Narrative:

Maintenance in peking tries to coerce us into taking the plane as is. They appear to have made up the numbers on the fuel service form to have each paired tank exactly equal; and center and tail tanks completely incongruent with actual gauges. They insisted all was ok; with complete disrespect for the safety on the matter of weight and balance with center tank and tail fuel far different on gauges versus service form. Load looked wrong per past experience to not have some tail fuel and my boeing fuel loading manual which looked like tail fuel was in order. Peking mechanics said all was ok; ready to go and asked if we would take the plane with the fuel form and fueling as is. Eventually; after hours of nonsense; fuel is xferred to the tail tanks. We return to the cockpit and gauge readings are as follows: gauge #1=29600 pounds; gauge #4=29600 pounds; gauge #2=83000 pounds; gauge #3=82500 pounds. Reservoir #2=8600 pounds; reservoir #3=8600 pounds; center=93000 pounds; tail=17500 pounds; total=352700 pounds. We tell load planning the actual fuel load in each tank. They tell us that they cannot do a weight and balance based upon our information; they must get 1 total fuel number from the peking ramp. Again; they say that they assume the fuel is in the proper tanks; which peking seems to have no idea how to complete. Involve duty flight manager and some fueling person. Eventually tell new dispatcher to audit the fuel load we show in tanks versus data peking gave to load planning to ensure that weight and balance was computed with proper weight in each tank; not lies on some fuel service form. Over 3-HR delay fooling around with this issue. Pilots have zero capability to audit these back room number shuffling operations; unlike all far 91 or 125 aircraft operations that have a flight manual including weight and balance available on the flight deck. If this plane were in private service; the crew would be required to have this data available. Seems like quite an unsafe operation given the consistently and rapidly decreasing level of skill that surrounds operations like fueling; loading; etc. In peking there is also huge inability of personnel to converse in english; a consistent attitude to try and shove things through even if wrong in the name of leaving on time and awful smell from cigarettes attaches to each mechanic. This is but one of several events involving these people. What could possibly be the motive and scheme that denies pilots the weight and balance and loading data to audit what seems to be felonious looking paperwork and fueling operations? It seems very suspicious. Zero trust for peking operations is again confirmed; and no trust for load planning operations if what we are told is true regarding how they gather data. Supplemental information from acn 786107: breach of weight and balance issues. These are the basics -- the captain has full details which he will be providing. Our aircraft was fuel-loaded incorrectly and we were to be dispatched as such. There was an excess amount of fuel in the center tank and no fuel in the stabilizer tank. After bringing this up; they tried to redistribute the fuel but only after dispatch's; load planning's; and captain's insistence through various sat calls. They started; stopped; and put all back into center again. More sat calls. They never came back to cockpit. After 1 hour; I went downstairs. Insisted on talking to station manager to no avail. Finally; I got a customer service supervisor who told me they were actually working on it. I disagreed. Told her no one was up in the cockpit for the fuel xfer. She looked at me funny and talked to someone on the radio. Apparently; they had started to put more fuel into the stabilizer tank instead of a xfer. They stopped that but had about 2000+ pounds in there already. Finally; they came up with a new fuel sheet after the xfer. However; fuel sheet showed 2500 pounds less in the center tank than we actually had. Load planning was unable to accept the fuel numbers in each tank as we provided to them various times over satcom. More delay. They instructed maintenance to read the gauges and do a proper fuel sheet. More delay. New fuel sheet arrived with still improper numbers. Unknown if THE2000+ pounds in stabilizer tank had even been taken into consideration. Maintenance said they would have to add more fuel to come up with the right numbers! We told them to do whatever they had to do but the fuel sheet must be correct and within load planning's tolerance. By this time; duty manager was on board satcom call. There had been a change of dispatchers within this delay; a fuel planner and fuel planner supervisor were also on board the call to no avail yet. Biggest problem: load planning not being able to accept our fuel load numbers per our gauges as stipulated in the fom. Bigger problem: load planning only seems to care about the final total fuel weight on board without regard to fuel loading! They have no way to verify how an aircraft fuel load has been done. Big problem: what if we had not caught the fact that the airplane was misloaded? What if another crew never catches it either? We were getting pretty weary of having to explain this multiple times on satcom given the time zone hours involved. Flight attendants went illegal but agreed per their contract to continue with additional pay. Mechanics (multiple) were on board at the same time. This delay was unnecessary and steps must be taken to assure compliance in the future with fuel-loading procedures prior to dispatching an aircraft for the sake of safety! There were some more details; perhaps. But I am looking at a time limit and it's almost up. It is difficult to reconstruct all that happened within this time and the time limit should be eliminated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 FLT CREW REPORTS IMPROPER FUEL LOAD BY FUELERS IN ZBAA AND INABILITY OF COMPANY LOAD PLANERS TO ACCEPT FUEL READINGS FROM FLT CREW.

Narrative: MAINT IN PEKING TRIES TO COERCE US INTO TAKING THE PLANE AS IS. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE MADE UP THE NUMBERS ON THE FUEL SVC FORM TO HAVE EACH PAIRED TANK EXACTLY EQUAL; AND CTR AND TAIL TANKS COMPLETELY INCONGRUENT WITH ACTUAL GAUGES. THEY INSISTED ALL WAS OK; WITH COMPLETE DISRESPECT FOR THE SAFETY ON THE MATTER OF WT AND BAL WITH CTR TANK AND TAIL FUEL FAR DIFFERENT ON GAUGES VERSUS SVC FORM. LOAD LOOKED WRONG PER PAST EXPERIENCE TO NOT HAVE SOME TAIL FUEL AND MY BOEING FUEL LOADING MANUAL WHICH LOOKED LIKE TAIL FUEL WAS IN ORDER. PEKING MECHS SAID ALL WAS OK; READY TO GO AND ASKED IF WE WOULD TAKE THE PLANE WITH THE FUEL FORM AND FUELING AS IS. EVENTUALLY; AFTER HRS OF NONSENSE; FUEL IS XFERRED TO THE TAIL TANKS. WE RETURN TO THE COCKPIT AND GAUGE READINGS ARE AS FOLLOWS: GAUGE #1=29600 LBS; GAUGE #4=29600 LBS; GAUGE #2=83000 LBS; GAUGE #3=82500 LBS. RESERVOIR #2=8600 LBS; RESERVOIR #3=8600 LBS; CTR=93000 LBS; TAIL=17500 LBS; TOTAL=352700 LBS. WE TELL LOAD PLANNING THE ACTUAL FUEL LOAD IN EACH TANK. THEY TELL US THAT THEY CANNOT DO A WT AND BAL BASED UPON OUR INFO; THEY MUST GET 1 TOTAL FUEL NUMBER FROM THE PEKING RAMP. AGAIN; THEY SAY THAT THEY ASSUME THE FUEL IS IN THE PROPER TANKS; WHICH PEKING SEEMS TO HAVE NO IDEA HOW TO COMPLETE. INVOLVE DUTY FLT MGR AND SOME FUELING PERSON. EVENTUALLY TELL NEW DISPATCHER TO AUDIT THE FUEL LOAD WE SHOW IN TANKS VERSUS DATA PEKING GAVE TO LOAD PLANNING TO ENSURE THAT WT AND BAL WAS COMPUTED WITH PROPER WT IN EACH TANK; NOT LIES ON SOME FUEL SVC FORM. OVER 3-HR DELAY FOOLING AROUND WITH THIS ISSUE. PLTS HAVE ZERO CAPABILITY TO AUDIT THESE BACK ROOM NUMBER SHUFFLING OPS; UNLIKE ALL FAR 91 OR 125 ACFT OPS THAT HAVE A FLT MANUAL INCLUDING WT AND BAL AVAILABLE ON THE FLT DECK. IF THIS PLANE WERE IN PVT SVC; THE CREW WOULD BE REQUIRED TO HAVE THIS DATA AVAILABLE. SEEMS LIKE QUITE AN UNSAFE OP GIVEN THE CONSISTENTLY AND RAPIDLY DECREASING LEVEL OF SKILL THAT SURROUNDS OPS LIKE FUELING; LOADING; ETC. IN PEKING THERE IS ALSO HUGE INABILITY OF PERSONNEL TO CONVERSE IN ENGLISH; A CONSISTENT ATTITUDE TO TRY AND SHOVE THINGS THROUGH EVEN IF WRONG IN THE NAME OF LEAVING ON TIME AND AWFUL SMELL FROM CIGARETTES ATTACHES TO EACH MECH. THIS IS BUT ONE OF SEVERAL EVENTS INVOLVING THESE PEOPLE. WHAT COULD POSSIBLY BE THE MOTIVE AND SCHEME THAT DENIES PLTS THE WT AND BAL AND LOADING DATA TO AUDIT WHAT SEEMS TO BE FELONIOUS LOOKING PAPERWORK AND FUELING OPS? IT SEEMS VERY SUSPICIOUS. ZERO TRUST FOR PEKING OPS IS AGAIN CONFIRMED; AND NO TRUST FOR LOAD PLANNING OPS IF WHAT WE ARE TOLD IS TRUE REGARDING HOW THEY GATHER DATA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 786107: BREACH OF WT AND BAL ISSUES. THESE ARE THE BASICS -- THE CAPT HAS FULL DETAILS WHICH HE WILL BE PROVIDING. OUR ACFT WAS FUEL-LOADED INCORRECTLY AND WE WERE TO BE DISPATCHED AS SUCH. THERE WAS AN EXCESS AMOUNT OF FUEL IN THE CTR TANK AND NO FUEL IN THE STABILIZER TANK. AFTER BRINGING THIS UP; THEY TRIED TO REDISTRIBUTE THE FUEL BUT ONLY AFTER DISPATCH'S; LOAD PLANNING'S; AND CAPT'S INSISTENCE THROUGH VARIOUS SAT CALLS. THEY STARTED; STOPPED; AND PUT ALL BACK INTO CTR AGAIN. MORE SAT CALLS. THEY NEVER CAME BACK TO COCKPIT. AFTER 1 HR; I WENT DOWNSTAIRS. INSISTED ON TALKING TO STATION MGR TO NO AVAIL. FINALLY; I GOT A CUSTOMER SVC SUPVR WHO TOLD ME THEY WERE ACTUALLY WORKING ON IT. I DISAGREED. TOLD HER NO ONE WAS UP IN THE COCKPIT FOR THE FUEL XFER. SHE LOOKED AT ME FUNNY AND TALKED TO SOMEONE ON THE RADIO. APPARENTLY; THEY HAD STARTED TO PUT MORE FUEL INTO THE STABILIZER TANK INSTEAD OF A XFER. THEY STOPPED THAT BUT HAD ABOUT 2000+ LBS IN THERE ALREADY. FINALLY; THEY CAME UP WITH A NEW FUEL SHEET AFTER THE XFER. HOWEVER; FUEL SHEET SHOWED 2500 LBS LESS IN THE CTR TANK THAN WE ACTUALLY HAD. LOAD PLANNING WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE FUEL NUMBERS IN EACH TANK AS WE PROVIDED TO THEM VARIOUS TIMES OVER SATCOM. MORE DELAY. THEY INSTRUCTED MAINT TO READ THE GAUGES AND DO A PROPER FUEL SHEET. MORE DELAY. NEW FUEL SHEET ARRIVED WITH STILL IMPROPER NUMBERS. UNKNOWN IF THE2000+ LBS IN STABILIZER TANK HAD EVEN BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. MAINT SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO ADD MORE FUEL TO COME UP WITH THE RIGHT NUMBERS! WE TOLD THEM TO DO WHATEVER THEY HAD TO DO BUT THE FUEL SHEET MUST BE CORRECT AND WITHIN LOAD PLANNING'S TOLERANCE. BY THIS TIME; DUTY MGR WAS ON BOARD SATCOM CALL. THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE OF DISPATCHERS WITHIN THIS DELAY; A FUEL PLANNER AND FUEL PLANNER SUPVR WERE ALSO ON BOARD THE CALL TO NO AVAIL YET. BIGGEST PROB: LOAD PLANNING NOT BEING ABLE TO ACCEPT OUR FUEL LOAD NUMBERS PER OUR GAUGES AS STIPULATED IN THE FOM. BIGGER PROB: LOAD PLANNING ONLY SEEMS TO CARE ABOUT THE FINAL TOTAL FUEL WT ON BOARD WITHOUT REGARD TO FUEL LOADING! THEY HAVE NO WAY TO VERIFY HOW AN ACFT FUEL LOAD HAS BEEN DONE. BIG PROB: WHAT IF WE HAD NOT CAUGHT THE FACT THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS MISLOADED? WHAT IF ANOTHER CREW NEVER CATCHES IT EITHER? WE WERE GETTING PRETTY WEARY OF HAVING TO EXPLAIN THIS MULTIPLE TIMES ON SATCOM GIVEN THE TIME ZONE HRS INVOLVED. FLT ATTENDANTS WENT ILLEGAL BUT AGREED PER THEIR CONTRACT TO CONTINUE WITH ADDITIONAL PAY. MECHS (MULTIPLE) WERE ON BOARD AT THE SAME TIME. THIS DELAY WAS UNNECESSARY AND STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE IN THE FUTURE WITH FUEL-LOADING PROCS PRIOR TO DISPATCHING AN ACFT FOR THE SAKE OF SAFETY! THERE WERE SOME MORE DETAILS; PERHAPS. BUT I AM LOOKING AT A TIME LIMIT AND IT'S ALMOST UP. IT IS DIFFICULT TO RECONSTRUCT ALL THAT HAPPENED WITHIN THIS TIME AND THE TIME LIMIT SHOULD BE ELIMINATED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.