Narrative:

During the climb phase of the flight; around 5000 ft; the fuel channel 1/2 caution message activated; followed by the left/right xfer sov message. I was the PF and instructed the first officer to run the QRH. The QRH instructions were to land at the nearest suitable airport. I chose to return back to ZZZ since it was approximately 15-20 mi behind us as we continued our climb up to 16000 ft while running the QRH. During the climb out and performing the checklist we had a left/right scav ejector message pop up then off. The fuel gauges were all indicating dash lines and the fuel page was showing no numbers. Sometime during the checklist; the fuel gauges came back on. However; the fuel was counting down the total fuel at a rapid rate as if the fuel was being poured out of the wings. Shortly after coming back on line; it went out again showing dash lines. I declared an emergency with ATC and advised that we would be returning to ZZZ for landing. The emergency equipment was dispatched as a precaution. Since the airport was close; VFR conditions and my first officer was preoccupied with other duties; I did not have time to notify company or maintenance control until after arriving back at the gate. During our flight back to ZZZ; I noticed that the controllers (yoke) had a tightness to the control inputs and was not the normal feel during normal flight conditions. Tower set us up on the localizer back course to runway 25R with the expect a visual when the airport was in sight. While on final approach; and flaps set to 20 degrees; I pushed the throttles up to the normal position for a power setting that usually provides the speed for approach. Unfortunately; the engines did not respond. I pushed the throttles up more with no results. The gauge was showing 30% on the engines with no increase as the throttles were advanced through its flight range. It was at this time I pushed the throttles to the climb detent. Approximately 5 seconds later the engines responded and provided power up to around 80%. Once the throttles were responding to my inputs; I was able to bring them back out of the climb detent and proceed as normal. After landing; and off the runway; I asked the first officer to pull back on the yoke. He advised that they were not working in a normal manner and were resistant. We pulled up to the gate and deplaned the passenger via the jetway. A flight attendant was sitting in the back close to the engines. She advised; after the flight was complete; she noticed that the engines did not sound normal during our final approach; which I concluded was about the time the throttles were not responding to my inputs. She described it as the engines were running out of gas and feared we would probably land in the ocean. During the throttle incident; that thought went through my mind as well. We did land overweight and it was noted in the maintenance log. During the descent back to the airport; I probably overloaded my first officer by keeping my speed up not allowing enough time for him to calmly perform the checklist. My speed stayed around 280 KTS below 10000 ft. Although he did a great job and an emergency was declared; I somehow got the idea that my throttle settings needed to be set to a higher setting due to my misunderstanding of the QRH. All I was thinking about was getting back to the airport. I also elected to keep hand flying the airplane even though there was tightness of the yoke control. I never activated the autoplt after takeoff. Once on the ground; I looked at the part of the QRH of power settings and realized that I misunderstood the meaning. I thought at the time; and the state of mindset that I was in of possibly losing fuel; the part of QRH stating engine thrust -- 'adjust as required to maintain equal fuel flow to the engines' was meaning to keep my power setting up at a higher rate to provide fuel to the engines. Thus; the reason for the higher than normal speed. I should have questioned the instructions and asked if the meaning meant what I thought. I could have slowed down allowing more time for the first officer. I chose to keep the autoplt off since I was already hand flying the airplane; and feeling the yoke having a resistant feel to it. I feared if I activated the autoplt if might have performed an abnormal jerk and disconnected. I also felt since we were close to the airport and in VFR conditions there was no reason to cause more panic should the autoplt not respond. While on final; I flew 180 KTS past the FAF as a result of the throttle problem as listed above. When the engines did not respond to the throttle input; I reflected back on the gauges; which came up momentarily; showing us losing fuel. I thought we ran out of fuel and were not going to make the airport. I had the airplane configured prior to 500 ft AGL and we performed a smooth landing. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised maintenance replaced a fuel quantity computer. There had been no actual loss of fuel. He further stated no problem had been found with either the throttle/fuel controller operation or the flight control feel system. The aircraft was returned to service later that day following maintenance inspections and replacement of the computer. Reporter feels he may have overreacted to a perceived delay in throttle response due to his anxiousness regarding the apparent loss of fuel and the desire to get on the ground as soon as possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARJ CAP ELECTS TO RETURN TO DEP ARPT WHEN MULTIPLE FUEL SYSTEM EICAS MESSAGES OCCUR AND FUEL QUANT GAUGES SHOW RAPID DECREASE IN QUANTITY AND THEN REVERT TO DASHES VICE NUMBERS.

Narrative: DURING THE CLB PHASE OF THE FLT; AROUND 5000 FT; THE FUEL CHANNEL 1/2 CAUTION MESSAGE ACTIVATED; FOLLOWED BY THE L/R XFER SOV MESSAGE. I WAS THE PF AND INSTRUCTED THE FO TO RUN THE QRH. THE QRH INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. I CHOSE TO RETURN BACK TO ZZZ SINCE IT WAS APPROX 15-20 MI BEHIND US AS WE CONTINUED OUR CLB UP TO 16000 FT WHILE RUNNING THE QRH. DURING THE CLBOUT AND PERFORMING THE CHKLIST WE HAD A L/R SCAV EJECTOR MESSAGE POP UP THEN OFF. THE FUEL GAUGES WERE ALL INDICATING DASH LINES AND THE FUEL PAGE WAS SHOWING NO NUMBERS. SOMETIME DURING THE CHKLIST; THE FUEL GAUGES CAME BACK ON. HOWEVER; THE FUEL WAS COUNTING DOWN THE TOTAL FUEL AT A RAPID RATE AS IF THE FUEL WAS BEING POURED OUT OF THE WINGS. SHORTLY AFTER COMING BACK ON LINE; IT WENT OUT AGAIN SHOWING DASH LINES. I DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND ADVISED THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO ZZZ FOR LNDG. THE EMER EQUIP WAS DISPATCHED AS A PRECAUTION. SINCE THE ARPT WAS CLOSE; VFR CONDITIONS AND MY FO WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER DUTIES; I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO NOTIFY COMPANY OR MAINT CTL UNTIL AFTER ARRIVING BACK AT THE GATE. DURING OUR FLT BACK TO ZZZ; I NOTICED THAT THE CTLRS (YOKE) HAD A TIGHTNESS TO THE CTL INPUTS AND WAS NOT THE NORMAL FEEL DURING NORMAL FLT CONDITIONS. TWR SET US UP ON THE LOC BACK COURSE TO RWY 25R WITH THE EXPECT A VISUAL WHEN THE ARPT WAS IN SIGHT. WHILE ON FINAL APCH; AND FLAPS SET TO 20 DEGS; I PUSHED THE THROTTLES UP TO THE NORMAL POS FOR A PWR SETTING THAT USUALLY PROVIDES THE SPD FOR APCH. UNFORTUNATELY; THE ENGS DID NOT RESPOND. I PUSHED THE THROTTLES UP MORE WITH NO RESULTS. THE GAUGE WAS SHOWING 30% ON THE ENGS WITH NO INCREASE AS THE THROTTLES WERE ADVANCED THROUGH ITS FLT RANGE. IT WAS AT THIS TIME I PUSHED THE THROTTLES TO THE CLB DETENT. APPROX 5 SECONDS LATER THE ENGS RESPONDED AND PROVIDED PWR UP TO AROUND 80%. ONCE THE THROTTLES WERE RESPONDING TO MY INPUTS; I WAS ABLE TO BRING THEM BACK OUT OF THE CLB DETENT AND PROCEED AS NORMAL. AFTER LNDG; AND OFF THE RWY; I ASKED THE FO TO PULL BACK ON THE YOKE. HE ADVISED THAT THEY WERE NOT WORKING IN A NORMAL MANNER AND WERE RESISTANT. WE PULLED UP TO THE GATE AND DEPLANED THE PAX VIA THE JETWAY. A FLT ATTENDANT WAS SITTING IN THE BACK CLOSE TO THE ENGS. SHE ADVISED; AFTER THE FLT WAS COMPLETE; SHE NOTICED THAT THE ENGS DID NOT SOUND NORMAL DURING OUR FINAL APCH; WHICH I CONCLUDED WAS ABOUT THE TIME THE THROTTLES WERE NOT RESPONDING TO MY INPUTS. SHE DESCRIBED IT AS THE ENGS WERE RUNNING OUT OF GAS AND FEARED WE WOULD PROBABLY LAND IN THE OCEAN. DURING THE THROTTLE INCIDENT; THAT THOUGHT WENT THROUGH MY MIND AS WELL. WE DID LAND OVERWT AND IT WAS NOTED IN THE MAINT LOG. DURING THE DSCNT BACK TO THE ARPT; I PROBABLY OVERLOADED MY FO BY KEEPING MY SPD UP NOT ALLOWING ENOUGH TIME FOR HIM TO CALMLY PERFORM THE CHKLIST. MY SPD STAYED AROUND 280 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. ALTHOUGH HE DID A GREAT JOB AND AN EMER WAS DECLARED; I SOMEHOW GOT THE IDEA THAT MY THROTTLE SETTINGS NEEDED TO BE SET TO A HIGHER SETTING DUE TO MY MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE QRH. ALL I WAS THINKING ABOUT WAS GETTING BACK TO THE ARPT. I ALSO ELECTED TO KEEP HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS TIGHTNESS OF THE YOKE CTL. I NEVER ACTIVATED THE AUTOPLT AFTER TKOF. ONCE ON THE GND; I LOOKED AT THE PART OF THE QRH OF PWR SETTINGS AND REALIZED THAT I MISUNDERSTOOD THE MEANING. I THOUGHT AT THE TIME; AND THE STATE OF MINDSET THAT I WAS IN OF POSSIBLY LOSING FUEL; THE PART OF QRH STATING ENG THRUST -- 'ADJUST AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN EQUAL FUEL FLOW TO THE ENGS' WAS MEANING TO KEEP MY PWR SETTING UP AT A HIGHER RATE TO PROVIDE FUEL TO THE ENGS. THUS; THE REASON FOR THE HIGHER THAN NORMAL SPD. I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND ASKED IF THE MEANING MEANT WHAT I THOUGHT. I COULD HAVE SLOWED DOWN ALLOWING MORE TIME FOR THE FO. I CHOSE TO KEEP THE AUTOPLT OFF SINCE I WAS ALREADY HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE; AND FEELING THE YOKE HAVING A RESISTANT FEEL TO IT. I FEARED IF I ACTIVATED THE AUTOPLT IF MIGHT HAVE PERFORMED AN ABNORMAL JERK AND DISCONNECTED. I ALSO FELT SINCE WE WERE CLOSE TO THE ARPT AND IN VFR CONDITIONS THERE WAS NO REASON TO CAUSE MORE PANIC SHOULD THE AUTOPLT NOT RESPOND. WHILE ON FINAL; I FLEW 180 KTS PAST THE FAF AS A RESULT OF THE THROTTLE PROB AS LISTED ABOVE. WHEN THE ENGS DID NOT RESPOND TO THE THROTTLE INPUT; I REFLECTED BACK ON THE GAUGES; WHICH CAME UP MOMENTARILY; SHOWING US LOSING FUEL. I THOUGHT WE RAN OUT OF FUEL AND WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE THE ARPT. I HAD THE AIRPLANE CONFIGURED PRIOR TO 500 FT AGL AND WE PERFORMED A SMOOTH LNDG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER ADVISED MAINT REPLACED A FUEL QUANTITY COMPUTER. THERE HAD BEEN NO ACTUAL LOSS OF FUEL. HE FURTHER STATED NO PROBLEM HAD BEEN FOUND WITH EITHER THE THROTTLE/FUEL CONTROLLER OPERATION OR THE FLT CONTROL FEEL SYSTEM. THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE LATER THAT DAY FOLLOWING MAINT INSPECTIONS AND REPLACEMENT OF THE COMPUTER. REPORTER FEELS HE MAY HAVE OVERREACTED TO A PERCEIVED DELAY IN THROTTLE RESPONSE DUE TO HIS ANXIOUSNESS REGARDING THE APPARENT LOSS OF FUEL AND THE DESIRE TO GET ON THE GND ASAP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.