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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 792809 |
Time | |
Date | 200806 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
ASRS Report | 792809 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other other : 1 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Cabin Crew Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Cabin Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
On jun/xa/08; myself and amt #2 placarded the first class oven inoperative for a broken operating handle. Per the galley item and safety of the aircraft; we opened and collared the circuit breaker and locked the oven in the closed position and applied inoperative stickers. The following day at approximately XA00 on jun/xb/08 we were accomplishing the interior inspection per the ETOPS program and found ovens were in operating condition; but with 'inoperative' placards torn off; oven hot; circuit breaker closed; and broken handle thrown on top of galley cabinet. On jun/xa/08 while exiting aircraft; an angry question was posed to us as to why the oven was inoperative'ed by a flight attendant. I told her the handle was broken and the oven should not be operated because it could overheat. This is a clear violation of the placard with total disregard to the safety of the crew and passenger. On jun/xb/08 we were the first people on the aircraft after the passenger and flight crew deplaned from inbound trip. Retrain flight attendants to not ignore placards for safety reasons. Flight crew ignored warnings; bypassed deferral and opened circuit breaker to operate oven. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated only one of the two first class ovens was placarded inoperative. He was concerned that whoever tore off the 'inoperative' placard and pushed the circuit breaker back in; to operate the deferred oven; did not realize the safety issue with the oven door handle broken. Reporter also stated he has noticed what appears to be an increasing disregard for cabin items that have been placarded and deferred inoperative by maintenance; only to see these cabin items still being used; such as lavs; ovens; and sparking cabin inflight entertainment systems. Although these items may not be necessarily critical for aircraft performance; using and resetting circuit breakers does constitute a safety issue for crew and passengers. Overheating and electrical fires are possible results of this type of behavior.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A MECHANIC WHO HAD DEFERRED; OPENED AND COLLARED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER; PLACARDED AND LOCKED THE FIRST CLASS #2 OVEN IN THE CLOSED POSITION; NOTICED THE SAME B767-300 ON A RETURN FLT; WITH PLACARD TORN OFF; CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED AND OVEN OPERATING.
Narrative: ON JUN/XA/08; MYSELF AND AMT #2 PLACARDED THE FIRST CLASS OVEN INOP FOR A BROKEN OPERATING HANDLE. PER THE GALLEY ITEM AND SAFETY OF THE ACFT; WE OPENED AND COLLARED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AND LOCKED THE OVEN IN THE CLOSED POS AND APPLIED INOP STICKERS. THE FOLLOWING DAY AT APPROX XA00 ON JUN/XB/08 WE WERE ACCOMPLISHING THE INTERIOR INSPECTION PER THE ETOPS PROGRAM AND FOUND OVENS WERE IN OPERATING CONDITION; BUT WITH 'INOP' PLACARDS TORN OFF; OVEN HOT; CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED; AND BROKEN HANDLE THROWN ON TOP OF GALLEY CABINET. ON JUN/XA/08 WHILE EXITING ACFT; AN ANGRY QUESTION WAS POSED TO US AS TO WHY THE OVEN WAS INOP'ED BY A FLT ATTENDANT. I TOLD HER THE HANDLE WAS BROKEN AND THE OVEN SHOULD NOT BE OPERATED BECAUSE IT COULD OVERHEAT. THIS IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE PLACARD WITH TOTAL DISREGARD TO THE SAFETY OF THE CREW AND PAX. ON JUN/XB/08 WE WERE THE FIRST PEOPLE ON THE ACFT AFTER THE PAX AND FLT CREW DEPLANED FROM INBOUND TRIP. RETRAIN FLT ATTENDANTS TO NOT IGNORE PLACARDS FOR SAFETY REASONS. FLT CREW IGNORED WARNINGS; BYPASSED DEFERRAL AND OPENED CIRCUIT BREAKER TO OPERATE OVEN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED ONLY ONE OF THE TWO FIRST CLASS OVENS WAS PLACARDED INOP. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT WHOEVER TORE OFF THE 'INOP' PLACARD AND PUSHED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER BACK IN; TO OPERATE THE DEFERRED OVEN; DID NOT REALIZE THE SAFETY ISSUE WITH THE OVEN DOOR HANDLE BROKEN. REPORTER ALSO STATED HE HAS NOTICED WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN INCREASING DISREGARD FOR CABIN ITEMS THAT HAVE BEEN PLACARDED AND DEFERRED INOP BY MAINT; ONLY TO SEE THESE CABIN ITEMS STILL BEING USED; SUCH AS LAVS; OVENS; AND SPARKING CABIN INFLIGHT ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS. ALTHOUGH THESE ITEMS MAY NOT BE NECESSARILY CRITICAL FOR ACFT PERFORMANCE; USING AND RESETTING CIRCUIT BREAKERS DOES CONSTITUTE A SAFETY ISSUE FOR CREW AND PASSENGERS. OVERHEATING AND ELECTRICAL FIRES ARE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF THIS TYPE OF BEHAVIOR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.