Narrative:

We arrived in slc slightly late and the operations agent promised a quick turn to get us back on schedule. I reviewed and signed the dispatch release(filed for direct tch as the first point); and confirmed first officer loaded it in the FMC. I then left the cockpit to help the flight attendants clean the aircraft to speed passenger loading. Passenger had already started loading prior to my return to the cockpit. My first officer was still in his seat and I asked if he was going to use the lav before we left since boarding was almost complete. He was surprised that we were so close to departure and said he was done with his preflight and would use the lav and return. I started; but had not completed my preflight cockpit flow (which included review of the pre departure clearance) when the operations agent delivered the load sheet (21 minute turn). My first officer returned and we did our before start checklist which included a departure brief that noted the leetz RNAV departure assigned on pre departure clearance; but the legs page was not displayed on the FMC for review. Having checked the load previously and having gotten a RNAV departure brief; I did not check the FMC load to confirm the RNAV points were loaded. We had the departure clipped to our yokes for reference. All events were normal until after takeoff while first officer was hand flying the LNAV guidance. After the 'set climb thrust' call; I selected navigation and the legs page to monitor the departure; but soon after; the first officer deselected legs page to view the climb page. I did not re-select legs until later due to other duties as pm while the PF hand flew. Aircraft steering directed a right turn as expected. However; instead of rolling out on a westerly heading; the steering commanded a continued right turn (toward tch). After passing the expected rollout point; we realized something was wrong and rolled out on an approximately 310 degree heading. I reached across the cockpit to try to determine the problem and subsequently tried to load the proper departure. Shortly after rollout; ATC called and asked us what heading we were on and if we were going direct to ppigg (first point on the RNAV departure). We replied with our heading and/altitudes until a clearance to a point further along the RNAV departure. We were asked to call the supervisor after landing. As requested; I called the ATC supervisor after landing and discussed the issue. He indicated that (luckily) there were no other aircraft in the area and therefore; no conflicts. His reason for wanting me to call was because he was curious as to what happened and why we did not fly the RNAV departure (evidently this has happened before). I told him what happened. While there may be reasons for our errors; there are no excuses. We were both aware of and prepared for the RNAV departure to be flown; except for having it loaded in the FMC. I feel that time compression may have been a factor in my first officer's failure to load and display the RNAV departure. This is based on his apparent surprise at how quickly the passenger loaded; being in the lav when the load sheet was delivered; and the fact that I do not believe he would intentionally brief a departure and not load it into the FMC. I feel my failure to call up and check the RNAV points was influenced by my 'comfort level' with the first officer. When he discussed the RNAV departure that was issued to us; I assumed it was loaded. Obviously; following procedures and complacency are at opposite ends of the spectrum. It is so easy; as a procedure; to press a few buttons to confirm where the aircraft will take you that it just isn't worth 'betting your wings' by assuming it is properly loaded. I feel the procedure as written is adequate to ensure proper FMC loading. It requires action and verification by 2 different pilots and if performed every time; will prevent future errors like this. Note: the fact that the first officer was hand flying the departure complicated the situation and I should have directed the use of autopilot sooner. The additional workload on the pm (me) while the PF hand flew (clean up aircraft; select LNAV/lvl change/headings/altitudes; work the radio; attempt to monitor the departure; and reach across the cockpit to check and attempt to change the FMC load) significantly degraded my ability to monitor our flight conditions/progress and to try to correct the error more rapidly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLT CREW FAILS TO LOAD RNAV SID INTO FMC. TRACK DEVIATION RESULTS.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED IN SLC SLIGHTLY LATE AND THE OPS AGENT PROMISED A QUICK TURN TO GET US BACK ON SCHEDULE. I REVIEWED AND SIGNED THE DISPATCH RELEASE(FILED FOR DIRECT tch AS THE FIRST POINT); AND CONFIRMED FO LOADED IT IN THE FMC. I THEN LEFT THE COCKPIT TO HELP THE FLT ATTENDANTS CLEAN THE ACFT TO SPEED PAX LOADING. PAX HAD ALREADY STARTED LOADING PRIOR TO MY RETURN TO THE COCKPIT. MY FO WAS STILL IN HIS SEAT AND I ASKED IF HE WAS GOING TO USE THE LAV BEFORE WE LEFT SINCE BOARDING WAS ALMOST COMPLETE. HE WAS SURPRISED THAT WE WERE SO CLOSE TO DEPARTURE AND SAID HE WAS DONE WITH HIS PREFLIGHT AND WOULD USE THE LAV AND RETURN. I STARTED; BUT HAD NOT COMPLETED MY PREFLIGHT COCKPIT FLOW (WHICH INCLUDED REVIEW OF THE PDC) WHEN THE OPS AGENT DELIVERED THE LOAD SHEET (21 MINUTE TURN). MY FO RETURNED AND WE DID OUR BEFORE START CHECKLIST WHICH INCLUDED A DEPARTURE BRIEF THAT NOTED THE LEETZ RNAV DEPARTURE ASSIGNED ON PDC; BUT THE LEGS PAGE WAS NOT DISPLAYED ON THE FMC FOR REVIEW. HAVING CHECKED THE LOAD PREVIOUSLY AND HAVING GOTTEN A RNAV DEPARTURE BRIEF; I DID NOT CHECK THE FMC LOAD TO CONFIRM THE RNAV POINTS WERE LOADED. WE HAD THE DEPARTURE CLIPPED TO OUR YOKES FOR REFERENCE. ALL EVENTS WERE NORMAL UNTIL AFTER TAKEOFF WHILE FO WAS HAND FLYING THE LNAV GUIDANCE. AFTER THE 'SET CLIMB THRUST' CALL; I SELECTED NAV AND THE LEGS PAGE TO MONITOR THE DEPARTURE; BUT SOON AFTER; THE FO DESELECTED LEGS PAGE TO VIEW THE CLIMB PAGE. I DID NOT RE-SELECT LEGS UNTIL LATER DUE TO OTHER DUTIES AS PM WHILE THE PF HAND FLEW. AIRCRAFT STEERING DIRECTED A RIGHT TURN AS EXPECTED. HOWEVER; INSTEAD OF ROLLING OUT ON A WESTERLY HEADING; THE STEERING COMMANDED A CONTINUED RIGHT TURN (TOWARD TCH). AFTER PASSING THE EXPECTED ROLLOUT POINT; WE REALIZED SOMETHING WAS WRONG AND ROLLED OUT ON AN APPROXIMATELY 310 DEG HEADING. I REACHED ACROSS THE COCKPIT TO TRY TO DETERMINE THE PROBLEM AND SUBSEQUENTLY TRIED TO LOAD THE PROPER DEPARTURE. SHORTLY AFTER ROLLOUT; ATC CALLED AND ASKED US WHAT HEADING WE WERE ON AND IF WE WERE GOING DIRECT TO PPIGG (FIRST POINT ON THE RNAV DEPARTURE). WE REPLIED WITH OUR HEADING AND/ALTITUDES UNTIL A CLEARANCE TO A POINT FURTHER ALONG THE RNAV DEPARTURE. WE WERE ASKED TO CALL THE SUPERVISOR AFTER LANDING. AS REQUESTED; I CALLED THE ATC SUPERVISOR AFTER LANDING AND DISCUSSED THE ISSUE. HE INDICATED THAT (LUCKILY) THERE WERE NO OTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA AND THEREFORE; NO CONFLICTS. HIS REASON FOR WANTING ME TO CALL WAS BECAUSE HE WAS CURIOUS AS TO WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY WE DID NOT FLY THE RNAV DEPARTURE (EVIDENTLY THIS HAS HAPPENED BEFORE). I TOLD HIM WHAT HAPPENED. WHILE THERE MAY BE REASONS FOR OUR ERRORS; THERE ARE NO EXCUSES. WE WERE BOTH AWARE OF AND PREPARED FOR THE RNAV DEPARTURE TO BE FLOWN; EXCEPT FOR HAVING IT LOADED IN THE FMC. I FEEL THAT TIME COMPRESSION MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN MY FO'S FAILURE TO LOAD AND DISPLAY THE RNAV DEPARTURE. THIS IS BASED ON HIS APPARENT SURPRISE AT HOW QUICKLY THE PAX LOADED; BEING IN THE LAV WHEN THE LOAD SHEET WAS DELIVERED; AND THE FACT THAT I DO NOT BELIEVE HE WOULD INTENTIONALLY BRIEF A DEPARTURE AND NOT LOAD IT INTO THE FMC. I FEEL MY FAILURE TO CALL UP AND CHECK THE RNAV POINTS WAS INFLUENCED BY MY 'COMFORT LEVEL' WITH THE FO. WHEN HE DISCUSSED THE RNAV DEPARTURE THAT WAS ISSUED TO US; I ASSUMED IT WAS LOADED. OBVIOUSLY; FOLLOWING PROCEDURES AND COMPLACENCY ARE AT OPPOSITE ENDS OF THE SPECTRUM. IT IS SO EASY; AS A PROCEDURE; TO PRESS A FEW BUTTONS TO CONFIRM WHERE THE AIRCRAFT WILL TAKE YOU THAT IT JUST ISN'T WORTH 'BETTING YOUR WINGS' BY ASSUMING IT IS PROPERLY LOADED. I FEEL THE PROCEDURE AS WRITTEN IS ADEQUATE TO ENSURE PROPER FMC LOADING. IT REQUIRES ACTION AND VERIFICATION BY 2 DIFFERENT PILOTS AND IF PERFORMED EVERY TIME; WILL PREVENT FUTURE ERRORS LIKE THIS. NOTE: THE FACT THAT THE FO WAS HAND FLYING THE DEPARTURE COMPLICATED THE SITUATION AND I SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED THE USE OF AUTOPILOT SOONER. THE ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD ON THE PM (ME) WHILE THE PF HAND FLEW (CLEAN UP ACFT; SELECT LNAV/LVL CHANGE/HEADINGS/ALTITUDES; WORK THE RADIO; ATTEMPT TO MONITOR THE DEPARTURE; AND REACH ACROSS THE COCKPIT TO CHECK AND ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE FMC LOAD) SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED MY ABILITY TO MONITOR OUR FLIGHT CONDITIONS/PROGRESS AND TO TRY TO CORRECT THE ERROR MORE RAPIDLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.