Narrative:

I was the PF. Arrival and descent went smoothly as planned. Approach control had us on a vector for the ILS runway 22L. When approach asked us if we had the airport in sight; I looked up and saw a runway where I expected it to be with the appropriate approach lighting system and I gave the captain a thumbs-up. He told ATC that we had the airport in sight and they cleared us for a visual approach. The captain asked me if I wanted to go direct rouge intersection (7.5 mi out on the runway 22L localizer) and I indicated that I did. Once we were set up direct rouge; our automation modes were: thr idle (180 KTS selected) operation des (2300 ft selected); and navigation (direct rouge). I also armed approach mode and activated autoplt #1 (armed localizer and GS modes). Somewhere around this time; we had selected flaps 1 degree. A few seconds later; it appeared to me that we were approaching the centerline to final approach to the runway. Since I was aware that dtw was conducting simultaneous approachs to parallel runways and also that the airbus is capable of overshooting the course centerline; I pulled the heading knob and began turning the aircraft toward the runway to help prevent a possible overshoot. Shortly thereafter; the captain asked 'where are you going?' I looked down at my navigation display and realized that we were still several mi from our runway centerline; and what I had thought was our runway was in fact a runway at another airport (willow run) which ran almost parallel to our runway (law of expectation). Upon realizing this; I selected a heading that would take us back to intercept the localizer to our runway; this time right about the FAF (hulka). At the end of this maneuver; my automation modes were: speed (still 180 KTS); vs-700 (mode reversion 2300 ft still armed); and heading with localizer and GS still armed. Now on our way to intercept the true runway (a little shaken by the event); I saw that we were going to intercept the localizer just inside the hulka fix above the GS; so I asked for flaps 2 degrees and spun the altitude knob to a higher altitude than we were; thus preventing a leveloff before intercepting the GS. I believe it was right about this point that I performed the most inexplicable error: instead of selecting a higher vs (still at -700); I pulled the altitude knob. I believe at the time that I had forgotten that I had already selected a higher altitude. I was expecting the automation to go to thr idle; operation des. In fact; it went to thr climb; operation climb. At precisely this time; the aircraft flew through the localizer course and felt like it was leveling off; so instead of fighting with the FCU; I simply disconnected the autoplt and began manually navigating the aircraft to the runway. The captain asked me 'what are you doing now?' (completely understandable) to which I replied 'I'm just gonna fly it to the runway.' looking back; I guess I didn't understand what his concern was; but now I know that what we were doing was descending somewhat rapidly while the autothrust was still in thr climb mode. Almost immediately; we were getting the continuous repetitive chime; flashing master warning lights; and the airspeed was well into the barber pole. It was only through the captain's quick thinking in selecting a lower airspeed (130 KTS) that we didn't go further into the overspeed regime. Shortly thereafter; we managed to get the aircraft on profile and landed without further incident. The aircraft was written up and inspected. The next day; the mechanic who performed the inspection told me that he had found no damage resulting from the incident. I can easily say that this has been the most embarrassing moment in my short yet rewarding career at air carrier X. All I can say is that a long day of commuting; taking a badge test; running errands; and having many things on my mind conspired against me to make a string of rudimentary and easily avoidable mistakes; resulting in the exceedance of an aircraft limitation. I take 100% responsibility in this occurrence. In the days (and nights) following this event; I have thought of many things I could have done to have prevented this occurrence: 1) xchk my navigation display. If I had only done this; the aircraft was set up perfectly to navigation to rouge; intercept the localizer and GS. All I would have had to have done was configure the aircraft. Had I looked at my navigation display; I would have known that the runway at willow run wasn't ours and not started us down the path. 2) set a heading to intercept the localizer outside the marker. The FAF (hulka) is the last point along the localizer course where you know the altitude of the GS (2300 ft). If I had simply gone outside of hulka; I would have known that as long as I made it to 2300 ft before hulka; I would intercept both the localizer and GS there and would have had plenty of time to configure. 3) be absolutely positive what the results of each action will be before I do it. If I would've taken 1 second to consider what would happen when I pulled the altitude knob; I would have done something different; such as selecting a higher vertical speed; disconnecting the autoplt; or even going around when the approach started getting ugly. 4) pay attention to my FMA's. When I pulled heading to line up on willow run; I knew that vertical mode would revert to vertical speed at whatever our vertical speed was at the time (-700). If I had looked at my FMA's immediately after wrongly pulling the altitude selector; I would've seen the thr climb operation climb and known that was not what we wanted and reacted accordingly (fix FCU or disconnect autoplt and autothrottles). Unfortunately; at the time; I was fixated outside the cockpit and on the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF A319 MAKES NUMEROUS AUTOFLT MANAGEMENT AND MENTAL ERRORS ON APCH CULMINATING IN MANUALLY DESCENDING WHILE THE AUTOTHRUST SYSTEM WENT TO CLIMB THRUST AS PROGRAMMED. FLAP OVERSPEED RESULTS.

Narrative: I WAS THE PF. ARR AND DSCNT WENT SMOOTHLY AS PLANNED. APCH CTL HAD US ON A VECTOR FOR THE ILS RWY 22L. WHEN APCH ASKED US IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT; I LOOKED UP AND SAW A RWY WHERE I EXPECTED IT TO BE WITH THE APPROPRIATE APCH LIGHTING SYS AND I GAVE THE CAPT A THUMBS-UP. HE TOLD ATC THAT WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND THEY CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH. THE CAPT ASKED ME IF I WANTED TO GO DIRECT ROUGE INTXN (7.5 MI OUT ON THE RWY 22L LOC) AND I INDICATED THAT I DID. ONCE WE WERE SET UP DIRECT ROUGE; OUR AUTOMATION MODES WERE: THR IDLE (180 KTS SELECTED) OP DES (2300 FT SELECTED); AND NAV (DIRECT ROUGE). I ALSO ARMED APCH MODE AND ACTIVATED AUTOPLT #1 (ARMED LOC AND GS MODES). SOMEWHERE AROUND THIS TIME; WE HAD SELECTED FLAPS 1 DEG. A FEW SECONDS LATER; IT APPEARED TO ME THAT WE WERE APCHING THE CTRLINE TO FINAL APCH TO THE RWY. SINCE I WAS AWARE THAT DTW WAS CONDUCTING SIMULTANEOUS APCHS TO PARALLEL RWYS AND ALSO THAT THE AIRBUS IS CAPABLE OF OVERSHOOTING THE COURSE CTRLINE; I PULLED THE HDG KNOB AND BEGAN TURNING THE ACFT TOWARD THE RWY TO HELP PREVENT A POSSIBLE OVERSHOOT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; THE CAPT ASKED 'WHERE ARE YOU GOING?' I LOOKED DOWN AT MY NAV DISPLAY AND REALIZED THAT WE WERE STILL SEVERAL MI FROM OUR RWY CTRLINE; AND WHAT I HAD THOUGHT WAS OUR RWY WAS IN FACT A RWY AT ANOTHER ARPT (WILLOW RUN) WHICH RAN ALMOST PARALLEL TO OUR RWY (LAW OF EXPECTATION). UPON REALIZING THIS; I SELECTED A HDG THAT WOULD TAKE US BACK TO INTERCEPT THE LOC TO OUR RWY; THIS TIME RIGHT ABOUT THE FAF (HULKA). AT THE END OF THIS MANEUVER; MY AUTOMATION MODES WERE: SPD (STILL 180 KTS); VS-700 (MODE REVERSION 2300 FT STILL ARMED); AND HDG WITH LOC AND GS STILL ARMED. NOW ON OUR WAY TO INTERCEPT THE TRUE RWY (A LITTLE SHAKEN BY THE EVENT); I SAW THAT WE WERE GOING TO INTERCEPT THE LOC JUST INSIDE THE HULKA FIX ABOVE THE GS; SO I ASKED FOR FLAPS 2 DEGS AND SPUN THE ALT KNOB TO A HIGHER ALT THAN WE WERE; THUS PREVENTING A LEVELOFF BEFORE INTERCEPTING THE GS. I BELIEVE IT WAS RIGHT ABOUT THIS POINT THAT I PERFORMED THE MOST INEXPLICABLE ERROR: INSTEAD OF SELECTING A HIGHER VS (STILL AT -700); I PULLED THE ALT KNOB. I BELIEVE AT THE TIME THAT I HAD FORGOTTEN THAT I HAD ALREADY SELECTED A HIGHER ALT. I WAS EXPECTING THE AUTOMATION TO GO TO THR IDLE; OP DES. IN FACT; IT WENT TO THR CLB; OP CLB. AT PRECISELY THIS TIME; THE ACFT FLEW THROUGH THE LOC COURSE AND FELT LIKE IT WAS LEVELING OFF; SO INSTEAD OF FIGHTING WITH THE FCU; I SIMPLY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND BEGAN MANUALLY NAVING THE ACFT TO THE RWY. THE CAPT ASKED ME 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING NOW?' (COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE) TO WHICH I REPLIED 'I'M JUST GONNA FLY IT TO THE RWY.' LOOKING BACK; I GUESS I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT HIS CONCERN WAS; BUT NOW I KNOW THAT WHAT WE WERE DOING WAS DSNDING SOMEWHAT RAPIDLY WHILE THE AUTOTHRUST WAS STILL IN THR CLB MODE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY; WE WERE GETTING THE CONTINUOUS REPETITIVE CHIME; FLASHING MASTER WARNING LIGHTS; AND THE AIRSPD WAS WELL INTO THE BARBER POLE. IT WAS ONLY THROUGH THE CAPT'S QUICK THINKING IN SELECTING A LOWER AIRSPD (130 KTS) THAT WE DIDN'T GO FURTHER INTO THE OVERSPEED REGIME. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WE MANAGED TO GET THE ACFT ON PROFILE AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE ACFT WAS WRITTEN UP AND INSPECTED. THE NEXT DAY; THE MECH WHO PERFORMED THE INSPECTION TOLD ME THAT HE HAD FOUND NO DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE INCIDENT. I CAN EASILY SAY THAT THIS HAS BEEN THE MOST EMBARRASSING MOMENT IN MY SHORT YET REWARDING CAREER AT ACR X. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT A LONG DAY OF COMMUTING; TAKING A BADGE TEST; RUNNING ERRANDS; AND HAVING MANY THINGS ON MY MIND CONSPIRED AGAINST ME TO MAKE A STRING OF RUDIMENTARY AND EASILY AVOIDABLE MISTAKES; RESULTING IN THE EXCEEDANCE OF AN ACFT LIMITATION. I TAKE 100% RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS OCCURRENCE. IN THE DAYS (AND NIGHTS) FOLLOWING THIS EVENT; I HAVE THOUGHT OF MANY THINGS I COULD HAVE DONE TO HAVE PREVENTED THIS OCCURRENCE: 1) XCHK MY NAV DISPLAY. IF I HAD ONLY DONE THIS; THE ACFT WAS SET UP PERFECTLY TO NAV TO ROUGE; INTERCEPT THE LOC AND GS. ALL I WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE DONE WAS CONFIGURE THE ACFT. HAD I LOOKED AT MY NAV DISPLAY; I WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE RWY AT WILLOW RUN WASN'T OURS AND NOT STARTED US DOWN THE PATH. 2) SET A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC OUTSIDE THE MARKER. THE FAF (HULKA) IS THE LAST POINT ALONG THE LOC COURSE WHERE YOU KNOW THE ALT OF THE GS (2300 FT). IF I HAD SIMPLY GONE OUTSIDE OF HULKA; I WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT AS LONG AS I MADE IT TO 2300 FT BEFORE HULKA; I WOULD INTERCEPT BOTH THE LOC AND GS THERE AND WOULD HAVE HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO CONFIGURE. 3) BE ABSOLUTELY POSITIVE WHAT THE RESULTS OF EACH ACTION WILL BE BEFORE I DO IT. IF I WOULD'VE TAKEN 1 SECOND TO CONSIDER WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN I PULLED THE ALT KNOB; I WOULD HAVE DONE SOMETHING DIFFERENT; SUCH AS SELECTING A HIGHER VERT SPD; DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT; OR EVEN GOING AROUND WHEN THE APCH STARTED GETTING UGLY. 4) PAY ATTN TO MY FMA'S. WHEN I PULLED HDG TO LINE UP ON WILLOW RUN; I KNEW THAT VERT MODE WOULD REVERT TO VERT SPD AT WHATEVER OUR VERT SPD WAS AT THE TIME (-700). IF I HAD LOOKED AT MY FMA'S IMMEDIATELY AFTER WRONGLY PULLING THE ALT SELECTOR; I WOULD'VE SEEN THE THR CLB OP CLB AND KNOWN THAT WAS NOT WHAT WE WANTED AND REACTED ACCORDINGLY (FIX FCU OR DISCONNECT AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES). UNFORTUNATELY; AT THE TIME; I WAS FIXATED OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT AND ON THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.