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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 789437 |
Time | |
Date | 200806 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : dca.airport |
State Reference | DC |
Altitude | msl single value : 5000 |
Environment | |
Weather Elements | Thunderstorm Rain |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zdc.artcc tower : ewr.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | approach : charted visual arrival star : eldee |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain observation : company check pilot oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 20 flight time total : 19000 flight time type : 3000 |
ASRS Report | 789437 |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : weather inflight encounter : turbulence |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA Chart Or Publication Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
I do not believe that we incurred any pilot deviations on this trip; but felt I needed to file this safety report. At first glance; the NOTAM appears to give adequate relief on the very 'tight' crossing restrs and subsequent reduction to 250 KTS at 10000 ft. However; in the actual operation while administering first officer IOE with his third flying leg; first leg in the B757; continuous light occasional moderate turbulence; deviating around a line of thunderstorms and attempting to make up time for scheduling the NOTAM which at first seemed to simplify things suddenly becomes very work intensive and confusing! The relief from the NOTAM is as follows: change crossing restr at capss. Change crossing restr at wzrrd to at or above 10000 ft. Delete crossing restr at daric. Cross eldee at 8000 ft; and if landing runway 19 at regan national; cross eldee at 8000 ft and 210 KTS. We accomplished this in the box and kept the STAR arrival chart in front of us per SOP. It was very work intensive to fly the 'new' box altitude limits while comparing the STAR chart and NOTAMS while simultaneously dealing with the distrs listed previously. Additionally; while changing/deleting altitudes per the NOTAM; other altitudes were still in the box which required close attention due to the multiple 'altitude captures' occurring which open the airspeed window and 'catch' current speed! The NOTAM changes along with the associated MCP anomalies make for a complex and work intensive environment. There were also several different altitude assignments just prior to and during the eldee arrival by ATC which added to the workload/confusion. For example; you are to expect sharr per the STAR at FL290; and expect druzz at 15000 ft. If I remember correctly; we never received the FL290 at sharr and received a crossing 15 mi out of druzz at 15000 ft. At this point; the box seemed confused with VNAV I am assuming because there was still a crossing restr in the box of druzz at 15000 ft followed by the same restr later of 15000 ft at revue (3 different fixes with a hard 15000 ft altitude at each). There was at least 1 more altitude assignment by ATC contrary to both the depicted chart and/or NOTAM. Somewhere around daric; we were instructed to descend to 5000 ft and to depart eldee on a 080 degree heading. This is contrary to the eldee at 8000 ft and 210 KTS for river visual runway 19 which both ATIS and ATC had said to expect; and once again different routing than is in the box; the STAR or NOTAM. Things got 'fuzzy' here and I believe at some point it became obvious to me that we were still high and fast. About this time I knew that we were heading in the direction of the prohibited areas and still hard IFR in heavy rain. We received a frequency change after several blocked attempts by ATC. I promptly forgot the frequency and attempted to clarify with ATC. Once again blocked xmissions but finally got through. (Still hard IFR; heavy rain). Changed frequencys and the controller told us to join the rosslyn lda to runway 19. (I really believe that he was trying to help us out here; but it just served to confuse us even more!) we had not briefed the lda and did not even have the plates out as VFR conditions were reported at the airport and the river visual had been broadcast on ATC and told to expect by ATC. I immediately asked ATC for the lda frequency; still worried about heading towards the prohibited areas IFR while searching for the chart so I could tune and identify for the first officer who was 'up to his knees in alligators' on his first leg in a B757! The controller took a couple of seconds and gave me the frequency. I tuned it and told the first officer to engage localizer on the autoplt and track it inbound. The display which he saw when selecting ILS on his HSI was not what he expected; as we were still on an assigned 080 degree heading with a 147 degree inbound course (almost a 70 degree intercept) on the lda! I noticed the needle swinging and told him to turn inbound. He stated that the autoplt had captured and was correcting. I quickly told ATC that we were passing through the localizer and correcting. He replied 'you are over my house; you are fine; just fly the lda until you see the river.' about this time we broke out of the cloud cover and turned over the river and followed the river visual which was our earlier expected clearance and somewhat close to the lda approach. We were still hot and high; and using speed brakes to correct. Finally stabilized around 1000 ft VMC and landed. The ordeal was very disconcerting. After parking; we debriefed. I believe the first officer's situational awareness was better than mine on the arrival; as he stated that he never felt we were anywhere close to the prohibited area (he was right; which was verified when we broke out of the clouds). I told him how close I was to telling the controller to give us vectors around for another approach; and in retrospect; that is exactly what I should have done. I called the approach facility after landing to inquire if we had violated any altitude; airspeed; or airspace rules. He stated no problems were noted. I briefly explained all this to him to which he replied 'we have been having a very difficult time with the eldee approach; thanks for the call and have a good day.' well; there you have it. Another 'longwinded' story as usual from me. I believe that problems started on the confusing eldee arrival complicated by all the aforementioned distrs and NOTAMS followed by a totally unexpected clearance to join the rosslyn lda which is usually not available on the river visual approach. I might add that we have the FMS cabbn visual procedure in the FMS which would have probably been much better for my situational awareness; however; it was not offered and I did not request it. I am curious; does ATC ever assign cabbn or neida visuals based on our flight plan information; or must you request the procedures; or are they even available? Sfo assigns the FMS visual without having to request it. I am assuming based on your flight plan information! Finally; I remember the responses from a couple of pilots on this problem in the past. They stated that they would never accept the river visual and/or visual departure procedures out of dca again; but would instead request the IMC procedures which are annotated on the charts. If you are very familiar with the dca procedures (which I am not); then the visuals are probably no problem; but if you are not familiar; this is probably a good idea!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757 CHK CAPT RPTS ANGST CAUSED BY COMPLYING WITH ELDEE 3 NOTAM; APCH PROC CHANGES; AND IMC WITH TURB DURING IOE TRAINING.
Narrative: I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE INCURRED ANY PLT DEVS ON THIS TRIP; BUT FELT I NEEDED TO FILE THIS SAFETY RPT. AT FIRST GLANCE; THE NOTAM APPEARS TO GIVE ADEQUATE RELIEF ON THE VERY 'TIGHT' XING RESTRS AND SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION TO 250 KTS AT 10000 FT. HOWEVER; IN THE ACTUAL OP WHILE ADMINISTERING FO IOE WITH HIS THIRD FLYING LEG; FIRST LEG IN THE B757; CONTINUOUS LIGHT OCCASIONAL MODERATE TURB; DEVIATING AROUND A LINE OF TSTMS AND ATTEMPTING TO MAKE UP TIME FOR SCHEDULING THE NOTAM WHICH AT FIRST SEEMED TO SIMPLIFY THINGS SUDDENLY BECOMES VERY WORK INTENSIVE AND CONFUSING! THE RELIEF FROM THE NOTAM IS AS FOLLOWS: CHANGE XING RESTR AT CAPSS. CHANGE XING RESTR AT WZRRD TO AT OR ABOVE 10000 FT. DELETE XING RESTR AT DARIC. CROSS ELDEE AT 8000 FT; AND IF LNDG RWY 19 AT REGAN NATIONAL; CROSS ELDEE AT 8000 FT AND 210 KTS. WE ACCOMPLISHED THIS IN THE BOX AND KEPT THE STAR ARR CHART IN FRONT OF US PER SOP. IT WAS VERY WORK INTENSIVE TO FLY THE 'NEW' BOX ALT LIMITS WHILE COMPARING THE STAR CHART AND NOTAMS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY DEALING WITH THE DISTRS LISTED PREVIOUSLY. ADDITIONALLY; WHILE CHANGING/DELETING ALTS PER THE NOTAM; OTHER ALTS WERE STILL IN THE BOX WHICH REQUIRED CLOSE ATTN DUE TO THE MULTIPLE 'ALT CAPTURES' OCCURRING WHICH OPEN THE AIRSPD WINDOW AND 'CATCH' CURRENT SPD! THE NOTAM CHANGES ALONG WITH THE ASSOCIATED MCP ANOMALIES MAKE FOR A COMPLEX AND WORK INTENSIVE ENVIRONMENT. THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL DIFFERENT ALT ASSIGNMENTS JUST PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELDEE ARR BY ATC WHICH ADDED TO THE WORKLOAD/CONFUSION. FOR EXAMPLE; YOU ARE TO EXPECT SHARR PER THE STAR AT FL290; AND EXPECT DRUZZ AT 15000 FT. IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY; WE NEVER RECEIVED THE FL290 AT SHARR AND RECEIVED A XING 15 MI OUT OF DRUZZ AT 15000 FT. AT THIS POINT; THE BOX SEEMED CONFUSED WITH VNAV I AM ASSUMING BECAUSE THERE WAS STILL A XING RESTR IN THE BOX OF DRUZZ AT 15000 FT FOLLOWED BY THE SAME RESTR LATER OF 15000 FT AT REVUE (3 DIFFERENT FIXES WITH A HARD 15000 FT ALT AT EACH). THERE WAS AT LEAST 1 MORE ALT ASSIGNMENT BY ATC CONTRARY TO BOTH THE DEPICTED CHART AND/OR NOTAM. SOMEWHERE AROUND DARIC; WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO DSND TO 5000 FT AND TO DEPART ELDEE ON A 080 DEG HDG. THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE ELDEE AT 8000 FT AND 210 KTS FOR RIVER VISUAL RWY 19 WHICH BOTH ATIS AND ATC HAD SAID TO EXPECT; AND ONCE AGAIN DIFFERENT ROUTING THAN IS IN THE BOX; THE STAR OR NOTAM. THINGS GOT 'FUZZY' HERE AND I BELIEVE AT SOME POINT IT BECAME OBVIOUS TO ME THAT WE WERE STILL HIGH AND FAST. ABOUT THIS TIME I KNEW THAT WE WERE HEADING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE PROHIBITED AREAS AND STILL HARD IFR IN HVY RAIN. WE RECEIVED A FREQ CHANGE AFTER SEVERAL BLOCKED ATTEMPTS BY ATC. I PROMPTLY FORGOT THE FREQ AND ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY WITH ATC. ONCE AGAIN BLOCKED XMISSIONS BUT FINALLY GOT THROUGH. (STILL HARD IFR; HVY RAIN). CHANGED FREQS AND THE CTLR TOLD US TO JOIN THE ROSSLYN LDA TO RWY 19. (I REALLY BELIEVE THAT HE WAS TRYING TO HELP US OUT HERE; BUT IT JUST SERVED TO CONFUSE US EVEN MORE!) WE HAD NOT BRIEFED THE LDA AND DID NOT EVEN HAVE THE PLATES OUT AS VFR CONDITIONS WERE RPTED AT THE ARPT AND THE RIVER VISUAL HAD BEEN BROADCAST ON ATC AND TOLD TO EXPECT BY ATC. I IMMEDIATELY ASKED ATC FOR THE LDA FREQ; STILL WORRIED ABOUT HEADING TOWARDS THE PROHIBITED AREAS IFR WHILE SEARCHING FOR THE CHART SO I COULD TUNE AND IDENT FOR THE FO WHO WAS 'UP TO HIS KNEES IN ALLIGATORS' ON HIS FIRST LEG IN A B757! THE CTLR TOOK A COUPLE OF SECONDS AND GAVE ME THE FREQ. I TUNED IT AND TOLD THE FO TO ENGAGE LOC ON THE AUTOPLT AND TRACK IT INBOUND. THE DISPLAY WHICH HE SAW WHEN SELECTING ILS ON HIS HSI WAS NOT WHAT HE EXPECTED; AS WE WERE STILL ON AN ASSIGNED 080 DEG HDG WITH A 147 DEG INBOUND COURSE (ALMOST A 70 DEG INTERCEPT) ON THE LDA! I NOTICED THE NEEDLE SWINGING AND TOLD HIM TO TURN INBOUND. HE STATED THAT THE AUTOPLT HAD CAPTURED AND WAS CORRECTING. I QUICKLY TOLD ATC THAT WE WERE PASSING THROUGH THE LOC AND CORRECTING. HE REPLIED 'YOU ARE OVER MY HOUSE; YOU ARE FINE; JUST FLY THE LDA UNTIL YOU SEE THE RIVER.' ABOUT THIS TIME WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUD COVER AND TURNED OVER THE RIVER AND FOLLOWED THE RIVER VISUAL WHICH WAS OUR EARLIER EXPECTED CLRNC AND SOMEWHAT CLOSE TO THE LDA APCH. WE WERE STILL HOT AND HIGH; AND USING SPD BRAKES TO CORRECT. FINALLY STABILIZED AROUND 1000 FT VMC AND LANDED. THE ORDEAL WAS VERY DISCONCERTING. AFTER PARKING; WE DEBRIEFED. I BELIEVE THE FO'S SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS BETTER THAN MINE ON THE ARR; AS HE STATED THAT HE NEVER FELT WE WERE ANYWHERE CLOSE TO THE PROHIBITED AREA (HE WAS RIGHT; WHICH WAS VERIFIED WHEN WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS). I TOLD HIM HOW CLOSE I WAS TO TELLING THE CTLR TO GIVE US VECTORS AROUND FOR ANOTHER APCH; AND IN RETROSPECT; THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE. I CALLED THE APCH FACILITY AFTER LNDG TO INQUIRE IF WE HAD VIOLATED ANY ALT; AIRSPD; OR AIRSPACE RULES. HE STATED NO PROBS WERE NOTED. I BRIEFLY EXPLAINED ALL THIS TO HIM TO WHICH HE REPLIED 'WE HAVE BEEN HAVING A VERY DIFFICULT TIME WITH THE ELDEE APCH; THANKS FOR THE CALL AND HAVE A GOOD DAY.' WELL; THERE YOU HAVE IT. ANOTHER 'LONGWINDED' STORY AS USUAL FROM ME. I BELIEVE THAT PROBS STARTED ON THE CONFUSING ELDEE ARR COMPLICATED BY ALL THE AFOREMENTIONED DISTRS AND NOTAMS FOLLOWED BY A TOTALLY UNEXPECTED CLRNC TO JOIN THE ROSSLYN LDA WHICH IS USUALLY NOT AVAILABLE ON THE RIVER VISUAL APCH. I MIGHT ADD THAT WE HAVE THE FMS CABBN VISUAL PROC IN THE FMS WHICH WOULD HAVE PROBABLY BEEN MUCH BETTER FOR MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; HOWEVER; IT WAS NOT OFFERED AND I DID NOT REQUEST IT. I AM CURIOUS; DOES ATC EVER ASSIGN CABBN OR NEIDA VISUALS BASED ON OUR FLT PLAN INFO; OR MUST YOU REQUEST THE PROCS; OR ARE THEY EVEN AVAILABLE? SFO ASSIGNS THE FMS VISUAL WITHOUT HAVING TO REQUEST IT. I AM ASSUMING BASED ON YOUR FLT PLAN INFO! FINALLY; I REMEMBER THE RESPONSES FROM A COUPLE OF PLTS ON THIS PROB IN THE PAST. THEY STATED THAT THEY WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE RIVER VISUAL AND/OR VISUAL DEP PROCS OUT OF DCA AGAIN; BUT WOULD INSTEAD REQUEST THE IMC PROCS WHICH ARE ANNOTATED ON THE CHARTS. IF YOU ARE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE DCA PROCS (WHICH I AM NOT); THEN THE VISUALS ARE PROBABLY NO PROB; BUT IF YOU ARE NOT FAMILIAR; THIS IS PROBABLY A GOOD IDEA!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.