Narrative:

I was working ZAB sector 42/49 combined. The ARTCC's monitor alert displayed upcoming significant traffic; so we looked forward to the training opportunity. Sector 42/49 primary duties are to blend a north and a south arrival stream into one (the GEELA2; and the ARLIN3 arrs). There is only about 45-50 mi to accomplish this action. Arrs are received from ZLA at FL250 from over the scole intersection on the north side; and over the mohak intersection on the south side. Sector 42/49 blends the streams and has turbojets cross geela at 11000 ft MSL at 250 KTS. Winds were extremely strong out of the north at approximately 100 KTS at FL250; and decreased significantly reaching 11000 ft MSL to around 40 KTS. This made compression a factor. In addition; the center-TRACON automation system was in use. ZLA was having a difficult time with overtakes and was issuing 250 KTS to all aircraft. Aircraft were; therefore; reaching the ctas freeze horizon with at least 2-3 mins to gain an assigned 250 (which would result in a further loss of ctas time; as speed for ctas is based on approximately 290-300 KTS). I initially let the trainee work the radar; as I thought we would have relief to commence training on the d-side position. Traffic started to pick up significantly; so I assumed the r-side position myself. There were several instances where I needed to speed up and descend arrs on initial contact to prevent ZLA from having an operational error; and to meet ctas times. During the midst of sequencing both south and north arrs; 2 overflts traversed the sector through the middle of the arrs. This eventually would mean vectors for arrival traffic's descent. 1 overflt was nwbound out of the gbn VOR at FL240. The other overflt was sebound from the vicko intersection toward gbn VOR at FL210. Just prior to the incident; phx approach handed off a string of BXK2 departures. I called for a certified d-side; but my calls were unheeded. Shortly after; phx approach called for a manual handoff. I yelled over to the D-65 controller to come and help me out; as the supervisor made no attempt to put a certified d-side at the sector. My attention had to be focused on both an arrival and departure push at the same time. By this time the sector was over its map (monitor alert numbers). This could have been precluded had a supervisor split off sector 49 from sector 42 (sector 49's airspace would have controled all of the BXK2 departures; and sector 42 could have focused on the arrs). Phx approach was having a hard time with overtakes on the departure; and had called at least once to tell me to 'watch the overtake.' with my attention divided; I had to vector the north arrs south for the descent because of the overflts. I had to be cautious with my vectors; because I had to bend the arrs around restr areas; R2306; and R2308. Aircraft X was at the tail end of the arrival push but was ahead of aircraft Y (these would be the 2 aircraft involved in the loss of separation). During this time I received a radar tracker. I; however; was consumed in the sector and was unaware that he had plugged in. I turned aircraft X to a 140 degree heading when he cleared the restr areas. I turned aircraft Y to a 110 degree heading to start a southerly heading and follow aircraft X; but one which would not conflict with R2306/R2308. Numerous xmissions were made after my turn of aircraft Y; primarily with the departures. Aircraft X was descended to FL200 and aircraft Y to FL190. I saw that both air carrier flts were clear of the overflts and turned aircraft X to the geela intersection and descended him to FL190 and shortly after gave the crossing restr at geela. I was assuming; incorrectly; that I had turned aircraft Y to a 140 degree heading. With the winds affecting the speeds and the incorrect heading and angle; aircraft X made a harder angled turn and slowed tremendously. I realized; at the same time that the tracker realized; I had not turned aircraft Y to a 140 degree heading which I immediately did. I told aircraft X to expedite to 17000 ft MSL. Aircraft X descended at an extremely slow rate. I then told aircraft X to fly heading of 075 degrees; hoping to widen out the angle and achieve 5 mi. Loss of separation occurred at approximately XX35Z. Aircraft Y caught the back side of the protected airspace of aircraft X. Closest proximity was 3.8 mi and 600 ft (class C mishap). I feel as though this event could have been prevented in several ways. #1) my realization that I did not turn aircraft Y to a 140 degree heading. #2) more involvement from the tmu to provide mi in trail on the arrs due to high compression and mi in trail on the departure side knowing how busy the sector was. #3) the front line supervisor could have been more proactive in providing a radar assistant prior to the rush; and splitting off sector 49 from sector 42. #4) a better job of sequencing and speed assignment by both ZOA and phx approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAB CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL190 WHEN FAILING TO ISSUE TURN; CITING TMU/SUPVR FAILURES AND ADJACENT FACILITIES AS CONTRIBUTORY.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING ZAB SECTOR 42/49 COMBINED. THE ARTCC'S MONITOR ALERT DISPLAYED UPCOMING SIGNIFICANT TFC; SO WE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE TRAINING OPPORTUNITY. SECTOR 42/49 PRIMARY DUTIES ARE TO BLEND A N AND A S ARR STREAM INTO ONE (THE GEELA2; AND THE ARLIN3 ARRS). THERE IS ONLY ABOUT 45-50 MI TO ACCOMPLISH THIS ACTION. ARRS ARE RECEIVED FROM ZLA AT FL250 FROM OVER THE SCOLE INTXN ON THE N SIDE; AND OVER THE MOHAK INTXN ON THE S SIDE. SECTOR 42/49 BLENDS THE STREAMS AND HAS TURBOJETS CROSS GEELA AT 11000 FT MSL AT 250 KTS. WINDS WERE EXTREMELY STRONG OUT OF THE N AT APPROX 100 KTS AT FL250; AND DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY REACHING 11000 FT MSL TO AROUND 40 KTS. THIS MADE COMPRESSION A FACTOR. IN ADDITION; THE CTR-TRACON AUTOMATION SYS WAS IN USE. ZLA WAS HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME WITH OVERTAKES AND WAS ISSUING 250 KTS TO ALL ACFT. ACFT WERE; THEREFORE; REACHING THE CTAS FREEZE HORIZON WITH AT LEAST 2-3 MINS TO GAIN AN ASSIGNED 250 (WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A FURTHER LOSS OF CTAS TIME; AS SPD FOR CTAS IS BASED ON APPROX 290-300 KTS). I INITIALLY LET THE TRAINEE WORK THE RADAR; AS I THOUGHT WE WOULD HAVE RELIEF TO COMMENCE TRAINING ON THE D-SIDE POS. TFC STARTED TO PICK UP SIGNIFICANTLY; SO I ASSUMED THE R-SIDE POS MYSELF. THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES WHERE I NEEDED TO SPD UP AND DSND ARRS ON INITIAL CONTACT TO PREVENT ZLA FROM HAVING AN OPERROR; AND TO MEET CTAS TIMES. DURING THE MIDST OF SEQUENCING BOTH S AND N ARRS; 2 OVERFLTS TRAVERSED THE SECTOR THROUGH THE MIDDLE OF THE ARRS. THIS EVENTUALLY WOULD MEAN VECTORS FOR ARR TFC'S DSCNT. 1 OVERFLT WAS NWBOUND OUT OF THE GBN VOR AT FL240. THE OTHER OVERFLT WAS SEBOUND FROM THE VICKO INTXN TOWARD GBN VOR AT FL210. JUST PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT; PHX APCH HANDED OFF A STRING OF BXK2 DEPS. I CALLED FOR A CERTIFIED D-SIDE; BUT MY CALLS WERE UNHEEDED. SHORTLY AFTER; PHX APCH CALLED FOR A MANUAL HDOF. I YELLED OVER TO THE D-65 CTLR TO COME AND HELP ME OUT; AS THE SUPVR MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PUT A CERTIFIED D-SIDE AT THE SECTOR. MY ATTN HAD TO BE FOCUSED ON BOTH AN ARR AND DEP PUSH AT THE SAME TIME. BY THIS TIME THE SECTOR WAS OVER ITS MAP (MONITOR ALERT NUMBERS). THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED HAD A SUPVR SPLIT OFF SECTOR 49 FROM SECTOR 42 (SECTOR 49'S AIRSPACE WOULD HAVE CTLED ALL OF THE BXK2 DEPS; AND SECTOR 42 COULD HAVE FOCUSED ON THE ARRS). PHX APCH WAS HAVING A HARD TIME WITH OVERTAKES ON THE DEP; AND HAD CALLED AT LEAST ONCE TO TELL ME TO 'WATCH THE OVERTAKE.' WITH MY ATTN DIVIDED; I HAD TO VECTOR THE N ARRS S FOR THE DSCNT BECAUSE OF THE OVERFLTS. I HAD TO BE CAUTIOUS WITH MY VECTORS; BECAUSE I HAD TO BEND THE ARRS AROUND RESTR AREAS; R2306; AND R2308. ACFT X WAS AT THE TAIL END OF THE ARR PUSH BUT WAS AHEAD OF ACFT Y (THESE WOULD BE THE 2 ACFT INVOLVED IN THE LOSS OF SEPARATION). DURING THIS TIME I RECEIVED A RADAR TRACKER. I; HOWEVER; WAS CONSUMED IN THE SECTOR AND WAS UNAWARE THAT HE HAD PLUGGED IN. I TURNED ACFT X TO A 140 DEG HDG WHEN HE CLRED THE RESTR AREAS. I TURNED ACFT Y TO A 110 DEG HDG TO START A SOUTHERLY HDG AND FOLLOW ACFT X; BUT ONE WHICH WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH R2306/R2308. NUMEROUS XMISSIONS WERE MADE AFTER MY TURN OF ACFT Y; PRIMARILY WITH THE DEPS. ACFT X WAS DSNDED TO FL200 AND ACFT Y TO FL190. I SAW THAT BOTH ACR FLTS WERE CLR OF THE OVERFLTS AND TURNED ACFT X TO THE GEELA INTXN AND DSNDED HIM TO FL190 AND SHORTLY AFTER GAVE THE XING RESTR AT GEELA. I WAS ASSUMING; INCORRECTLY; THAT I HAD TURNED ACFT Y TO A 140 DEG HDG. WITH THE WINDS AFFECTING THE SPDS AND THE INCORRECT HDG AND ANGLE; ACFT X MADE A HARDER ANGLED TURN AND SLOWED TREMENDOUSLY. I REALIZED; AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE TRACKER REALIZED; I HAD NOT TURNED ACFT Y TO A 140 DEG HDG WHICH I IMMEDIATELY DID. I TOLD ACFT X TO EXPEDITE TO 17000 FT MSL. ACFT X DSNDED AT AN EXTREMELY SLOW RATE. I THEN TOLD ACFT X TO FLY HDG OF 075 DEGS; HOPING TO WIDEN OUT THE ANGLE AND ACHIEVE 5 MI. LOSS OF SEPARATION OCCURRED AT APPROX XX35Z. ACFT Y CAUGHT THE BACK SIDE OF THE PROTECTED AIRSPACE OF ACFT X. CLOSEST PROX WAS 3.8 MI AND 600 FT (CLASS C MISHAP). I FEEL AS THOUGH THIS EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IN SEVERAL WAYS. #1) MY REALIZATION THAT I DID NOT TURN ACFT Y TO A 140 DEG HDG. #2) MORE INVOLVEMENT FROM THE TMU TO PROVIDE MI IN TRAIL ON THE ARRS DUE TO HIGH COMPRESSION AND MI IN TRAIL ON THE DEP SIDE KNOWING HOW BUSY THE SECTOR WAS. #3) THE FRONT LINE SUPVR COULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROACTIVE IN PROVIDING A RADAR ASSISTANT PRIOR TO THE RUSH; AND SPLITTING OFF SECTOR 49 FROM SECTOR 42. #4) A BETTER JOB OF SEQUENCING AND SPD ASSIGNMENT BY BOTH ZOA AND PHX APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.