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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 785176 |
Time | |
Date | 200805 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ord.airport |
State Reference | IL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 700 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 785176 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
ASRS Report | 785175 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe maintenance problem : improper maintenance |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : eicas other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft Company Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
A little backgnd on the problems we had with this aircraft: consistently; while climbing through FL316; the ED2 would display the following messages: spoiler/stabilizer fault; pitch feel fault; rudder limit fault; flaps 1/2 speed. Maintenance would clear on the ground; but most flts above FL316 the previously mentioned messages would reappear. But; shortly after takeoff; antiskid fault was displayed. The checklist called for no further action. Landing was normal with the exception the brakes seemed a little mushy (I tried to describe it to maintenance; but all indications were normal) and the #4 brake temperature read 7 after we had been parked and deplaned; while all of the others indicated green zeroes. I called maintenance that night and asked them to write it up with contract maintenance because I was unsure of the real problem and/or the correct phraseology. The next morning I ended up signing the discrepancy anyway. I voiced my concerns of an improper write-up I; myself; was a little confused. Upon approach to chicago; we were originally assigned runway 22R we requested runway 28 for the extra runway length in case of a deterioration in our braking ability. During that flight; the above EICAS messages reappeared; maintenance ran another self-test; and all but the antiskid fault were cleared. En route next leg; I referenced the fom where it describes the antiskid as a no-dispatch item. I called maintenance on the ground expressing my concerns again and referencing fom; and I was told it was considered an associated item to the MEL. Maintenance had been notified and been kept up-to-date regularly. I had a few conversations asking a lot of questions and having them explain the MEL and their logic involved. I told them I believed the current MEL was not the correct MEL for the problem the aircraft had. I was told the EICAS message was 'associated with the MEL...they had looked it up and confirmed it.' I passed the information onto the next captain accepting the aircraft and told him of my reservations. I also had 1 final un-reassuring conversation with maintenance that they were ok with the MEL and the aircraft airworthiness. I want it known to all who read this; that I fully expressed my concerns to operations maintenance. I was reassured it was legal and safe; even though the fom called it a 'no-dispatch' item (this was discovered when I was on the phone with maintenance for the last time). Previously; I had been told antiskid fault message was an associated message with the MEL. I disagreed but I do not have the information they have. This event occurred because of the inconsistencies printed on the MEL; QRH; and fom and some of the 'associated items' that may be seen on the aircraft EICAS display that the pilots have no reference to. Or a breakdown in communication to adequately describe the aircraft fault (contract maintenance came out to look at it) and/or maintenance to explain the MEL and its associated items. All of the manuals in the aircraft need to say the same thing and be up-to-date. Maintenance needs to have a checklist to run when something is in question to better isolate the problem and reconfirm the correct problem has been addressed. In other words; fixing the arm that is broken -- not just make sure the cast is properly fitted. Better communication between both crew and maintenance department. Sync the MEL with QRH and fom.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ700 FLT CREW HAS ISSUES WITH MEL ITEM THAT CAUSES ANTI SKID FAULT LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE. ANTI SKID FAULT IS A NO GO ITEM IN THIS ACFT.
Narrative: A LITTLE BACKGND ON THE PROBS WE HAD WITH THIS ACFT: CONSISTENTLY; WHILE CLBING THROUGH FL316; THE ED2 WOULD DISPLAY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES: SPOILER/STABILIZER FAULT; PITCH FEEL FAULT; RUDDER LIMIT FAULT; FLAPS 1/2 SPD. MAINT WOULD CLR ON THE GND; BUT MOST FLTS ABOVE FL316 THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED MESSAGES WOULD REAPPEAR. BUT; SHORTLY AFTER TKOF; ANTISKID FAULT WAS DISPLAYED. THE CHKLIST CALLED FOR NO FURTHER ACTION. LNDG WAS NORMAL WITH THE EXCEPTION THE BRAKES SEEMED A LITTLE MUSHY (I TRIED TO DESCRIBE IT TO MAINT; BUT ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL) AND THE #4 BRAKE TEMP READ 7 AFTER WE HAD BEEN PARKED AND DEPLANED; WHILE ALL OF THE OTHERS INDICATED GREEN ZEROES. I CALLED MAINT THAT NIGHT AND ASKED THEM TO WRITE IT UP WITH CONTRACT MAINT BECAUSE I WAS UNSURE OF THE REAL PROB AND/OR THE CORRECT PHRASEOLOGY. THE NEXT MORNING I ENDED UP SIGNING THE DISCREPANCY ANYWAY. I VOICED MY CONCERNS OF AN IMPROPER WRITE-UP I; MYSELF; WAS A LITTLE CONFUSED. UPON APCH TO CHICAGO; WE WERE ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED RWY 22R WE REQUESTED RWY 28 FOR THE EXTRA RWY LENGTH IN CASE OF A DETERIORATION IN OUR BRAKING ABILITY. DURING THAT FLT; THE ABOVE EICAS MESSAGES REAPPEARED; MAINT RAN ANOTHER SELF-TEST; AND ALL BUT THE ANTISKID FAULT WERE CLRED. ENRTE NEXT LEG; I REFED THE FOM WHERE IT DESCRIBES THE ANTISKID AS A NO-DISPATCH ITEM. I CALLED MAINT ON THE GND EXPRESSING MY CONCERNS AGAIN AND REFING FOM; AND I WAS TOLD IT WAS CONSIDERED AN ASSOCIATED ITEM TO THE MEL. MAINT HAD BEEN NOTIFIED AND BEEN KEPT UP-TO-DATE REGULARLY. I HAD A FEW CONVERSATIONS ASKING A LOT OF QUESTIONS AND HAVING THEM EXPLAIN THE MEL AND THEIR LOGIC INVOLVED. I TOLD THEM I BELIEVED THE CURRENT MEL WAS NOT THE CORRECT MEL FOR THE PROB THE ACFT HAD. I WAS TOLD THE EICAS MESSAGE WAS 'ASSOCIATED WITH THE MEL...THEY HAD LOOKED IT UP AND CONFIRMED IT.' I PASSED THE INFO ONTO THE NEXT CAPT ACCEPTING THE ACFT AND TOLD HIM OF MY RESERVATIONS. I ALSO HAD 1 FINAL UN-REASSURING CONVERSATION WITH MAINT THAT THEY WERE OK WITH THE MEL AND THE ACFT AIRWORTHINESS. I WANT IT KNOWN TO ALL WHO READ THIS; THAT I FULLY EXPRESSED MY CONCERNS TO OPS MAINT. I WAS REASSURED IT WAS LEGAL AND SAFE; EVEN THOUGH THE FOM CALLED IT A 'NO-DISPATCH' ITEM (THIS WAS DISCOVERED WHEN I WAS ON THE PHONE WITH MAINT FOR THE LAST TIME). PREVIOUSLY; I HAD BEEN TOLD ANTISKID FAULT MESSAGE WAS AN ASSOCIATED MESSAGE WITH THE MEL. I DISAGREED BUT I DO NOT HAVE THE INFO THEY HAVE. THIS EVENT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF THE INCONSISTENCIES PRINTED ON THE MEL; QRH; AND FOM AND SOME OF THE 'ASSOCIATED ITEMS' THAT MAY BE SEEN ON THE ACFT EICAS DISPLAY THAT THE PLTS HAVE NO REF TO. OR A BREAKDOWN IN COM TO ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE THE ACFT FAULT (CONTRACT MAINT CAME OUT TO LOOK AT IT) AND/OR MAINT TO EXPLAIN THE MEL AND ITS ASSOCIATED ITEMS. ALL OF THE MANUALS IN THE ACFT NEED TO SAY THE SAME THING AND BE UP-TO-DATE. MAINT NEEDS TO HAVE A CHKLIST TO RUN WHEN SOMETHING IS IN QUESTION TO BETTER ISOLATE THE PROB AND RECONFIRM THE CORRECT PROB HAS BEEN ADDRESSED. IN OTHER WORDS; FIXING THE ARM THAT IS BROKEN -- NOT JUST MAKE SURE THE CAST IS PROPERLY FITTED. BETTER COM BTWN BOTH CREW AND MAINT DEPT. SYNC THE MEL WITH QRH AND FOM.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.