Narrative:

I was working arrival east with a line of thunderstorms extending from the northeast of mem to the southwest approaching mem eastbound. The line of thunderstorms made the approach courses for runway 18L/C/right unusable with a southwest wind. The supervisor directed the TRACON to take all arrival aircraft to runway 27. No coordination was implemented to get arrs not regularly assigned runway 27 to that runway. First; I vectored aircraft Z; and aircraft west (a CRJ2) descending to 5000 ft from the southeast to runway 27. Then I vectored aircraft Y; a CRJ2; descending to 4000 ft from the northeast to follow aircraft west. I took handoffs on aircraft X (a CRJ2) at 3000 ft; and aircraft V (a DC9) descending to 4000 ft; both aircraft inbound from the southwest (aircraft I would not normally work at east arrival). I climbed aircraft X to 4000 ft to make sure the aircraft stayed in the class B airspace (mem has had a serious issue with aircraft leaving the class B airspace recently). I then directed aircraft V to expedite their descent to 4000 ft so they could slow to 210 KTS. At some point; I took a handoff on aircraft U (a DC9) at 6000 ft from due west moving eastbound. I had been told that aircraft U did not want to make an approach. When aircraft U checked in; he asked me what the plan was. I told aircraft U that I would vector him around at 6000 ft until he was ready to proceed inbound to land. Aircraft U asked if other aircraft were landing without incident with the WX moving in. I told him I would solicit a PIREP from the tower. I called the tower for a PIREP; and they said they had a BE20 landing and rolling out; and they would give me a call back with any information they could get. These 2 calls took more time than I would have liked and delayed several actions that I took. First; I turned aircraft Y sbound from the northeast about 7 mi later than I wanted. This meant that aircraft Y's base was about 5 mi closer to the airport than I wanted. Second; I believe that aircraft Y was level at 4000 ft as soon as he reached 4000 ft. These 2 items meant that the runway 27 final controller would have to wait a little longer to turn aircraft Y onto the runway 27 localizer behind aircraft west. Finally; I was late to slow aircraft X; which put that aircraft into closer proximity with aircraft Y. Prior to handing off aircraft Y to runway 27 final controller; I turned the aircraft to a 170 degree heading to give that controller a little extra room. I vectored aircraft X and aircraft V as close to the edge of the class B shelf at 4000 ft as I could to try and buy more time for the next controller. Finally; when aircraft X was due south of aircraft Y; I turned aircraft X due north for the base for runway 27. I was expecting at any moment for aircraft Y to show a turn to join the runway 27 localizer. I placed aircraft X in a handoff status and asked the runway 27 final controller if he had turned aircraft Y. He was transmitting to an aircraft and taking my handoff. I looked again to see if aircraft Y was turning and asked the controller again about aircraft Y. I did not hear the answer; as I saw aircraft Y continue towards aircraft X. I turned aircraft X to a 090 degree heading and asked again. Aircraft Y still continued towards aircraft X; so I turned aircraft X to an immediate 120 degree heading and issued traffic. Aircraft X advised the traffic in sight; and I established visual separation. Aircraft X and aircraft Y got as close as 2.24 mi and 500 ft. I later found out that the runway 27 final controller had used the wrong call sign when he attempted to turn aircraft Y towards the runway 27 localizer. Through the entire session; I felt very uncomfortable working that many aircraft with all the uncertainty of the situation and little; if any; coordination to handle that uncertainty. In the future; I will be reluctant to accept handoffs as readily in similar circumstances. I will also be sure to focus on my priorities; as I let aircraft U and his situation distract me. I also hope that the training provided our supervisors is more thorough. Recently; our new supervisors seem to get certified based on familiarity with the operation as opposed to proficiency. I believe that some of the more experienced supervisors at our facility would have been more on top of this situation. Unfortunately; it seems the agency (FAA) is just trying to fill position as fast as it can.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEM TRACON CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 4000 FT; DISTRACTED BY AN ACR REQUEST TO DELAY ARR FOR WX; ISSUED CONFLICTING VECTOR HEADINGS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING ARR E WITH A LINE OF TSTMS EXTENDING FROM THE NE OF MEM TO THE SW APCHING MEM EBOUND. THE LINE OF TSTMS MADE THE APCH COURSES FOR RWY 18L/C/R UNUSABLE WITH A SW WIND. THE SUPVR DIRECTED THE TRACON TO TAKE ALL ARR ACFT TO RWY 27. NO COORD WAS IMPLEMENTED TO GET ARRS NOT REGULARLY ASSIGNED RWY 27 TO THAT RWY. FIRST; I VECTORED ACFT Z; AND ACFT W (A CRJ2) DSNDING TO 5000 FT FROM THE SOUTHEAST TO RWY 27. THEN I VECTORED ACFT Y; A CRJ2; DESCENDING TO 4000 FT FROM THE NE TO FOLLOW ACFT W. I TOOK HDOFS ON ACFT X (A CRJ2) AT 3000 FT; AND ACFT V (A DC9) DSNDING TO 4000 FT; BOTH ACFT INBOUND FROM THE SW (ACFT I WOULD NOT NORMALLY WORK AT E ARR). I CLBED ACFT X TO 4000 FT TO MAKE SURE THE ACFT STAYED IN THE CLASS B AIRSPACE (MEM HAS HAD A SERIOUS ISSUE WITH ACFT LEAVING THE CLASS B AIRSPACE RECENTLY). I THEN DIRECTED ACFT V TO EXPEDITE THEIR DSCNT TO 4000 FT SO THEY COULD SLOW TO 210 KTS. AT SOME POINT; I TOOK A HDOF ON ACFT U (A DC9) AT 6000 FT FROM DUE W MOVING EBOUND. I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ACFT U DID NOT WANT TO MAKE AN APCH. WHEN ACFT U CHKED IN; HE ASKED ME WHAT THE PLAN WAS. I TOLD ACFT U THAT I WOULD VECTOR HIM AROUND AT 6000 FT UNTIL HE WAS READY TO PROCEED INBOUND TO LAND. ACFT U ASKED IF OTHER ACFT WERE LNDG WITHOUT INCIDENT WITH THE WX MOVING IN. I TOLD HIM I WOULD SOLICIT A PIREP FROM THE TWR. I CALLED THE TWR FOR A PIREP; AND THEY SAID THEY HAD A BE20 LNDG AND ROLLING OUT; AND THEY WOULD GIVE ME A CALL BACK WITH ANY INFO THEY COULD GET. THESE 2 CALLS TOOK MORE TIME THAN I WOULD HAVE LIKED AND DELAYED SEVERAL ACTIONS THAT I TOOK. FIRST; I TURNED ACFT Y SBOUND FROM THE NE ABOUT 7 MI LATER THAN I WANTED. THIS MEANT THAT ACFT Y'S BASE WAS ABOUT 5 MI CLOSER TO THE ARPT THAN I WANTED. SECOND; I BELIEVE THAT ACFT Y WAS LEVEL AT 4000 FT AS SOON AS HE REACHED 4000 FT. THESE 2 ITEMS MEANT THAT THE RWY 27 FINAL CTLR WOULD HAVE TO WAIT A LITTLE LONGER TO TURN ACFT Y ONTO THE RWY 27 LOC BEHIND ACFT W. FINALLY; I WAS LATE TO SLOW ACFT X; WHICH PUT THAT ACFT INTO CLOSER PROX WITH ACFT Y. PRIOR TO HANDING OFF ACFT Y TO RWY 27 FINAL CTLR; I TURNED THE ACFT TO A 170 DEG HDG TO GIVE THAT CTLR A LITTLE EXTRA ROOM. I VECTORED ACFT X AND ACFT V AS CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF THE CLASS B SHELF AT 4000 FT AS I COULD TO TRY AND BUY MORE TIME FOR THE NEXT CTLR. FINALLY; WHEN ACFT X WAS DUE S OF ACFT Y; I TURNED ACFT X DUE N FOR THE BASE FOR RWY 27. I WAS EXPECTING AT ANY MOMENT FOR ACFT Y TO SHOW A TURN TO JOIN THE RWY 27 LOC. I PLACED ACFT X IN A HDOF STATUS AND ASKED THE RWY 27 FINAL CTLR IF HE HAD TURNED ACFT Y. HE WAS XMITTING TO AN ACFT AND TAKING MY HDOF. I LOOKED AGAIN TO SEE IF ACFT Y WAS TURNING AND ASKED THE CTLR AGAIN ABOUT ACFT Y. I DID NOT HEAR THE ANSWER; AS I SAW ACFT Y CONTINUE TOWARDS ACFT X. I TURNED ACFT X TO A 090 DEG HDG AND ASKED AGAIN. ACFT Y STILL CONTINUED TOWARDS ACFT X; SO I TURNED ACFT X TO AN IMMEDIATE 120 DEG HDG AND ISSUED TFC. ACFT X ADVISED THE TFC IN SIGHT; AND I ESTABLISHED VISUAL SEPARATION. ACFT X AND ACFT Y GOT AS CLOSE AS 2.24 MI AND 500 FT. I LATER FOUND OUT THAT THE RWY 27 FINAL CTLR HAD USED THE WRONG CALL SIGN WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO TURN ACFT Y TOWARDS THE RWY 27 LOC. THROUGH THE ENTIRE SESSION; I FELT VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WORKING THAT MANY ACFT WITH ALL THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE SITUATION AND LITTLE; IF ANY; COORD TO HANDLE THAT UNCERTAINTY. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT HDOFS AS READILY IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. I WILL ALSO BE SURE TO FOCUS ON MY PRIORITIES; AS I LET ACFT U AND HIS SITUATION DISTRACT ME. I ALSO HOPE THAT THE TRAINING PROVIDED OUR SUPVRS IS MORE THOROUGH. RECENTLY; OUR NEW SUPVRS SEEM TO GET CERTIFIED BASED ON FAMILIARITY WITH THE OP AS OPPOSED TO PROFICIENCY. I BELIEVE THAT SOME OF THE MORE EXPERIENCED SUPVRS AT OUR FACILITY WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ON TOP OF THIS SITUATION. UNFORTUNATELY; IT SEEMS THE AGENCY (FAA) IS JUST TRYING TO FILL POS AS FAST AS IT CAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.