Narrative:

During the departure briefing prior to pushback; I had inadvertently idented runway 14 as the departure runway. I'd operated into and out of aex many times over the last 10 yrs and understood runway 14/32 to be the primary runway under normal conditions. My first officer immediately reminded me that runway 14 was unavailable and the runway 18 was being used for departures. I changed the departure runway in the FMS to runway 18; and completed the briefing and all checklists. As the pushback began; we were momentarily distraction by a problem with the tug that was soon corrected. After pushback was complete; my first officer called for a taxi clearance; and we were cleared to taxi to runway 18. The pushback left us facing northeast; toward the terminal building. Upon receiving the taxi clearance; I made a left turn and joined taxiway a. By now; my prior conditioning (thinking of runway 14/32 as the 'primary runway') reasserted itself and I began taxiing to runway 14. Instead of turning right onto taxiway B to approach runway 18; I continued on taxiway a to approach runway 14. As far as I was concerned; nothing out of the ordinary was happening. I was maintaining a conservative taxi speed since taxiway a had a slight zigzag character to it on that part of the airport. As we approached runway 18 at taxiway a my first officer (who later confessed she was by this time thoroughly satisfied that I was competent; confident; and seasoned PIC) began to sense that something was wrong. Upon recognizing that I intended to enter runway 18/36 on taxiway a; she asked 'what are you doing?' she did not take positive action to stop the aircraft because on some gut level; she believed that I did; in fact; know what I was doing. At the same moment my first officer spoke; the ground controller told us to turn right onto runway 18 and contact the tower on 127.35 MHZ. All this happened as the aircraft was entering the runway and approaching the runway centerline. The tower further instructed us to back-taxi on runway 18; make a 180 degree turn at the end; and advise when ready to take off. It was only when the ground controller told us to turn right onto runway 18 that I realized what I had done. The remainder of the departure was normal; and there was no further mention of the event by ATC. I recently completed FAA-mandatory runway incursion awareness training via my company's training department -- as did all pilots at my company. I; for one; took the training very seriously; and spent some time considering various ways to make myself 'incursion-proof.' to me; the most important lesson to come out of the training was that an incursion can happen to anyone; regardless of training or experience. Nevertheless; I allowed my routine experience with this 'slow; small-town' airport to make me complacent. I stripped away all of the procedural 'fail-safes' I normally use to protect myself and my passenger; and left myself completely dependent on my first officer to keep me out of trouble. From a CRM perspective; her decision to not take action to stop the aircraft; while regrettable; is completely understandable. After all; I'm the veteran with hundreds of hours of experience with this field; and she's the 14-month first officer. Why shouldn't she believe that I know exactly what I'm doing? I have re-committed myself to elevating my situational awareness; as well as that of my crew; during all phases of flight; but particularly during taxi. I'm still kicking myself for making the mistake that was supposed to happen to 'other people;' not to me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ FLT CREW EXPERIENCES A RUNWAY INCURSION AT AEX.

Narrative: DURING THE DEP BRIEFING PRIOR TO PUSHBACK; I HAD INADVERTENTLY IDENTED RWY 14 AS THE DEP RWY. I'D OPERATED INTO AND OUT OF AEX MANY TIMES OVER THE LAST 10 YRS AND UNDERSTOOD RWY 14/32 TO BE THE PRIMARY RWY UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS. MY FO IMMEDIATELY REMINDED ME THAT RWY 14 WAS UNAVAILABLE AND THE RWY 18 WAS BEING USED FOR DEPS. I CHANGED THE DEP RWY IN THE FMS TO RWY 18; AND COMPLETED THE BRIEFING AND ALL CHKLISTS. AS THE PUSHBACK BEGAN; WE WERE MOMENTARILY DISTR BY A PROB WITH THE TUG THAT WAS SOON CORRECTED. AFTER PUSHBACK WAS COMPLETE; MY FO CALLED FOR A TAXI CLRNC; AND WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 18. THE PUSHBACK LEFT US FACING NE; TOWARD THE TERMINAL BUILDING. UPON RECEIVING THE TAXI CLRNC; I MADE A L TURN AND JOINED TXWY A. BY NOW; MY PRIOR CONDITIONING (THINKING OF RWY 14/32 AS THE 'PRIMARY RWY') REASSERTED ITSELF AND I BEGAN TAXIING TO RWY 14. INSTEAD OF TURNING R ONTO TXWY B TO APCH RWY 18; I CONTINUED ON TXWY A TO APCH RWY 14. AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED; NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY WAS HAPPENING. I WAS MAINTAINING A CONSERVATIVE TAXI SPD SINCE TXWY A HAD A SLIGHT ZIGZAG CHARACTER TO IT ON THAT PART OF THE ARPT. AS WE APCHED RWY 18 AT TXWY A MY FO (WHO LATER CONFESSED SHE WAS BY THIS TIME THOROUGHLY SATISFIED THAT I WAS COMPETENT; CONFIDENT; AND SEASONED PIC) BEGAN TO SENSE THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG. UPON RECOGNIZING THAT I INTENDED TO ENTER RWY 18/36 ON TXWY A; SHE ASKED 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING?' SHE DID NOT TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO STOP THE ACFT BECAUSE ON SOME GUT LEVEL; SHE BELIEVED THAT I DID; IN FACT; KNOW WHAT I WAS DOING. AT THE SAME MOMENT MY FO SPOKE; THE GND CTLR TOLD US TO TURN R ONTO RWY 18 AND CONTACT THE TWR ON 127.35 MHZ. ALL THIS HAPPENED AS THE ACFT WAS ENTERING THE RWY AND APCHING THE RWY CTRLINE. THE TWR FURTHER INSTRUCTED US TO BACK-TAXI ON RWY 18; MAKE A 180 DEG TURN AT THE END; AND ADVISE WHEN READY TO TAKE OFF. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE GND CTLR TOLD US TO TURN R ONTO RWY 18 THAT I REALIZED WHAT I HAD DONE. THE REMAINDER OF THE DEP WAS NORMAL; AND THERE WAS NO FURTHER MENTION OF THE EVENT BY ATC. I RECENTLY COMPLETED FAA-MANDATORY RWY INCURSION AWARENESS TRAINING VIA MY COMPANY'S TRAINING DEPT -- AS DID ALL PLTS AT MY COMPANY. I; FOR ONE; TOOK THE TRAINING VERY SERIOUSLY; AND SPENT SOME TIME CONSIDERING VARIOUS WAYS TO MAKE MYSELF 'INCURSION-PROOF.' TO ME; THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON TO COME OUT OF THE TRAINING WAS THAT AN INCURSION CAN HAPPEN TO ANYONE; REGARDLESS OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE. NEVERTHELESS; I ALLOWED MY ROUTINE EXPERIENCE WITH THIS 'SLOW; SMALL-TOWN' ARPT TO MAKE ME COMPLACENT. I STRIPPED AWAY ALL OF THE PROCEDURAL 'FAIL-SAFES' I NORMALLY USE TO PROTECT MYSELF AND MY PAX; AND LEFT MYSELF COMPLETELY DEPENDENT ON MY FO TO KEEP ME OUT OF TROUBLE. FROM A CRM PERSPECTIVE; HER DECISION TO NOT TAKE ACTION TO STOP THE ACFT; WHILE REGRETTABLE; IS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE. AFTER ALL; I'M THE VETERAN WITH HUNDREDS OF HRS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THIS FIELD; AND SHE'S THE 14-MONTH FO. WHY SHOULDN'T SHE BELIEVE THAT I KNOW EXACTLY WHAT I'M DOING? I HAVE RE-COMMITTED MYSELF TO ELEVATING MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; AS WELL AS THAT OF MY CREW; DURING ALL PHASES OF FLT; BUT PARTICULARLY DURING TAXI. I'M STILL KICKING MYSELF FOR MAKING THE MISTAKE THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO HAPPEN TO 'OTHER PEOPLE;' NOT TO ME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.