Narrative:

Approaching teb on vectors for ILS 6 from the south (JAIKE2); we were given a turn to 090 degrees (towards known traffic) to intercept the runway 6 localizer and a descent from 5000 ft to 3000 ft. As we began the turn; we received an RA; responded by following the TCAS RA by climbing back to slightly above 5K and notified ATC. Once clear of traffic; we then rapidly descended to 3000 ft and continued to join the approach course. Prior to being handed off to the tower; we were told to maintain 170 KIAS. Once with teb tower; we were asked to slow to minimum approach speed (which we did). The preceding aircraft (a citation) missed the turnoff and failed to expedite to the next opportunity to exit the runway. Since we had yet to receive landing clearance; I asked the pilot monitoring to verify we were cleared to land. I rounded out the approach but remained ready for a go around. We received landing clearance approximately 700 ft down the runway. I chopped the power and landed without further incident. The tower controller then instructed us to exit the runway in the opposite direction of the majority of the GA FBO's and onto a taxiway that was behind our aircraft! Once clear; he apologized 'for the miscom.' while no mishap/injury occurred; turning and descending an aircraft into known traffic was only mitigated by our having TCASII. Also by not alerting us to the possibility of the need to go around and providing at least a heading and altitude for our potential 'miss' (in severe clear VMC); the tower controller risked further conflict with the traffic inbound to ewr. My first officer (pilot monitoring) suggested a go around as we passed 125 ft at dze -- I should have initiated the maneuver then. My concern was for possible conflicting traffic inbound on the visual portion of the VOR-DME circling approach and overhead traffic inbound to ewr. In my opinion; teb as presently handled; remains an accident just waiting to happen. I personally know many crews who (while visually searching for traffic or responding to TCAS RA's) have busted altitudes on both the arrs and departures into and out of this airport. Both procedures are complicated and separation minima are tight with the other traffic in the nyc metropolitan area. Honeywell's FMS database for the TEB5 still shows runway heading until 1500 ft as an 'at or above' altitude before the turn to 280 degrees; while the departure requires leveling at 1500 ft; turning to 280 degrees; and maintaining 1500 ft until 4.5 DME from teb before climbing to 2000 ft. This renders VNAV useless for the TEB5; while leading crews towards the false sense that by using LNAV/VNAV that the altitude requirements of the departure will be met. And don't get me started about extended vectoring of jet aircraft below the floor of class B airspace at the omni directional VFR altitude of 3000 ft MSL while inbound for the VOR-DME circling approach into teb!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: G4 ARR AT EWR EXPERIENCED TCAS RA WITH OTHER ARR TFC; CITING CONCERNS REGARDING OVERALL ATC HANDLING BY BOTH APCH AND TWR CTLRS.

Narrative: APCHING TEB ON VECTORS FOR ILS 6 FROM THE S (JAIKE2); WE WERE GIVEN A TURN TO 090 DEGS (TOWARDS KNOWN TFC) TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 6 LOC AND A DSCNT FROM 5000 FT TO 3000 FT. AS WE BEGAN THE TURN; WE RECEIVED AN RA; RESPONDED BY FOLLOWING THE TCAS RA BY CLBING BACK TO SLIGHTLY ABOVE 5K AND NOTIFIED ATC. ONCE CLR OF TFC; WE THEN RAPIDLY DSNDED TO 3000 FT AND CONTINUED TO JOIN THE APCH COURSE. PRIOR TO BEING HANDED OFF TO THE TWR; WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 170 KIAS. ONCE WITH TEB TWR; WE WERE ASKED TO SLOW TO MINIMUM APCH SPD (WHICH WE DID). THE PRECEDING ACFT (A CITATION) MISSED THE TURNOFF AND FAILED TO EXPEDITE TO THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY TO EXIT THE RWY. SINCE WE HAD YET TO RECEIVE LNDG CLRNC; I ASKED THE PLT MONITORING TO VERIFY WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. I ROUNDED OUT THE APCH BUT REMAINED READY FOR A GAR. WE RECEIVED LNDG CLRNC APPROX 700 FT DOWN THE RWY. I CHOPPED THE PWR AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE TWR CTLR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO EXIT THE RWY IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE GA FBO'S AND ONTO A TXWY THAT WAS BEHIND OUR ACFT! ONCE CLR; HE APOLOGIZED 'FOR THE MISCOM.' WHILE NO MISHAP/INJURY OCCURRED; TURNING AND DSNDING AN ACFT INTO KNOWN TFC WAS ONLY MITIGATED BY OUR HAVING TCASII. ALSO BY NOT ALERTING US TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NEED TO GO AROUND AND PROVIDING AT LEAST A HDG AND ALT FOR OUR POTENTIAL 'MISS' (IN SEVERE CLR VMC); THE TWR CTLR RISKED FURTHER CONFLICT WITH THE TFC INBOUND TO EWR. MY FO (PLT MONITORING) SUGGESTED A GAR AS WE PASSED 125 FT AT DZE -- I SHOULD HAVE INITIATED THE MANEUVER THEN. MY CONCERN WAS FOR POSSIBLE CONFLICTING TFC INBOUND ON THE VISUAL PORTION OF THE VOR-DME CIRCLING APCH AND OVERHEAD TFC INBOUND TO EWR. IN MY OPINION; TEB AS PRESENTLY HANDLED; REMAINS AN ACCIDENT JUST WAITING TO HAPPEN. I PERSONALLY KNOW MANY CREWS WHO (WHILE VISUALLY SEARCHING FOR TFC OR RESPONDING TO TCAS RA'S) HAVE BUSTED ALTS ON BOTH THE ARRS AND DEPS INTO AND OUT OF THIS ARPT. BOTH PROCS ARE COMPLICATED AND SEPARATION MINIMA ARE TIGHT WITH THE OTHER TFC IN THE NYC METRO AREA. HONEYWELL'S FMS DATABASE FOR THE TEB5 STILL SHOWS RWY HDG UNTIL 1500 FT AS AN 'AT OR ABOVE' ALT BEFORE THE TURN TO 280 DEGS; WHILE THE DEP REQUIRES LEVELING AT 1500 FT; TURNING TO 280 DEGS; AND MAINTAINING 1500 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME FROM TEB BEFORE CLBING TO 2000 FT. THIS RENDERS VNAV USELESS FOR THE TEB5; WHILE LEADING CREWS TOWARDS THE FALSE SENSE THAT BY USING LNAV/VNAV THAT THE ALT REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEP WILL BE MET. AND DON'T GET ME STARTED ABOUT EXTENDED VECTORING OF JET ACFT BELOW THE FLOOR OF CLASS B AIRSPACE AT THE OMNI DIRECTIONAL VFR ALT OF 3000 FT MSL WHILE INBOUND FOR THE VOR-DME CIRCLING APCH INTO TEB!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.