPD AND RATE OF CLB FOR THE SITUATION. THE PF BECAME DISTR. MY EFFORT TO HELP HIM BACK ON TRACK APPARENTLY DISTR HIM FURTHER. THE ATC FREQ I HEARD AND READ BACK WAS WRONG. THIS CAUSED ME TO BECOME DISTR AS WELL. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK ON BETTER CREW COORD AND COM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.