Narrative:

The backgnd to this event is important because the captain has an accent and I have difficulty understanding him in both his diction and volume. The captain and I have flown before and he likes things his way. Although he does allow first officer input; I'm not always sure the message is conveyed because his actions rarely change from his original intent (ie; I've heard what you had to say but this is how it's going to be!). The captain was the PF and he expected and received the visual runway 27L. He had briefed a 'left turn' off the runway on A1. The captain also has a tendency to let the aircraft roll out after touchdown without much effort to make a timely turnoff. After touchdown; the controller asked us to make the A1 turnoff and the captain continued to let the aircraft roll through the intersection. I would surmise the speed may have been 80 KTS at the time; although I cannot be certain. The controller then asked us to hurry down to taxiway east and exit; again with a left turn. The controller then said 'I don't have time for that; so turn right on taxiway right.' the captain was at approximately 50 KTS or less when he started a left turn from centerline onto taxiway right. I strongly advocated more than once to turn right on taxiway right; but by the time captain had heard and understood my message (if at all); the aircraft was 90 degrees to the centerline headed for taxiway right. I thought about stomping on the brakes and grabbing the tiller but it would have required a 180 degree turn on the runway to get turned around and headed in the proper direction on taxiway right. As this air carrier does not teach the first officer's to taxi nor are we expected to take control of the aircraft during ground operations; I felt the safer course of action was to continue to advocate a turn in the proper direction but not take the aircraft from the captain. I did not see an imminent threat to the airframe or a person on the ground and; therefore; did not take the aircraft. The controller then informed us that we had made an illegal left turn and I decided to fill out the safety report. The captain was still unaware that he had turned the aircraft the wrong way after the event was complete. This further reinforced my belief that although the captain may have heard me strongly advocate turn right; he never got the meaning of my message.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FO DESCRIBES A CAPT'S ATTITUDE; BEHAVIOR AND ACTIONS LEADING UP TO AND FOLLOWING A TXWY INCURSION AFTER LANDING.

Narrative: THE BACKGND TO THIS EVENT IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE CAPT HAS AN ACCENT AND I HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING HIM IN BOTH HIS DICTION AND VOLUME. THE CAPT AND I HAVE FLOWN BEFORE AND HE LIKES THINGS HIS WAY. ALTHOUGH HE DOES ALLOW FO INPUT; I'M NOT ALWAYS SURE THE MESSAGE IS CONVEYED BECAUSE HIS ACTIONS RARELY CHANGE FROM HIS ORIGINAL INTENT (IE; I'VE HEARD WHAT YOU HAD TO SAY BUT THIS IS HOW IT'S GOING TO BE!). THE CAPT WAS THE PF AND HE EXPECTED AND RECEIVED THE VISUAL RWY 27L. HE HAD BRIEFED A 'L TURN' OFF THE RWY ON A1. THE CAPT ALSO HAS A TENDENCY TO LET THE ACFT ROLL OUT AFTER TOUCHDOWN WITHOUT MUCH EFFORT TO MAKE A TIMELY TURNOFF. AFTER TOUCHDOWN; THE CTLR ASKED US TO MAKE THE A1 TURNOFF AND THE CAPT CONTINUED TO LET THE ACFT ROLL THROUGH THE INTXN. I WOULD SURMISE THE SPD MAY HAVE BEEN 80 KTS AT THE TIME; ALTHOUGH I CANNOT BE CERTAIN. THE CTLR THEN ASKED US TO HURRY DOWN TO TXWY E AND EXIT; AGAIN WITH A L TURN. THE CTLR THEN SAID 'I DON'T HAVE TIME FOR THAT; SO TURN R ON TXWY R.' THE CAPT WAS AT APPROX 50 KTS OR LESS WHEN HE STARTED A L TURN FROM CTRLINE ONTO TXWY R. I STRONGLY ADVOCATED MORE THAN ONCE TO TURN R ON TXWY R; BUT BY THE TIME CAPT HAD HEARD AND UNDERSTOOD MY MESSAGE (IF AT ALL); THE ACFT WAS 90 DEGS TO THE CTRLINE HEADED FOR TXWY R. I THOUGHT ABOUT STOMPING ON THE BRAKES AND GRABBING THE TILLER BUT IT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY TO GET TURNED AROUND AND HEADED IN THE PROPER DIRECTION ON TXWY R. AS THIS ACR DOES NOT TEACH THE FO'S TO TAXI NOR ARE WE EXPECTED TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT DURING GND OPS; I FELT THE SAFER COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE A TURN IN THE PROPER DIRECTION BUT NOT TAKE THE ACFT FROM THE CAPT. I DID NOT SEE AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE AIRFRAME OR A PERSON ON THE GND AND; THEREFORE; DID NOT TAKE THE ACFT. THE CTLR THEN INFORMED US THAT WE HAD MADE AN ILLEGAL L TURN AND I DECIDED TO FILL OUT THE SAFETY RPT. THE CAPT WAS STILL UNAWARE THAT HE HAD TURNED THE ACFT THE WRONG WAY AFTER THE EVENT WAS COMPLETE. THIS FURTHER REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT ALTHOUGH THE CAPT MAY HAVE HEARD ME STRONGLY ADVOCATE TURN R; HE NEVER GOT THE MEANING OF MY MESSAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.