Narrative:

I landed long on runway X at ZZZ and stopped just short of the end of the runway with aggressive braking. I was inbound for a left midfield downwind entry to runway Y. I was just about to call entering the left midfield downwind runway Y (I believe I was less than 1 mi from the center of the runway) when the controller asked if I would be going to the FBO where the airplane I was flying is usually fueled first. I said that I was. He then stated '...turn south for a 1 mi right base to final runway X. Runway X cleared to land; wind calm.' it was clear to me that this was intended at shortening my taxi time to the FBO (which is at the end of runway X) and getting me on the ground and out of the pattern quicker to our mutual benefit. I was initially unsure of how to enter this approach for runway X; being not overly familiar with airport and answered the controller: 'you want me to make a 2 mi right base for runway X.' he replied; 'you can fly south and bring it straight to the numbers runway X; cleared to land runway X.' at this point I realized what he wanted me to do and seeing the numbers on runway X. I figured I'd head straight for them to expedite the approach and replied 'ok; I'll take it right to the numbers runway X...' I was at pattern altitude of 1500 ft MSL at approximately 80-85 KIAS with no flaps. I pulled the power back to idle and headed for the numbers picking up airspeed over 100 KIAS. I slipped the plane down some but when I recovered from the slip I was still over 80 KTS and well above the runway. I forced the plane down at about 80 KTS; bounced once I think; then slowed it down braking harder as I realized I was running out of runway. The last few seconds I was braking hard with the yoke back and the tires or brakes were squealing. There were no burns or bald spots on the tires postflt. Continuing this approach was obviously against better judgment. I never considered making a go around though the approach was obviously not stabilized. I did not consider that runway X at 4451 ft while not short; is shorter than runway Y which is 6548 ft. I was caught by surprise when instructed to make the runway X approach and should have turned it down because I was close to the airport and unsure of how to enter the approach despite the controller's clear instructions. If I had been asked if I wanted to use runway X; I think I would have said no; that I would rather continue the approach to runway Y because that is what I had planned on. As I turned inbound for runway X I realized I was high but didn't think a go around was necessary at that point which it certainly was. Instead I slipped the plane and lost a lot of altitude (which made me think I could get it down; though it would not be a 'normal' landing) but I also picked up a lot of speed (more of a dive than a slip) which did not bleed off as quickly as I thought it would in the flare. The fact that I never considered a go around (except when I saw I was running out of runway and then considered an attempt at a go around unsafe) was due to a couple of factors. The first is that I wanted to complete the landing to accommodate the controller who was accommodating me by giving me the runway X approach. Though I didn't think of it in these terms; I must have subconsciously thought that if I didn't accomplish the first approach I would have wasted the controller's efforts which; while true; was not a good reason to continue a bad approach. The second reason is that I also seem to subconsciously hold the attitude that making a go around is a failure and that I should be able to 'save' bad approachs. I have to consciously remind myself that a go around is normal maneuver and much better than trying to complete a bad approach. I've made some other long lndgs after high approachs because I didn't want to waste time at the end of a long and expensive flight. I also have to remind myself that it doesn't take long and isn't a big deal to do a lap of the pattern; especially considering the consequences that I was a few ft from making. I've read that this aversion to doing go around's (because they indicate failure) is common among students and I understand that this is a dangerous attitude. I thought I would be able to recognize this attitude inmyself but I have not on several occasions; this being the worst. That said; this landing was eye opening for me. I was lucky enough to keep the plane on the runway but will be far more willing to do go around's in the future. I also plan on practicing go around's as part of the pattern work I do to maintain proficiency. One final note; I did very few go around's in my primary training; mostly because my approachs were good. Nevertheless; I don't think there was enough emphasis on go around's in my training; enough to make choosing a go around automatic when needed; rather than to allow the aforementioned hazardous attitudes to cloud my judgment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C172 PILOT RCVD A RWY CHANGE AND CLRNC FOR A SHORT APCH BUT GOT HIGH AND FAST. AFTER LNDG; HARD BRAKING PREVENTED THE ACFT FROM A RWY END EXCURSION.

Narrative: I LANDED LONG ON RWY X AT ZZZ AND STOPPED JUST SHORT OF THE END OF THE RWY WITH AGGRESSIVE BRAKING. I WAS INBOUND FOR A L MIDFIELD DOWNWIND ENTRY TO RWY Y. I WAS JUST ABOUT TO CALL ENTERING THE L MIDFIELD DOWNWIND RWY Y (I BELIEVE I WAS LESS THAN 1 MI FROM THE CTR OF THE RWY) WHEN THE CTLR ASKED IF I WOULD BE GOING TO THE FBO WHERE THE AIRPLANE I WAS FLYING IS USUALLY FUELED FIRST. I SAID THAT I WAS. HE THEN STATED '...TURN S FOR A 1 MI R BASE TO FINAL RWY X. RWY X CLRED TO LAND; WIND CALM.' IT WAS CLR TO ME THAT THIS WAS INTENDED AT SHORTENING MY TAXI TIME TO THE FBO (WHICH IS AT THE END OF RWY X) AND GETTING ME ON THE GND AND OUT OF THE PATTERN QUICKER TO OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT. I WAS INITIALLY UNSURE OF HOW TO ENTER THIS APCH FOR RWY X; BEING NOT OVERLY FAMILIAR WITH ARPT AND ANSWERED THE CTLR: 'YOU WANT ME TO MAKE A 2 MI R BASE FOR RWY X.' HE REPLIED; 'YOU CAN FLY S AND BRING IT STRAIGHT TO THE NUMBERS RWY X; CLRED TO LAND RWY X.' AT THIS POINT I REALIZED WHAT HE WANTED ME TO DO AND SEEING THE NUMBERS ON RWY X. I FIGURED I'D HEAD STRAIGHT FOR THEM TO EXPEDITE THE APCH AND REPLIED 'OK; I'LL TAKE IT RIGHT TO THE NUMBERS RWY X...' I WAS AT PATTERN ALT OF 1500 FT MSL AT APPROX 80-85 KIAS WITH NO FLAPS. I PULLED THE PWR BACK TO IDLE AND HEADED FOR THE NUMBERS PICKING UP AIRSPD OVER 100 KIAS. I SLIPPED THE PLANE DOWN SOME BUT WHEN I RECOVERED FROM THE SLIP I WAS STILL OVER 80 KTS AND WELL ABOVE THE RWY. I FORCED THE PLANE DOWN AT ABOUT 80 KTS; BOUNCED ONCE I THINK; THEN SLOWED IT DOWN BRAKING HARDER AS I REALIZED I WAS RUNNING OUT OF RWY. THE LAST FEW SECONDS I WAS BRAKING HARD WITH THE YOKE BACK AND THE TIRES OR BRAKES WERE SQUEALING. THERE WERE NO BURNS OR BALD SPOTS ON THE TIRES POSTFLT. CONTINUING THIS APCH WAS OBVIOUSLY AGAINST BETTER JUDGMENT. I NEVER CONSIDERED MAKING A GAR THOUGH THE APCH WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT STABILIZED. I DID NOT CONSIDER THAT RWY X AT 4451 FT WHILE NOT SHORT; IS SHORTER THAN RWY Y WHICH IS 6548 FT. I WAS CAUGHT BY SURPRISE WHEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THE RWY X APCH AND SHOULD HAVE TURNED IT DOWN BECAUSE I WAS CLOSE TO THE ARPT AND UNSURE OF HOW TO ENTER THE APCH DESPITE THE CTLR'S CLR INSTRUCTIONS. IF I HAD BEEN ASKED IF I WANTED TO USE RWY X; I THINK I WOULD HAVE SAID NO; THAT I WOULD RATHER CONTINUE THE APCH TO RWY Y BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT I HAD PLANNED ON. AS I TURNED INBOUND FOR RWY X I REALIZED I WAS HIGH BUT DIDN'T THINK A GAR WAS NECESSARY AT THAT POINT WHICH IT CERTAINLY WAS. INSTEAD I SLIPPED THE PLANE AND LOST A LOT OF ALT (WHICH MADE ME THINK I COULD GET IT DOWN; THOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE A 'NORMAL' LNDG) BUT I ALSO PICKED UP A LOT OF SPD (MORE OF A DIVE THAN A SLIP) WHICH DID NOT BLEED OFF AS QUICKLY AS I THOUGHT IT WOULD IN THE FLARE. THE FACT THAT I NEVER CONSIDERED A GAR (EXCEPT WHEN I SAW I WAS RUNNING OUT OF RWY AND THEN CONSIDERED AN ATTEMPT AT A GAR UNSAFE) WAS DUE TO A COUPLE OF FACTORS. THE FIRST IS THAT I WANTED TO COMPLETE THE LNDG TO ACCOMMODATE THE CTLR WHO WAS ACCOMMODATING ME BY GIVING ME THE RWY X APCH. THOUGH I DIDN'T THINK OF IT IN THESE TERMS; I MUST HAVE SUBCONSCIOUSLY THOUGHT THAT IF I DIDN'T ACCOMPLISH THE FIRST APCH I WOULD HAVE WASTED THE CTLR'S EFFORTS WHICH; WHILE TRUE; WAS NOT A GOOD REASON TO CONTINUE A BAD APCH. THE SECOND REASON IS THAT I ALSO SEEM TO SUBCONSCIOUSLY HOLD THE ATTITUDE THAT MAKING A GAR IS A FAILURE AND THAT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO 'SAVE' BAD APCHS. I HAVE TO CONSCIOUSLY REMIND MYSELF THAT A GAR IS NORMAL MANEUVER AND MUCH BETTER THAN TRYING TO COMPLETE A BAD APCH. I'VE MADE SOME OTHER LONG LNDGS AFTER HIGH APCHS BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT TO WASTE TIME AT THE END OF A LONG AND EXPENSIVE FLT. I ALSO HAVE TO REMIND MYSELF THAT IT DOESN'T TAKE LONG AND ISN'T A BIG DEAL TO DO A LAP OF THE PATTERN; ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES THAT I WAS A FEW FT FROM MAKING. I'VE READ THAT THIS AVERSION TO DOING GAR'S (BECAUSE THEY INDICATE FAILURE) IS COMMON AMONG STUDENTS AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS A DANGEROUS ATTITUDE. I THOUGHT I WOULD BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE THIS ATTITUDE INMYSELF BUT I HAVE NOT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS; THIS BEING THE WORST. THAT SAID; THIS LNDG WAS EYE OPENING FOR ME. I WAS LUCKY ENOUGH TO KEEP THE PLANE ON THE RWY BUT WILL BE FAR MORE WILLING TO DO GAR'S IN THE FUTURE. I ALSO PLAN ON PRACTICING GAR'S AS PART OF THE PATTERN WORK I DO TO MAINTAIN PROFICIENCY. ONE FINAL NOTE; I DID VERY FEW GAR'S IN MY PRIMARY TRAINING; MOSTLY BECAUSE MY APCHS WERE GOOD. NEVERTHELESS; I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ENOUGH EMPHASIS ON GAR'S IN MY TRAINING; ENOUGH TO MAKE CHOOSING A GAR AUTO WHEN NEEDED; RATHER THAN TO ALLOW THE AFOREMENTIONED HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES TO CLOUD MY JUDGMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.