Narrative:

On the downwind leg we were asked to slow down to 170 KTS for traffic. Our confign was flaps 10 degrees; landing gear up. ATC asked to keep our speed up during the approach. On final approach the captain asked for landing gear down; flaps 15 degrees; and shortly thereafter flaps 30 degrees 'before landing checklist' which I selected. We both noticed immediately that flaps were still stuck at flaps 10 degrees with the 'leading edge flaps transit' light illuminated. We quickly decided to initiate a go around in order to analyze the problem. ATC was notified; we received vectors; no emergency was declared at that point. We briefly talked to the flight attendants to inform them; who talked to the passenger. We discussed which checklist was applicable. Decided that it was the 'flaps; trailing edge: symmetrical non-normal/no flaps' checklist. After some troubleshooting; we determined that the flaps were indeed stuck in 10 degree position. We also checked aircraft system and circuit breakers and analyzed the entire scenario with less than 5000 pounds left for fuel and no opc (opc was MEL'ed and did not work). At that point we requested calculation from dispatch for flaps 10 degrees with a landing weight of 109.0 pounds. With no initial response; I contacted operations to get a patch through to dispatch. It took several attempts; then they started working on the patch. Dispatch came back at a later point asking about the flaps 10 degrees; but no numbers. Time was of the essence. Captain requested vectors back to the airport in order to avoid a low fuel situation. We received some vectors which would not take us toward the field at which point we deviated from the instructions slightly and immediately called ATC to inform them about our time constraints and that we needed a more direct vector. We briefed the checklist; which called for the alternate flap extension. During final we performed the alternate flap extension procedure with no results. In consideration of fuel load which was close to 4000 pounds; our airspeed at flaps 10 degrees; which was between 160-165 KTS; we declared an emergency at that time and requested runway xxr for landing as we were gaining on the traffic ahead on runway xxl and we preferred the longer runway. All applicable checklists have been completed. The dispatch patch came through on short final at which point we concentrated on the landing. We touched down between 155-160 KTS on maximum braking. When we taxied onto the taxiway; we called off the emergency vehicles. As we taxied toward the gate; I would have preferred to have maintenance check the brake temperatures before actually parking at the gate; but the captain opted to drive in to the gate. He notified the people on the ground about potentially hot brakes and I called maintenance out to check the brake temperatures at that point; which ended up at 495 degrees C and required 55 mins of cooling. Maintenance was going to release the aircraft after a short cycling of the flap-check without being able to duplicate the problem. Neither the captain nor I thought that was good enough. We asked for a supervisor who took the airplane OTS. Better education on this system with regards to the skew sensors on the -700. The maintenance supervisor told us that there have been problems in the past with that system; but neither the captain nor I have ever heard about this. We should try to not act so fast to put an airplane back on the line after an emergency was declared! Dispatch did not reply for 13 mins (ACARS) and when they did; they questioned our request instead of helping us. Operations took 3 of our calls before there was a reply; even though it was apparent that we had a problem. Communication between me and the captain could have been better. I felt I had no input on the decisions all the way to the brake problem. I am aware of my position as an first officer and not making the final call; but I did not feel very useful at all; which in my mind was fueled from a '1-way communication.' even the debrief was counterproductive. I believe that brake temperatures should have been checked before proceeding to jetway. I am not sure if a logbook entry for the hot brakes was made; but it should have! Supplemental information from acn 793806: as airspeed slowed through 160 KTS; I called for flaps 30 degrees. At that moment; we felt a momentary activation of the stick shaker. Note 1 of the procedure says to activate the alternate flap extension system momentarily to ensure the trailing edge flaps will operate with the alternate system. I chose to hold the checklist at this point because I did not want any more flaps out until we were on final and landing assured due to a rapidly deteriorating fuel state. There was a brief discussion between the first officer and me about whether we should approach the gate or not due to the possibility of hot brakes. I felt that at our landing weight/touchdown speed and the braking forces I used to stop the aircraft; the brakes might have exceeded maximum quick turn limits but I did not feel they posed a threat. It should be noted that the first officer did not agree with my decision to continue to the gate. I did stop the aircraft and we discussed this point; but not reaching an agreement; I elected to continue to the gate. I have great respect for this first officer and respect her opinion -- we simply did not agree on this point. Maintenance: when maintenance came in the cockpit; he put the flap handle up and of course the flaps worked just fine. He was ready to sign off the aircraft and put it back into service after brake cooling. It took a significant amount of discussion to get a maintenance supervisor involved and convinced that we had more than an out-of-sequence flap event.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 SUFFERS FLAPS STUCK AT 10 DEGREES ON FINAL APCH. LOW FUEL STATE; DEFERRED SYSTEMS; LACK OF TIMELY SUPPORT FROM DISPATCH AND POOR FLT CREW CRM CONTRIBUTE TO AN IMPERFECT BUT SAFE RESOLUTION.

Narrative: ON THE DOWNWIND LEG WE WERE ASKED TO SLOW DOWN TO 170 KTS FOR TFC. OUR CONFIGN WAS FLAPS 10 DEGS; LNDG GEAR UP. ATC ASKED TO KEEP OUR SPD UP DURING THE APCH. ON FINAL APCH THE CAPT ASKED FOR LNDG GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 15 DEGS; AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER FLAPS 30 DEGS 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' WHICH I SELECTED. WE BOTH NOTICED IMMEDIATELY THAT FLAPS WERE STILL STUCK AT FLAPS 10 DEGS WITH THE 'LEADING EDGE FLAPS TRANSIT' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. WE QUICKLY DECIDED TO INITIATE A GAR IN ORDER TO ANALYZE THE PROB. ATC WAS NOTIFIED; WE RECEIVED VECTORS; NO EMER WAS DECLARED AT THAT POINT. WE BRIEFLY TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO INFORM THEM; WHO TALKED TO THE PAX. WE DISCUSSED WHICH CHKLIST WAS APPLICABLE. DECIDED THAT IT WAS THE 'FLAPS; TRAILING EDGE: SYMMETRICAL NON-NORMAL/NO FLAPS' CHKLIST. AFTER SOME TROUBLESHOOTING; WE DETERMINED THAT THE FLAPS WERE INDEED STUCK IN 10 DEG POS. WE ALSO CHKED ACFT SYS AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND ANALYZED THE ENTIRE SCENARIO WITH LESS THAN 5000 LBS LEFT FOR FUEL AND NO OPC (OPC WAS MEL'ED AND DID NOT WORK). AT THAT POINT WE REQUESTED CALCULATION FROM DISPATCH FOR FLAPS 10 DEGS WITH A LNDG WT OF 109.0 LBS. WITH NO INITIAL RESPONSE; I CONTACTED OPS TO GET A PATCH THROUGH TO DISPATCH. IT TOOK SEVERAL ATTEMPTS; THEN THEY STARTED WORKING ON THE PATCH. DISPATCH CAME BACK AT A LATER POINT ASKING ABOUT THE FLAPS 10 DEGS; BUT NO NUMBERS. TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. CAPT REQUESTED VECTORS BACK TO THE ARPT IN ORDER TO AVOID A LOW FUEL SITUATION. WE RECEIVED SOME VECTORS WHICH WOULD NOT TAKE US TOWARD THE FIELD AT WHICH POINT WE DEVIATED FROM THE INSTRUCTIONS SLIGHTLY AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED ATC TO INFORM THEM ABOUT OUR TIME CONSTRAINTS AND THAT WE NEEDED A MORE DIRECT VECTOR. WE BRIEFED THE CHKLIST; WHICH CALLED FOR THE ALTERNATE FLAP EXTENSION. DURING FINAL WE PERFORMED THE ALTERNATE FLAP EXTENSION PROC WITH NO RESULTS. IN CONSIDERATION OF FUEL LOAD WHICH WAS CLOSE TO 4000 LBS; OUR AIRSPD AT FLAPS 10 DEGS; WHICH WAS BTWN 160-165 KTS; WE DECLARED AN EMER AT THAT TIME AND REQUESTED RWY XXR FOR LNDG AS WE WERE GAINING ON THE TFC AHEAD ON RWY XXL AND WE PREFERRED THE LONGER RWY. ALL APPLICABLE CHKLISTS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. THE DISPATCH PATCH CAME THROUGH ON SHORT FINAL AT WHICH POINT WE CONCENTRATED ON THE LNDG. WE TOUCHED DOWN BTWN 155-160 KTS ON MAX BRAKING. WHEN WE TAXIED ONTO THE TXWY; WE CALLED OFF THE EMER VEHICLES. AS WE TAXIED TOWARD THE GATE; I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE MAINT CHK THE BRAKE TEMPS BEFORE ACTUALLY PARKING AT THE GATE; BUT THE CAPT OPTED TO DRIVE IN TO THE GATE. HE NOTIFIED THE PEOPLE ON THE GND ABOUT POTENTIALLY HOT BRAKES AND I CALLED MAINT OUT TO CHK THE BRAKE TEMPS AT THAT POINT; WHICH ENDED UP AT 495 DEGS C AND REQUIRED 55 MINS OF COOLING. MAINT WAS GOING TO RELEASE THE ACFT AFTER A SHORT CYCLING OF THE FLAP-CHK WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROB. NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I THOUGHT THAT WAS GOOD ENOUGH. WE ASKED FOR A SUPVR WHO TOOK THE AIRPLANE OTS. BETTER EDUCATION ON THIS SYS WITH REGARDS TO THE SKEW SENSORS ON THE -700. THE MAINT SUPVR TOLD US THAT THERE HAVE BEEN PROBS IN THE PAST WITH THAT SYS; BUT NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I HAVE EVER HEARD ABOUT THIS. WE SHOULD TRY TO NOT ACT SO FAST TO PUT AN AIRPLANE BACK ON THE LINE AFTER AN EMER WAS DECLARED! DISPATCH DID NOT REPLY FOR 13 MINS (ACARS) AND WHEN THEY DID; THEY QUESTIONED OUR REQUEST INSTEAD OF HELPING US. OPS TOOK 3 OF OUR CALLS BEFORE THERE WAS A REPLY; EVEN THOUGH IT WAS APPARENT THAT WE HAD A PROB. COM BTWN ME AND THE CAPT COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER. I FELT I HAD NO INPUT ON THE DECISIONS ALL THE WAY TO THE BRAKE PROB. I AM AWARE OF MY POS AS AN FO AND NOT MAKING THE FINAL CALL; BUT I DID NOT FEEL VERY USEFUL AT ALL; WHICH IN MY MIND WAS FUELED FROM A '1-WAY COM.' EVEN THE DEBRIEF WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. I BELIEVE THAT BRAKE TEMPS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHKED BEFORE PROCEEDING TO JETWAY. I AM NOT SURE IF A LOGBOOK ENTRY FOR THE HOT BRAKES WAS MADE; BUT IT SHOULD HAVE! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 793806: AS AIRSPD SLOWED THROUGH 160 KTS; I CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS. AT THAT MOMENT; WE FELT A MOMENTARY ACTIVATION OF THE STICK SHAKER. NOTE 1 OF THE PROC SAYS TO ACTIVATE THE ALTERNATE FLAP EXTENSION SYS MOMENTARILY TO ENSURE THE TRAILING EDGE FLAPS WILL OPERATE WITH THE ALTERNATE SYS. I CHOSE TO HOLD THE CHKLIST AT THIS POINT BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT ANY MORE FLAPS OUT UNTIL WE WERE ON FINAL AND LNDG ASSURED DUE TO A RAPIDLY DETERIORATING FUEL STATE. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION BTWN THE FO AND ME ABOUT WHETHER WE SHOULD APPROACH THE GATE OR NOT DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF HOT BRAKES. I FELT THAT AT OUR LNDG WT/TOUCHDOWN SPD AND THE BRAKING FORCES I USED TO STOP THE ACFT; THE BRAKES MIGHT HAVE EXCEEDED MAX QUICK TURN LIMITS BUT I DID NOT FEEL THEY POSED A THREAT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE FO DID NOT AGREE WITH MY DECISION TO CONTINUE TO THE GATE. I DID STOP THE ACFT AND WE DISCUSSED THIS POINT; BUT NOT REACHING AN AGREEMENT; I ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO THE GATE. I HAVE GREAT RESPECT FOR THIS FO AND RESPECT HER OPINION -- WE SIMPLY DID NOT AGREE ON THIS POINT. MAINT: WHEN MAINT CAME IN THE COCKPIT; HE PUT THE FLAP HANDLE UP AND OF COURSE THE FLAPS WORKED JUST FINE. HE WAS READY TO SIGN OFF THE ACFT AND PUT IT BACK INTO SVC AFTER BRAKE COOLING. IT TOOK A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF DISCUSSION TO GET A MAINT SUPVR INVOLVED AND CONVINCED THAT WE HAD MORE THAN AN OUT-OF-SEQUENCE FLAP EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.