Narrative:

After switching frequencys from tower to departure; the flight was cleared to 'maintain 140.' since a slower aircraft took off in front of us and we were close to that heading (137 degree runway heading and on track) the clearance was read back 'maintain heading 140.' the controller did not challenge our readback until we departed the SID and he asked us where we were going. We replied that we were 'heading 140 climbing to 5000 ft.' he responded that he cleared us to 'climb to 140' which no one in the cockpit heard. We were then directed to turn left and resume the SID and climb to 140 which we did as expeditiously as possible. We discussed the event as a crew and believe that the error was not due to language or interpretation. Critical words were left out of the xmissions possibly due to equipment or task saturation but everyone in the cockpit heard the same thing or thought we did. It would be beneficial to review the tapes; not to place blame; but to learn where the communication between pilot and controller broke down. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised that controllers in germany do ordinarily include the words 'flight level XXX' in clrncs above the transition altitude. Reporter has been advised by the company that ATC has taken no enforcement action on the event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB FLT CREW CLRED VIA A SID INTERPRETS CLRNC TO 'MAINTAIN 140' AS A HEADING. DEP CTLR ALERTS THEM TO THE CONFUSION.

Narrative: AFTER SWITCHING FREQS FROM TWR TO DEP; THE FLT WAS CLRED TO 'MAINTAIN 140.' SINCE A SLOWER ACFT TOOK OFF IN FRONT OF US AND WE WERE CLOSE TO THAT HDG (137 DEG RWY HDG AND ON TRACK) THE CLRNC WAS READ BACK 'MAINTAIN HDG 140.' THE CTLR DID NOT CHALLENGE OUR READBACK UNTIL WE DEPARTED THE SID AND HE ASKED US WHERE WE WERE GOING. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE 'HDG 140 CLBING TO 5000 FT.' HE RESPONDED THAT HE CLRED US TO 'CLB TO 140' WHICH NO ONE IN THE COCKPIT HEARD. WE WERE THEN DIRECTED TO TURN L AND RESUME THE SID AND CLB TO 140 WHICH WE DID AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. WE DISCUSSED THE EVENT AS A CREW AND BELIEVE THAT THE ERROR WAS NOT DUE TO LANGUAGE OR INTERP. CRITICAL WORDS WERE LEFT OUT OF THE XMISSIONS POSSIBLY DUE TO EQUIP OR TASK SATURATION BUT EVERYONE IN THE COCKPIT HEARD THE SAME THING OR THOUGHT WE DID. IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO REVIEW THE TAPES; NOT TO PLACE BLAME; BUT TO LEARN WHERE THE COM BTWN PLT AND CTLR BROKE DOWN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER ADVISED THAT CTLRS IN GERMANY DO ORDINARILY INCLUDE THE WORDS 'FLIGHT LEVEL XXX' IN CLRNCS ABOVE THE TRANSITION ALTITUDE. REPORTER HAS BEEN ADVISED BY THE COMPANY THAT ATC HAS TAKEN NO ENFORCEMENT ACTION ON THE EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.