Narrative:

Inbound flight arrived in ZZZ1 on aug/xa/08. While preflting the cockpit and reviewing the aircraft logbook in preparation to take it back to ZZZ2; I discovered what I determined to be an incorrect logbook write-up of an ETOPS-critical pitot static system failure prior to flight's departure from ZZZ2. Contrary to the deferral statements entered by ZZZ2 aircraft maintenance; the 'captain left pitot' and 'left auxiliary pitot' overhead light caps were actually functional (extinguished); and correctly indicating that those probes were being heated on the ground. In a properly functioning pitot heat system those probes should have been off and cool. I opened my cockpit window; reached out to the suspect probes; confirming that the captain left pitot and left auxiliary were hot. The other pitot-related light caps were correctly illuminated; indicating that those probes were unheated (they were confirmed cool). The logbook entries indicated that ZZZ2 aircraft maintenance had deferred the defective pitot heat system as just light caps 'inoperative' that morning prior to flight's departure. They were not 'inoperative' -- the pitot system had actually failed and the light caps were accurately indicating that failure. The captain left pitot and left auxiliary pitot were hot on ground with both main engines shut down. After analyzing the actual problem I called ZZZ1 aircraft maintenance and accurately entered the pitot system failure in the logbook. First officer then informed me that the inbound first officer had stated to him that the flight crew had conducted a prolonged discussion with ZZZ2 aircraft maintenance on this same discrepancy prior to departing ZZZ2 and the flight crew had 'pulled the pitot heat circuit breakers on the ground' to keep system from 'getting too hot on the ground.' no record of this action was entered in aircraft logbook and there was no record of any repair being made to the pitot heat system prior to flight's departure from ZZZ2 on aug/xa/08. All pitot heat circuit breakers were found in the normal ('pressed in') position when we arrived at the aircraft in ZZZ1 and conducted our preflight. ZZZ1 aircraft maintenance confirmed that the system was indeed not functioning properly and the aircraft was subsequently taken OTS for repair. That resulted in outbound flight being canceled; as well as inbound flight on the following morning. To recap: the aircraft X as presented to me in ZZZ1 on the gate was not legal for ETOPS/rvsm operation. The pitot system had been previously written up; deferred; not repaired; and then improperly diagnosed and again not repaired prior to flight's departure on aug/xa/08. I was very concerned that a potentially dangerous situation (inoperative pitot system/electrical fire) was not handled in compliance with federal regulations and air carrier procedures prior to flight departing on ETOPS/rvsm operation from ZZZ2 on aug/xa/08; and I immediately took steps to correctly address the aircraft status at the gate in ZZZ1. As a result of my actions; the aircraft pitot heat system was finally; and properly; repaired overnight and we operated aircraft X on flight the next day in full compliance with all rules; regulations; and prudent operational practices. I cannot explain; and am deeply concerned; that flight was allowed to depart ZZZ2 on aug/xa/08 with a pitot heat system that clearly was not operating correctly; was not in compliance with regulations and procedure; and that may have posed a danger to flight. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated; after he entered the pitot static failure in the logbook of the outbound B757-200; maintenance corrected the 'hot' pitot probes on the ground issue. New pitot probes and three relays were replaced. Reporter stated he did not know if the aircraft's 'air/ground' logic system relay box was replaced.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING PREFLIGHT OF A B757-200; PILOT NOTICED AN INCORRECT LOGBOOK WRITE-UP AND DEFERRAL OF AN ETOPS CRITICAL PITOT STATIC SYSTEM FAILURE. THE PITOT SYS WAS IMPROPERLY DIAGNOSED. OUTBOUND FLIGHT CANCELED.

Narrative: INBOUND FLT ARRIVED IN ZZZ1 ON AUG/XA/08. WHILE PREFLTING THE COCKPIT AND REVIEWING THE ACFT LOGBOOK IN PREPARATION TO TAKE IT BACK TO ZZZ2; I DISCOVERED WHAT I DETERMINED TO BE AN INCORRECT LOGBOOK WRITE-UP OF AN ETOPS-CRITICAL PITOT STATIC SYS FAILURE PRIOR TO FLT'S DEP FROM ZZZ2. CONTRARY TO THE DEFERRAL STATEMENTS ENTERED BY ZZZ2 ACFT MAINT; THE 'CAPT L PITOT' AND 'L AUX PITOT' OVERHEAD LIGHT CAPS WERE ACTUALLY FUNCTIONAL (EXTINGUISHED); AND CORRECTLY INDICATING THAT THOSE PROBES WERE BEING HEATED ON THE GND. IN A PROPERLY FUNCTIONING PITOT HEAT SYS THOSE PROBES SHOULD HAVE BEEN OFF AND COOL. I OPENED MY COCKPIT WINDOW; REACHED OUT TO THE SUSPECT PROBES; CONFIRMING THAT THE CAPT L PITOT AND L AUX WERE HOT. THE OTHER PITOT-RELATED LIGHT CAPS WERE CORRECTLY ILLUMINATED; INDICATING THAT THOSE PROBES WERE UNHEATED (THEY WERE CONFIRMED COOL). THE LOGBOOK ENTRIES INDICATED THAT ZZZ2 ACFT MAINT HAD DEFERRED THE DEFECTIVE PITOT HEAT SYS AS JUST LIGHT CAPS 'INOP' THAT MORNING PRIOR TO FLT'S DEP. THEY WERE NOT 'INOP' -- THE PITOT SYS HAD ACTUALLY FAILED AND THE LIGHT CAPS WERE ACCURATELY INDICATING THAT FAILURE. THE CAPT L PITOT AND L AUX PITOT WERE HOT ON GND WITH BOTH MAIN ENGS SHUT DOWN. AFTER ANALYZING THE ACTUAL PROB I CALLED ZZZ1 ACFT MAINT AND ACCURATELY ENTERED THE PITOT SYS FAILURE IN THE LOGBOOK. FO THEN INFORMED ME THAT THE INBOUND FO HAD STATED TO HIM THAT THE FLT CREW HAD CONDUCTED A PROLONGED DISCUSSION WITH ZZZ2 ACFT MAINT ON THIS SAME DISCREPANCY PRIOR TO DEPARTING ZZZ2 AND THE FLT CREW HAD 'PULLED THE PITOT HEAT CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON THE GND' TO KEEP SYS FROM 'GETTING TOO HOT ON THE GND.' NO RECORD OF THIS ACTION WAS ENTERED IN ACFT LOGBOOK AND THERE WAS NO RECORD OF ANY REPAIR BEING MADE TO THE PITOT HEAT SYS PRIOR TO FLT'S DEP FROM ZZZ2 ON AUG/XA/08. ALL PITOT HEAT CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE FOUND IN THE NORMAL ('PRESSED IN') POS WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE ACFT IN ZZZ1 AND CONDUCTED OUR PREFLT. ZZZ1 ACFT MAINT CONFIRMED THAT THE SYS WAS INDEED NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND THE ACFT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN OTS FOR REPAIR. THAT RESULTED IN OUTBOUND FLT BEING CANCELED; AS WELL AS INBOUND FLT ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING. TO RECAP: THE ACFT X AS PRESENTED TO ME IN ZZZ1 ON THE GATE WAS NOT LEGAL FOR ETOPS/RVSM OP. THE PITOT SYS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN UP; DEFERRED; NOT REPAIRED; AND THEN IMPROPERLY DIAGNOSED AND AGAIN NOT REPAIRED PRIOR TO FLT'S DEP ON AUG/XA/08. I WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION (INOP PITOT SYS/ELECTRICAL FIRE) WAS NOT HANDLED IN COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL REGS AND ACR PROCS PRIOR TO FLT DEPARTING ON ETOPS/RVSM OP FROM ZZZ2 ON AUG/XA/08; AND I IMMEDIATELY TOOK STEPS TO CORRECTLY ADDRESS THE ACFT STATUS AT THE GATE IN ZZZ1. AS A RESULT OF MY ACTIONS; THE ACFT PITOT HEAT SYS WAS FINALLY; AND PROPERLY; REPAIRED OVERNIGHT AND WE OPERATED ACFT X ON FLT THE NEXT DAY IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL RULES; REGS; AND PRUDENT OPERATIONAL PRACTICES. I CANNOT EXPLAIN; AND AM DEEPLY CONCERNED; THAT FLT WAS ALLOWED TO DEPART ZZZ2 ON AUG/XA/08 WITH A PITOT HEAT SYS THAT CLEARLY WAS NOT OPERATING CORRECTLY; WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH REGS AND PROC; AND THAT MAY HAVE POSED A DANGER TO FLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED; AFTER HE ENTERED THE PITOT STATIC FAILURE IN THE LOGBOOK OF THE OUTBOUND B757-200; MAINT CORRECTED THE 'HOT' PITOT PROBES ON THE GROUND ISSUE. NEW PITOT PROBES AND THREE RELAYS WERE REPLACED. REPORTER STATED HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE ACFT'S 'AIR/GROUND' LOGIC SYSTEM RELAY BOX WAS REPLACED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.