Narrative:

On takeoff from ZZZ; my speed tape at rotation was giving erroneous readings showing the aircraft below vls. As my readings were false I had not called V1/vr but the first officer saw the speeds and rotated the aircraft. As I thought we were too slow and was quite surprised by this; I took priority of the aircraft and immediately began to try and accelerate -- not yet realizing we were already fast I then tried several times to give control back to the first officer so that I could try to assess the situation. Each time the speed readings I saw were not satisfactory and we were accelerating. We subsequently got both an autothrottle off ECAM and an overspeed; at which time the first officer made the statement he saw approximately 300 KTS. At this point he was again flying and I had realized the errors I was seeing and I instructed him to fly manually; slow the aircraft and continue the departure while I cleaned up the aircraft. Very shortly after this; my speed tape suddenly returned to normal. After assessing the aircraft and system and consulting with maintenance control; we continued to ZZZ1. We sent maintenance messages for a speed error/overspeed and the status showed CAT I only. Many factors to this situation included the distraction of a windshear alert for xxr at around the 80 KT call and then the same call for xxl at about rotation. Also; my inability to read the first officer instruments or the ECAM without maneuvering quite a bit to counteract the glare. Supplemental information from acn 790810: the following incident began on takeoff roll. I was the PF. The takeoff roll began normally. At some point during the takeoff roll; ATC announced a windshear advisory was in effect. Shortly thereafter; the captain made the 80 KT call. The aircraft felt and was acting normally during the roll. It seemed like the roll was lasting longer than normal and I hadn't heard a V1/vr call. I looked down at that point and saw the airspeed well above vr (160-170 KTS; I'd estimate). I didn't know why the call hadn't been made; but seeing that I was well above vr and everything felt normal; I initiated rotation. At that point I heard the captain say something to the effect 'keep the nose down.' I took this to mean that he wanted more airspeed for the windshear advisory. Shortly after the rotation; the captain took control for a short period of time and then returned control to me. I was again directed to 'lower the nose' which I did until we reached the flap limit speed. At that point; I increased pitch to keep the aircraft from overspeeding the flaps and was again directed to increase airspeed. The aircraft was finally cleaned up and we climbed through 3000 ft AGL and I asked for managed speed and flew to our initial leveloff altitude of 5000 ft. At that point I saw the airspeed exceeding 250 KTS even though it was managed at 250 KTS. I also noticed that the engines were producing full thrust (we were in the 'cl' detent at that time; autothrust engaged). I was again directed to increase speed and at that point I said 'I'm at 300 KTS.' it was at that time we realized that there was an airspeed indication problem. The autothrust was disconnected and as I was slowing back to 250 KTS the captain's airspeed returned to normal. I learned later that the captain's airspeed indicator was indicating at and sometimes below vls; hence his calling for airspeed. Mine was reading normally. A subsequent inspection by maintenance revealed that FMGC #1 had failed (and then fixed itself).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW REPORTS AIRSPEED INDICATION ANOMALIES DURING TKOF AND INITIAL CLIMB.

Narrative: ON TKOF FROM ZZZ; MY SPD TAPE AT ROTATION WAS GIVING ERRONEOUS READINGS SHOWING THE ACFT BELOW VLS. AS MY READINGS WERE FALSE I HAD NOT CALLED V1/VR BUT THE FO SAW THE SPDS AND ROTATED THE ACFT. AS I THOUGHT WE WERE TOO SLOW AND WAS QUITE SURPRISED BY THIS; I TOOK PRIORITY OF THE ACFT AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO TRY AND ACCELERATE -- NOT YET REALIZING WE WERE ALREADY FAST I THEN TRIED SEVERAL TIMES TO GIVE CTL BACK TO THE FO SO THAT I COULD TRY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. EACH TIME THE SPD READINGS I SAW WERE NOT SATISFACTORY AND WE WERE ACCELERATING. WE SUBSEQUENTLY GOT BOTH AN AUTOTHROTTLE OFF ECAM AND AN OVERSPEED; AT WHICH TIME THE FO MADE THE STATEMENT HE SAW APPROX 300 KTS. AT THIS POINT HE WAS AGAIN FLYING AND I HAD REALIZED THE ERRORS I WAS SEEING AND I INSTRUCTED HIM TO FLY MANUALLY; SLOW THE ACFT AND CONTINUE THE DEP WHILE I CLEANED UP THE ACFT. VERY SHORTLY AFTER THIS; MY SPD TAPE SUDDENLY RETURNED TO NORMAL. AFTER ASSESSING THE ACFT AND SYS AND CONSULTING WITH MAINT CTL; WE CONTINUED TO ZZZ1. WE SENT MAINT MESSAGES FOR A SPD ERROR/OVERSPEED AND THE STATUS SHOWED CAT I ONLY. MANY FACTORS TO THIS SITUATION INCLUDED THE DISTR OF A WINDSHEAR ALERT FOR XXR AT AROUND THE 80 KT CALL AND THEN THE SAME CALL FOR XXL AT ABOUT ROTATION. ALSO; MY INABILITY TO READ THE FO INSTS OR THE ECAM WITHOUT MANEUVERING QUITE A BIT TO COUNTERACT THE GLARE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 790810: THE FOLLOWING INCIDENT BEGAN ON TKOF ROLL. I WAS THE PF. THE TKOF ROLL BEGAN NORMALLY. AT SOME POINT DURING THE TKOF ROLL; ATC ANNOUNCED A WINDSHEAR ADVISORY WAS IN EFFECT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; THE CAPT MADE THE 80 KT CALL. THE ACFT FELT AND WAS ACTING NORMALLY DURING THE ROLL. IT SEEMED LIKE THE ROLL WAS LASTING LONGER THAN NORMAL AND I HADN'T HEARD A V1/VR CALL. I LOOKED DOWN AT THAT POINT AND SAW THE AIRSPD WELL ABOVE VR (160-170 KTS; I'D ESTIMATE). I DIDN'T KNOW WHY THE CALL HADN'T BEEN MADE; BUT SEEING THAT I WAS WELL ABOVE VR AND EVERYTHING FELT NORMAL; I INITIATED ROTATION. AT THAT POINT I HEARD THE CAPT SAY SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT 'KEEP THE NOSE DOWN.' I TOOK THIS TO MEAN THAT HE WANTED MORE AIRSPD FOR THE WINDSHEAR ADVISORY. SHORTLY AFTER THE ROTATION; THE CAPT TOOK CTL FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND THEN RETURNED CTL TO ME. I WAS AGAIN DIRECTED TO 'LOWER THE NOSE' WHICH I DID UNTIL WE REACHED THE FLAP LIMIT SPD. AT THAT POINT; I INCREASED PITCH TO KEEP THE ACFT FROM OVERSPEEDING THE FLAPS AND WAS AGAIN DIRECTED TO INCREASE AIRSPD. THE ACFT WAS FINALLY CLEANED UP AND WE CLBED THROUGH 3000 FT AGL AND I ASKED FOR MANAGED SPD AND FLEW TO OUR INITIAL LEVELOFF ALT OF 5000 FT. AT THAT POINT I SAW THE AIRSPD EXCEEDING 250 KTS EVEN THOUGH IT WAS MANAGED AT 250 KTS. I ALSO NOTICED THAT THE ENGS WERE PRODUCING FULL THRUST (WE WERE IN THE 'CL' DETENT AT THAT TIME; AUTOTHRUST ENGAGED). I WAS AGAIN DIRECTED TO INCREASE SPD AND AT THAT POINT I SAID 'I'M AT 300 KTS.' IT WAS AT THAT TIME WE REALIZED THAT THERE WAS AN AIRSPD INDICATION PROB. THE AUTOTHRUST WAS DISCONNECTED AND AS I WAS SLOWING BACK TO 250 KTS THE CAPT'S AIRSPD RETURNED TO NORMAL. I LEARNED LATER THAT THE CAPT'S AIRSPD INDICATOR WAS INDICATING AT AND SOMETIMES BELOW VLS; HENCE HIS CALLING FOR AIRSPD. MINE WAS READING NORMALLY. A SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION BY MAINT REVEALED THAT FMGC #1 HAD FAILED (AND THEN FIXED ITSELF).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.