Narrative:

On approach; we decided to overfly the airport and enter a left pattern for runway 2. The first officer was the PF. We flew a tight pattern even though we were a bit high and fast; which I brought to the first officer's attention. After we got configured; the first officer overshot the runway on the base to final turn and attempted to correct and recapture centerline. On our turn from base to final; we drifted close to the hill on the approach end to runway 2. We heard the '500' ft call from the radar altimeter midway through the turn; at which point I instructed the first officer to start a climb. We were in about a 300 FPM descent at the time; which the first officer arrested. As soon as we were clear of the conflict with the hill; I instructed the first officer to initiate the missed approach and that we would try it again. At no point did the egpws activate; or was aggressive action needed to avoid an impact. We initiated the missed approach and flew a pattern to landing without incident. I believe that the largest factor in this incident was a lack of situational awareness on the part of the first officer. During the approach and on the briefing; I mentioned the hill to the first officer; and he said that he was familiar with the terrain. I saw the conflict coming; but I failed to prevent it from becoming an issue. I do not believe that this was an unsafe situation; but I did let it go too far.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DHC8 CAPTAIN FAILS TO MITIGATE UNSTABILIZED LNDG APCH BY FO UNTIL LATE IN THE EVENT.

Narrative: ON APCH; WE DECIDED TO OVERFLY THE ARPT AND ENTER A L PATTERN FOR RWY 2. THE FO WAS THE PF. WE FLEW A TIGHT PATTERN EVEN THOUGH WE WERE A BIT HIGH AND FAST; WHICH I BROUGHT TO THE FO'S ATTN. AFTER WE GOT CONFIGURED; THE FO OVERSHOT THE RWY ON THE BASE TO FINAL TURN AND ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT AND RECAPTURE CTRLINE. ON OUR TURN FROM BASE TO FINAL; WE DRIFTED CLOSE TO THE HILL ON THE APCH END TO RWY 2. WE HEARD THE '500' FT CALL FROM THE RADAR ALTIMETER MIDWAY THROUGH THE TURN; AT WHICH POINT I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO START A CLB. WE WERE IN ABOUT A 300 FPM DSCNT AT THE TIME; WHICH THE FO ARRESTED. AS SOON AS WE WERE CLR OF THE CONFLICT WITH THE HILL; I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO INITIATE THE MISSED APCH AND THAT WE WOULD TRY IT AGAIN. AT NO POINT DID THE EGPWS ACTIVATE; OR WAS AGGRESSIVE ACTION NEEDED TO AVOID AN IMPACT. WE INITIATED THE MISSED APCH AND FLEW A PATTERN TO LNDG WITHOUT INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THAT THE LARGEST FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT WAS A LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON THE PART OF THE FO. DURING THE APCH AND ON THE BRIEFING; I MENTIONED THE HILL TO THE FO; AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN. I SAW THE CONFLICT COMING; BUT I FAILED TO PREVENT IT FROM BECOMING AN ISSUE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS AN UNSAFE SITUATION; BUT I DID LET IT GO TOO FAR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.