Narrative:

I was the first officer and PF; operating into msp. The flight operated normally until the initial arrival phase into msp. Arrival traffic into msp was being impacted by a significant WX system which dropped the airport arrival rate to less than 5 aircraft per hour. Our flight was originally cleared via the twolf 1 arrival. Due to severe WX along that arrival route; ZMP instructed us to fly direct to kaspr intersection and join the kaspr 3 arrival to msp. We were then issued holding instructions at kaspr to hold as published; legs at our discretion; and an efc of XA50Z. We did not have a sufficient fuel quantity for a hold of this duration. ZMP also advised that WX near kaspr might preclude holding but he wanted us to take a look and see if we could do it and advise. The captain started sending ACARS messages to the dispatcher in order to determine where we should divert to. As we approached kaspr; there was convective activity along both sides of the airway and a l-hand hold would be better than a r-hand. Radar depicted 2 level 1 cells approximately 10 mi east of kaspr. I determined that if we could not get left turns; a r-hand hold might work. Due to frequency congestion we could not contact ZMP prior to entering the hold. I had previously slowed to turbulent air penetration speed prior to hold entry. Upon rolling out on the outbound leg; a thunderstorm illuminated its presence immediately in front of the aircraft. I started a 1/2 standard rate turn back toward kaspr. The next 45-60 seconds were very exciting with moderate to severe turbulence. The captain asked me if I wanted to climb. I replied that if we could get clearance; it might get us out faster. In either case; we would exit the cell to the west shortly. Upon exiting the cell; I discovered that the autoplt was in vertical speed mode and that we had climbed 900 ft and were still climbing. I abruptly pushed the nose over and started back to FL320. About that time; ZMP called and said to immediately descend and maintain FL320 and to turn right to heading 090 degrees. There was traffic at 2 O'clock position and 4 mi converging at FL330. I got down to FL320 in about 30 seconds; and called center and told him that I was sorry for the altitude deviation; but I had just exited the thunderstorm that a 090 degree heading was going to put me right back in. He said that any northeast heading would work and to advise when I got on the 090 degree heading. Once we were on the 090 degree heading; I called center and advised of our status. The controller then started vectoring us to rst VOR. As the flight progressed; it became clear that 2 things were not going to happen. We were not going to get to msp any time soon; and the WX over rst was beginning to deteriorate rapidly. Compounding our predicament was the fact that the previous electrical encounter was beginning to manifest itself in system failures. First the captain's air data computer failed. Upon me noticing this failure; I talked the captain into diverting into rochester. During the descent; the captain's ahars failed and was soon followed by a rudder over-boost. All failures were handled through company established procedures. The flight landed normally and without further incident. In discussions with the captain the next day; I learned that he had never been in a WX system like that and had no idea how to handle it. He also admitted to selecting the vertical speed mode and not telling me that he did it. At the time he selected vertical speed mode; the aircraft was climbing; so the selection of the mode at that time assured that the autoplt continued a climb. He further said that he was trying to dial in a descent but turbulence threw his hand into the overhead and hurt him. I will be having a discussion with my airline's professional standards folks in the near future to discuss this pilot's CRM skills as the altitude deviation would not have happened if he had just told me he did it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WEATHER; TURBULENCE; LIGHTNING AND FUEL ISSUES COMBINE TO PROVIDE AN E145 FLT CREW A LITTLE MORE THAN THEY CAN HANDLE.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO AND PF; OPERATING INTO MSP. THE FLT OPERATED NORMALLY UNTIL THE INITIAL ARR PHASE INTO MSP. ARR TFC INTO MSP WAS BEING IMPACTED BY A SIGNIFICANT WX SYS WHICH DROPPED THE ARPT ARR RATE TO LESS THAN 5 ACFT PER HR. OUR FLT WAS ORIGINALLY CLRED VIA THE TWOLF 1 ARR. DUE TO SEVERE WX ALONG THAT ARR RTE; ZMP INSTRUCTED US TO FLY DIRECT TO KASPR INTXN AND JOIN THE KASPR 3 ARR TO MSP. WE WERE THEN ISSUED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AT KASPR TO HOLD AS PUBLISHED; LEGS AT OUR DISCRETION; AND AN EFC OF XA50Z. WE DID NOT HAVE A SUFFICIENT FUEL QUANTITY FOR A HOLD OF THIS DURATION. ZMP ALSO ADVISED THAT WX NEAR KASPR MIGHT PRECLUDE HOLDING BUT HE WANTED US TO TAKE A LOOK AND SEE IF WE COULD DO IT AND ADVISE. THE CAPT STARTED SENDING ACARS MESSAGES TO THE DISPATCHER IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHERE WE SHOULD DIVERT TO. AS WE APCHED KASPR; THERE WAS CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE AIRWAY AND A L-HAND HOLD WOULD BE BETTER THAN A R-HAND. RADAR DEPICTED 2 LEVEL 1 CELLS APPROX 10 MI E OF KASPR. I DETERMINED THAT IF WE COULD NOT GET L TURNS; A R-HAND HOLD MIGHT WORK. DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION WE COULD NOT CONTACT ZMP PRIOR TO ENTERING THE HOLD. I HAD PREVIOUSLY SLOWED TO TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION SPD PRIOR TO HOLD ENTRY. UPON ROLLING OUT ON THE OUTBOUND LEG; A TSTM ILLUMINATED ITS PRESENCE IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THE ACFT. I STARTED A 1/2 STANDARD RATE TURN BACK TOWARD KASPR. THE NEXT 45-60 SECONDS WERE VERY EXCITING WITH MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB. THE CAPT ASKED ME IF I WANTED TO CLB. I REPLIED THAT IF WE COULD GET CLRNC; IT MIGHT GET US OUT FASTER. IN EITHER CASE; WE WOULD EXIT THE CELL TO THE W SHORTLY. UPON EXITING THE CELL; I DISCOVERED THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS IN VERT SPD MODE AND THAT WE HAD CLBED 900 FT AND WERE STILL CLBING. I ABRUPTLY PUSHED THE NOSE OVER AND STARTED BACK TO FL320. ABOUT THAT TIME; ZMP CALLED AND SAID TO IMMEDIATELY DSND AND MAINTAIN FL320 AND TO TURN R TO HDG 090 DEGS. THERE WAS TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK POS AND 4 MI CONVERGING AT FL330. I GOT DOWN TO FL320 IN ABOUT 30 SECONDS; AND CALLED CTR AND TOLD HIM THAT I WAS SORRY FOR THE ALTDEV; BUT I HAD JUST EXITED THE TSTM THAT A 090 DEG HDG WAS GOING TO PUT ME RIGHT BACK IN. HE SAID THAT ANY NE HDG WOULD WORK AND TO ADVISE WHEN I GOT ON THE 090 DEG HDG. ONCE WE WERE ON THE 090 DEG HDG; I CALLED CTR AND ADVISED OF OUR STATUS. THE CTLR THEN STARTED VECTORING US TO RST VOR. AS THE FLT PROGRESSED; IT BECAME CLR THAT 2 THINGS WERE NOT GOING TO HAPPEN. WE WERE NOT GOING TO GET TO MSP ANY TIME SOON; AND THE WX OVER RST WAS BEGINNING TO DETERIORATE RAPIDLY. COMPOUNDING OUR PREDICAMENT WAS THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS ELECTRICAL ENCOUNTER WAS BEGINNING TO MANIFEST ITSELF IN SYS FAILURES. FIRST THE CAPT'S ADC FAILED. UPON ME NOTICING THIS FAILURE; I TALKED THE CAPT INTO DIVERTING INTO ROCHESTER. DURING THE DSCNT; THE CAPT'S AHARS FAILED AND WAS SOON FOLLOWED BY A RUDDER OVER-BOOST. ALL FAILURES WERE HANDLED THROUGH COMPANY ESTABLISHED PROCS. THE FLT LANDED NORMALLY AND WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CAPT THE NEXT DAY; I LEARNED THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN IN A WX SYS LIKE THAT AND HAD NO IDEA HOW TO HANDLE IT. HE ALSO ADMITTED TO SELECTING THE VERT SPD MODE AND NOT TELLING ME THAT HE DID IT. AT THE TIME HE SELECTED VERT SPD MODE; THE ACFT WAS CLBING; SO THE SELECTION OF THE MODE AT THAT TIME ASSURED THAT THE AUTOPLT CONTINUED A CLB. HE FURTHER SAID THAT HE WAS TRYING TO DIAL IN A DSCNT BUT TURB THREW HIS HAND INTO THE OVERHEAD AND HURT HIM. I WILL BE HAVING A DISCUSSION WITH MY AIRLINE'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOLKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS THIS PLT'S CRM SKILLS AS THE ALTDEV WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF HE HAD JUST TOLD ME HE DID IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.