Narrative:

Issue 1: during main deck preflight checks; I found a pallet containing multiple boxes of potassium nitrate; which is a class 5.1 dangerous good (dg). The boxes were all properly labelled and the dg was declared on the pallet hazmat tag. However; there were no class 5.1 goods declared anywhere on the notice to captain (notoc). (There was also some boxes of nitric acid (a class 8; subclass 5.1 dg) on the pallet that was on the notoc.)resolution: the loadmaster removed the pallet from the aircraft; inspected it; added the [box of dg] to the notoc; and reloaded it onto the aircraft.issue 2: during main deck preflight checks; I found a pallet containing multiple boxes containing class 8 and class 4.3 dangerous goods. Class 8 and class 4.3 dg are incompatible dangerous goods according to the segregation chart - hazmat organization checklist and must be separated by 0.5 meters (19.5 inches). As they were in small boxes; it was impossible to determine if they were indeed segregated (and due to the small size of the boxes; incredibly unlikely. I'm not even sure the boxes were more than 19 inches long on the longest dimension.)resolution: the loadmaster removed the pallet from the aircraft; inspected it to ensure all boxes were identified that had class 8 and class 4.3; removed the affected boxes; and reloaded the pallet on the aircraft.issue 1: outside of the aircrew role; I do not know what checks are in place to ensure that hazmat loaded on a pallet is properly labelled and documented on both the pallet hazmat tag as well as the notoc. Obviously; a procedure is either missing; insufficient; or was not followed in this case. Recommend a top to bottom review of the procedures and training on them; as well as whether there should be two person verification involved to a single person won't inadvertently miss something of this import.issue 2: this baffles me. This is a complete breakdown of hazmat procedures from initial acceptance from the shipper; to processing the paperwork; loading the pallet; validating the hazmat; etc. In my opinion; this is likely evidence of serious systemic issues. Recommend investigating both this specific instance to find out how all the people in the process missed this obvious error as well as a look at the overall system; training; and organizational environment as I would suggest a single incident of this magnitude likely is happening without detection multiple times. Incompatible hazmat is a serious issue that can easily cause a hull loss and serious loss of life.general observation: hazmat; more so than our regular cargo; has a very detailed handling and documentation process with a large amount of training for all personnel involved. When we have multiple failures and issues on a single flight that is highly suggestive of much larger issues with large safety and regulatory impacts. These need to be fully identified and rectified before something bad happens.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 First Officer reported finding improperly loaded hazmat during their pre-flight check.

Narrative: Issue 1: During Main Deck Preflight checks; I found a pallet containing multiple boxes of Potassium Nitrate; which is a Class 5.1 Dangerous Good (DG). The boxes were all properly labelled and the DG was declared on the Pallet HAZMAT tag. However; there were no Class 5.1 goods declared anywhere on the Notice to Captain (NOTOC). (There was also some boxes of Nitric Acid (A Class 8; subclass 5.1 DG) on the pallet that was on the NOTOC.)Resolution: The loadmaster removed the pallet from the aircraft; inspected it; added the [box of DG] to the NOTOC; and reloaded it onto the aircraft.Issue 2: During Main Deck Preflight checks; I found a pallet containing multiple boxes containing Class 8 and Class 4.3 Dangerous Goods. Class 8 and Class 4.3 DG are Incompatible Dangerous Goods according to the Segregation Chart - HAZMAT Organization Checklist and must be separated by 0.5 meters (19.5 Inches). As they were in small boxes; it was impossible to determine if they were indeed segregated (and due to the small size of the boxes; incredibly unlikely. I'm not even sure the boxes were more than 19 inches long on the longest dimension.)Resolution: The loadmaster removed the pallet from the aircraft; inspected it to ensure all boxes were identified that had Class 8 and Class 4.3; removed the affected boxes; and reloaded the pallet on the aircraft.Issue 1: Outside of the aircrew role; I do not know what checks are in place to ensure that HAZMAT loaded on a pallet is properly labelled and documented on both the pallet HAZMAT tag as well as the NOTOC. Obviously; a procedure is either missing; insufficient; or was not followed in this case. Recommend a top to bottom review of the procedures and training on them; as well as whether there should be two person verification involved to a single person won't inadvertently miss something of this import.Issue 2: This baffles me. This is a complete breakdown of HAZMAT procedures from initial acceptance from the shipper; to processing the paperwork; loading the pallet; validating the HAZMAT; etc. In my opinion; this is likely evidence of serious systemic issues. Recommend investigating both this specific instance to find out how all the people in the process missed this obvious error as well as a look at the overall system; training; and organizational environment as I would suggest a single incident of this magnitude likely is happening without detection multiple times. Incompatible HAZMAT is a serious issue that can easily cause a hull loss and serious loss of life.General Observation: HAZMAT; more so than our regular cargo; has a very detailed handling and documentation process with a large amount of training for all personnel involved. When we have multiple failures and issues on a single flight that is highly suggestive of much larger issues with large safety and regulatory impacts. These need to be fully identified and rectified before something bad happens.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.