Narrative:

Flight X was a line ferry flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 for revenue flight Y (ZZZ1 to ZZZ2). On taxi out from ZZZ we had a left wing body overheat light illuminate. The light remained on after the appropriate checklist was accomplished. We returned to the gate and an approximately 4 hour delay ensued. Maintenance finally discovered the APU bleed was leaking hot air near the tail section of the aircraft. Maintenance said they didn't have the part to fix it and that they could defer the APU. I strongly stated; in no uncertain terms; to the mechanic and the captain; I was not comfortable going to ZZZ1 with the APU deferred. The mechanic said the 3 bars on my shoulder meant that my opinion didn't count. The captain said it was fine with him to go if ZZZ1 had a ground cart and start capability; which he said he verified with dispatch. He also told dispatch that he would take it on the condition that the airplane would be fixed in ZZZ2 where they did have the necessary part (verified by the mechanic) to which the dispatcher and mechanic seemed to agree. Outside temperature was approximately 90 degrees; and the aircraft was already hot sitting at the gate (80+ cabin; approximately 90+ flight deck). Despite my advocating for getting another airplane; the captain said he was 'mission oriented' and that he didn't see a safety issue. He made the decision to go with the plane we had. I didn't refuse to fly because I didn't want to get called in to the flight office for refusing to fly when a captain with more experience thought it was safe. On taxi out; the temperature proceeded to increase and didn't really cool off much in-flight; pack supply duct temperature would only lower to about 70 degrees with both packs at full cold in 'automatic.' using 70 degree air to cool a 90-plus degree flight deck with 3 air vents doesn't work well. When we arrived in ZZZ1; ground air was attached but was not working; which the ground crew apparently knew about. The unit was blowing 90 degree air and its compressor fans (seen from the flight deck) were windmilling (inoperative) and the station had no air start cart. First they borrowed an air start cart; one from another airline (?) which didn't work; then they borrowed another which worked fine. By now cockpit temperature was 95-100 degrees with an unknown humidity (dew point was in the 70's; I believe); cabin temperature was between 85-90 by the gauge (the cabin had cooled to about 75 degrees in-flight). It wasn't until we were in the air that I realized how messed up our departure was. The departure brief consisted of 'are you ready?' the before pushback checklist was accomplished after we had pushed 50 ft from the gate. On takeoff/climb out I had no idea what acceleration ht was and thought what were we thinking? The captain turned the heading bug to the wrong heading after takeoff (I don't know where the heading came from but it turned out to be within 20 degrees or so of what it should have been). When the departure controller assigned us the appropriate heading for the runway in use; I checked the departure plate and yes; we had been on the wrong one. The climb was not programmed in the FMC so that step had been skipped as well. This made me wonder what else wasn't programmed so I checked the route which the captain entered -- it was correct. On this flight; it took about 40 mins for the flight deck to cool to a comfortable temperature. About that time the captain stated 'now I'm rethinking my decision to take this airplane in ZZZ1. I thought 'no kidding?' but said nothing; since I thought I was pretty clear before. On arrival at ZZZ2; another crew was waiting to take the plane to ZZZ3. So much for maintenance telling us they would fix it in ZZZ2. So much for dispatch telling us ZZZ1 had ground cart. As far as I'm concerned; they flat out lied about it all. I have flown with this captain before and things were by SOP. The only explanation I have for both our lack of performance and vigilance was the high heat and stress of the flight deck. If there is a next time; I will tell the captain he has the authority/authorized to accept the aircraft; and that I will call scheduling to look for a new first officer for him; I will refuse to fly. These unsafe situations were 100% preventable and if we had encountered an engine failure/fire/critical maintenance issue; it might not have seemed as uneventful as a 20 degree heading deviation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FO LAMENTS MEL'ED APU ON HOT SUMMER DAY AS WELL AS POOR CHECKLIST USAGE AND DEPARTURE BRIEFINGS.

Narrative: FLT X WAS A LINE FERRY FLT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 FOR REVENUE FLT Y (ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2). ON TAXI OUT FROM ZZZ WE HAD A L WING BODY OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATE. THE LIGHT REMAINED ON AFTER THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE AND AN APPROX 4 HR DELAY ENSUED. MAINT FINALLY DISCOVERED THE APU BLEED WAS LEAKING HOT AIR NEAR THE TAIL SECTION OF THE ACFT. MAINT SAID THEY DIDN'T HAVE THE PART TO FIX IT AND THAT THEY COULD DEFER THE APU. I STRONGLY STATED; IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS; TO THE MECH AND THE CAPT; I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE GOING TO ZZZ1 WITH THE APU DEFERRED. THE MECH SAID THE 3 BARS ON MY SHOULDER MEANT THAT MY OPINION DIDN'T COUNT. THE CAPT SAID IT WAS FINE WITH HIM TO GO IF ZZZ1 HAD A GND CART AND START CAPABILITY; WHICH HE SAID HE VERIFIED WITH DISPATCH. HE ALSO TOLD DISPATCH THAT HE WOULD TAKE IT ON THE CONDITION THAT THE AIRPLANE WOULD BE FIXED IN ZZZ2 WHERE THEY DID HAVE THE NECESSARY PART (VERIFIED BY THE MECH) TO WHICH THE DISPATCHER AND MECH SEEMED TO AGREE. OUTSIDE TEMP WAS APPROX 90 DEGS; AND THE ACFT WAS ALREADY HOT SITTING AT THE GATE (80+ CABIN; APPROX 90+ FLT DECK). DESPITE MY ADVOCATING FOR GETTING ANOTHER AIRPLANE; THE CAPT SAID HE WAS 'MISSION ORIENTED' AND THAT HE DIDN'T SEE A SAFETY ISSUE. HE MADE THE DECISION TO GO WITH THE PLANE WE HAD. I DIDN'T REFUSE TO FLY BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT TO GET CALLED IN TO THE FLT OFFICE FOR REFUSING TO FLY WHEN A CAPT WITH MORE EXPERIENCE THOUGHT IT WAS SAFE. ON TAXI OUT; THE TEMP PROCEEDED TO INCREASE AND DIDN'T REALLY COOL OFF MUCH INFLT; PACK SUPPLY DUCT TEMP WOULD ONLY LOWER TO ABOUT 70 DEGS WITH BOTH PACKS AT FULL COLD IN 'AUTO.' USING 70 DEG AIR TO COOL A 90-PLUS DEG FLIGHT DECK WITH 3 AIR VENTS DOESN'T WORK WELL. WHEN WE ARRIVED IN ZZZ1; GND AIR WAS ATTACHED BUT WAS NOT WORKING; WHICH THE GND CREW APPARENTLY KNEW ABOUT. THE UNIT WAS BLOWING 90 DEG AIR AND ITS COMPRESSOR FANS (SEEN FROM THE FLT DECK) WERE WINDMILLING (INOP) AND THE STATION HAD NO AIR START CART. FIRST THEY BORROWED AN AIR START CART; ONE FROM ANOTHER AIRLINE (?) WHICH DIDN'T WORK; THEN THEY BORROWED ANOTHER WHICH WORKED FINE. BY NOW COCKPIT TEMP WAS 95-100 DEGS WITH AN UNKNOWN HUMIDITY (DEW POINT WAS IN THE 70'S; I BELIEVE); CABIN TEMP WAS BTWN 85-90 BY THE GAUGE (THE CABIN HAD COOLED TO ABOUT 75 DEGS INFLT). IT WASN'T UNTIL WE WERE IN THE AIR THAT I REALIZED HOW MESSED UP OUR DEP WAS. THE DEP BRIEF CONSISTED OF 'ARE YOU READY?' THE BEFORE PUSHBACK CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED AFTER WE HAD PUSHED 50 FT FROM THE GATE. ON TKOF/CLBOUT I HAD NO IDEA WHAT ACCELERATION HT WAS AND THOUGHT WHAT WERE WE THINKING? THE CAPT TURNED THE HDG BUG TO THE WRONG HDG AFTER TKOF (I DON'T KNOW WHERE THE HDG CAME FROM BUT IT TURNED OUT TO BE WITHIN 20 DEGS OR SO OF WHAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN). WHEN THE DEP CTLR ASSIGNED US THE APPROPRIATE HDG FOR THE RWY IN USE; I CHKED THE DEP PLATE AND YES; WE HAD BEEN ON THE WRONG ONE. THE CLB WAS NOT PROGRAMMED IN THE FMC SO THAT STEP HAD BEEN SKIPPED AS WELL. THIS MADE ME WONDER WHAT ELSE WASN'T PROGRAMMED SO I CHKED THE RTE WHICH THE CAPT ENTERED -- IT WAS CORRECT. ON THIS FLT; IT TOOK ABOUT 40 MINS FOR THE FLT DECK TO COOL TO A COMFORTABLE TEMP. ABOUT THAT TIME THE CAPT STATED 'NOW I'M RETHINKING MY DECISION TO TAKE THIS AIRPLANE IN ZZZ1. I THOUGHT 'NO KIDDING?' BUT SAID NOTHING; SINCE I THOUGHT I WAS PRETTY CLEAR BEFORE. ON ARR AT ZZZ2; ANOTHER CREW WAS WAITING TO TAKE THE PLANE TO ZZZ3. SO MUCH FOR MAINT TELLING US THEY WOULD FIX IT IN ZZZ2. SO MUCH FOR DISPATCH TELLING US ZZZ1 HAD GND CART. AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED; THEY FLAT OUT LIED ABOUT IT ALL. I HAVE FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT BEFORE AND THINGS WERE BY SOP. THE ONLY EXPLANATION I HAVE FOR BOTH OUR LACK OF PERFORMANCE AND VIGILANCE WAS THE HIGH HEAT AND STRESS OF THE FLT DECK. IF THERE IS A NEXT TIME; I WILL TELL THE CAPT HE HAS THE AUTH TO ACCEPT THE ACFT; AND THAT I WILL CALL SCHEDULING TO LOOK FOR A NEW FO FOR HIM; I WILL REFUSE TO FLY. THESE UNSAFE SITUATIONS WERE 100% PREVENTABLE AND IF WE HAD ENCOUNTERED AN ENG FAILURE/FIRE/CRITICAL MAINT ISSUE; IT MIGHT NOT HAVE SEEMED AS UNEVENTFUL AS A 20 DEG HDG DEV.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.