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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 784559 |
Time | |
Date | 200804 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | msl single value : 40000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Person 1 | |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 784559 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe maintenance problem : improper maintenance |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
At top of descent; we received an ACARS message 'please perform autoland on next occasion.' during review of the logbook earlier; it was noted that an autoland had been performed on a recent flight and that the aircraft had recently returned from 'C' check out of the country. Dispatch release noted CAT I status but WX and conditions in ZZZ allowed for us to perform the autoland per guidance in the field and facilities notices of the flight paperwork. We performed a satisfactory autoland and documented the results in the logbook. During our turnaround I was notified by the avionics lead that certain maintenance checks had not yet been completed and that maintenance did not yet desire autoland performance checks. Further inquiry to dispatch/maintenance control revealed that no human was making these requests and that a computer on the airplane was the source of the request. The avionics lead said that he would enter the autoland data and that would solve the problem. On the next leg we received the exact same request just at the top of descent. Pilots could call dispatch via radio to confirm/verify that requests via ACARS were actually valid.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-700 REPORTS RECEIVING DATA-LINK MAINTENANCE TESTING REQUESTS GENERATED BY ACFT SOFTWARE ABOUT WHICH MAINTENANCE WAS UNAWARE. POST EVENT DOCUMENTATION WAS NECESSARY TO PAIR THE PERFORMANCE WITH A VALID REQUEST.
Narrative: AT TOP OF DSCNT; WE RECEIVED AN ACARS MESSAGE 'PLEASE PERFORM AUTOLAND ON NEXT OCCASION.' DURING REVIEW OF THE LOGBOOK EARLIER; IT WAS NOTED THAT AN AUTOLAND HAD BEEN PERFORMED ON A RECENT FLT AND THAT THE ACFT HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM 'C' CHK OUT OF THE COUNTRY. DISPATCH RELEASE NOTED CAT I STATUS BUT WX AND CONDITIONS IN ZZZ ALLOWED FOR US TO PERFORM THE AUTOLAND PER GUIDANCE IN THE FIELD AND FACILITIES NOTICES OF THE FLT PAPERWORK. WE PERFORMED A SATISFACTORY AUTOLAND AND DOCUMENTED THE RESULTS IN THE LOGBOOK. DURING OUR TURNAROUND I WAS NOTIFIED BY THE AVIONICS LEAD THAT CERTAIN MAINT CHKS HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED AND THAT MAINT DID NOT YET DESIRE AUTOLAND PERFORMANCE CHKS. FURTHER INQUIRY TO DISPATCH/MAINT CTL REVEALED THAT NO HUMAN WAS MAKING THESE REQUESTS AND THAT A COMPUTER ON THE AIRPLANE WAS THE SOURCE OF THE REQUEST. THE AVIONICS LEAD SAID THAT HE WOULD ENTER THE AUTOLAND DATA AND THAT WOULD SOLVE THE PROB. ON THE NEXT LEG WE RECEIVED THE EXACT SAME REQUEST JUST AT THE TOP OF DSCNT. PLTS COULD CALL DISPATCH VIA RADIO TO CONFIRM/VERIFY THAT REQUESTS VIA ACARS WERE ACTUALLY VALID.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.