Narrative:

Both aircraft were on vectors for the same runway. The H/B777 was inbound from the east; and the H/B744 was inbound from the west. I vectored the west arrival a little wide and issued a speed restr of 210 KTS about 25 mi west of the airport to allow the H/B777 to remain #1 -- a sequencing call I should have later changed. I had the H/B777 on a modified 8 mi downwind and when I began to base him to a normal 6 mi final; he requested to extend another mi and a half. I figured it would still work; so I widened the H/B744 another 20; slowed him to 190 or 180 because he was still showing 290 across the ground even though I'd slowed him to 210 KTS previously. I told the H/B744 to expect a vector across the final. I based the H/B777 and cleared him for the visual approach with a speed assignment of 180 KTS to a 5 mi final; since I didn't want him slowing further. To this point in my shift; every aircraft had their traffic and the field in sight with no difficulty -- some calling the field 50 mi out; so I had no indication that the H/B744 would not call his traffic to follow in sight. I pointed out the traffic to follow and he said 'looking.' I turned the H/B744 right to 110 to get behind the H/B777 and waited until I had 4 mi between them to clear him for approach (all this time I had kept him 1000 ft or more above the H/B777). After clearing him for approach; I advised the H/B744 to slow to 180 KTS or less and exchanged traffic again; to which he called the H/B777 in sight. The H/B777 was already on tower frequency by this time and was slowing so I was concerned about compression because of runway acceptance. I told the tower that the H/B744 had the traffic in sight and following him; and the tower advised the H/B777 was prepped for minimum time on runway; so I believed the sequence would work. It would be close; but it should work. The H/B777 did not make the high-speed diagonal taxiway so the H/B744 was instructed to go around on about a 3 mi final. There was a chain of events here that I should have recognized and been more attentive. First and foremost; I came to work sick. I've been sick all week and not 100%. I am feeling 'better' but not 'well.' staffing is deplorable and I was the only person scheduled on this shift until a supervisor was called in on overtime to work it with me. Second; not being well rested and as alert; I thought I could 'stuff' this downwind in ahead of a straight in and I just should not have tried to make it happen. All things being equal; the sequence could have gone either way; and I chose the hard way. I always tell my trainees that 'if you vector a guy across the localizer more than once; you made a bad sequence call' and those words were ringing in my ear this whole time. Still; I stubbornly clung to the hope my sequence would work. Third; the H/B744 pilot did not slow as anticipated/instructed. He later refused to call his traffic in sight until my very next transmission was to cancel his approach and break him out. He was combative all the way in. Fourth; when the H/B777 requested to extend one more mi and a half; I considered but did not change the sequence then. I could have extended him out to be #2 and it would have been a non-event. I also train my trainees that 'a straight-in beats a base; which beats a downwind' when determining a sequence on final. I should have obeyed this credo too and made the H/B744 #1 and this would have been a non-event. Fifth; I should have requested sooner that the H/B777 was flying a much slower final approach speed inside the marker than the H/B744 could and broke #2 out instead of giving him to the tower; thinking the first guy would be off the runway in time. Sixth; I have seen a similar situation before when I first got here at this facility where an MD11 and H/B747 got too close on final after I'd vectored trying to get a downwind in ahead of a straight in. I knew better than to let a crappy sequence play out this way; but I was not 100% and though I wasn't inattentive (I saw it was just not working like I wanted) I didn't want to admit it was too close and make #2 fly another 8 or 10 mi by boxing him around due to my bad call. In the end; he had to go around anyway and fly back out to a 8 mi final costing him more than it would have if I'd have just broke him out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A11 CTLR'S SEQUENCE AND SPACING RESULTED IN GAR WHEN SECOND ACFT; ON A VISUAL APCH; WAS TOO CLOSE TO FIRST LNDG ACFT.

Narrative: BOTH ACFT WERE ON VECTORS FOR THE SAME RWY. THE H/B777 WAS INBOUND FROM THE E; AND THE H/B744 WAS INBOUND FROM THE W. I VECTORED THE W ARR A LITTLE WIDE AND ISSUED A SPD RESTR OF 210 KTS ABOUT 25 MI W OF THE ARPT TO ALLOW THE H/B777 TO REMAIN #1 -- A SEQUENCING CALL I SHOULD HAVE LATER CHANGED. I HAD THE H/B777 ON A MODIFIED 8 MI DOWNWIND AND WHEN I BEGAN TO BASE HIM TO A NORMAL 6 MI FINAL; HE REQUESTED TO EXTEND ANOTHER MI AND A HALF. I FIGURED IT WOULD STILL WORK; SO I WIDENED THE H/B744 ANOTHER 20; SLOWED HIM TO 190 OR 180 BECAUSE HE WAS STILL SHOWING 290 ACROSS THE GND EVEN THOUGH I'D SLOWED HIM TO 210 KTS PREVIOUSLY. I TOLD THE H/B744 TO EXPECT A VECTOR ACROSS THE FINAL. I BASED THE H/B777 AND CLRED HIM FOR THE VISUAL APCH WITH A SPD ASSIGNMENT OF 180 KTS TO A 5 MI FINAL; SINCE I DIDN'T WANT HIM SLOWING FURTHER. TO THIS POINT IN MY SHIFT; EVERY ACFT HAD THEIR TFC AND THE FIELD IN SIGHT WITH NO DIFFICULTY -- SOME CALLING THE FIELD 50 MI OUT; SO I HAD NO INDICATION THAT THE H/B744 WOULD NOT CALL HIS TFC TO FOLLOW IN SIGHT. I POINTED OUT THE TFC TO FOLLOW AND HE SAID 'LOOKING.' I TURNED THE H/B744 R TO 110 TO GET BEHIND THE H/B777 AND WAITED UNTIL I HAD 4 MI BTWN THEM TO CLR HIM FOR APCH (ALL THIS TIME I HAD KEPT HIM 1000 FT OR MORE ABOVE THE H/B777). AFTER CLRING HIM FOR APCH; I ADVISED THE H/B744 TO SLOW TO 180 KTS OR LESS AND EXCHANGED TFC AGAIN; TO WHICH HE CALLED THE H/B777 IN SIGHT. THE H/B777 WAS ALREADY ON TWR FREQ BY THIS TIME AND WAS SLOWING SO I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT COMPRESSION BECAUSE OF RWY ACCEPTANCE. I TOLD THE TWR THAT THE H/B744 HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AND FOLLOWING HIM; AND THE TWR ADVISED THE H/B777 WAS PREPPED FOR MINIMUM TIME ON RWY; SO I BELIEVED THE SEQUENCE WOULD WORK. IT WOULD BE CLOSE; BUT IT SHOULD WORK. THE H/B777 DID NOT MAKE THE HIGH-SPD DIAGONAL TXWY SO THE H/B744 WAS INSTRUCTED TO GO AROUND ON ABOUT A 3 MI FINAL. THERE WAS A CHAIN OF EVENTS HERE THAT I SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED AND BEEN MORE ATTENTIVE. FIRST AND FOREMOST; I CAME TO WORK SICK. I'VE BEEN SICK ALL WEEK AND NOT 100%. I AM FEELING 'BETTER' BUT NOT 'WELL.' STAFFING IS DEPLORABLE AND I WAS THE ONLY PERSON SCHEDULED ON THIS SHIFT UNTIL A SUPVR WAS CALLED IN ON OVERTIME TO WORK IT WITH ME. SECOND; NOT BEING WELL RESTED AND AS ALERT; I THOUGHT I COULD 'STUFF' THIS DOWNWIND IN AHEAD OF A STRAIGHT IN AND I JUST SHOULD NOT HAVE TRIED TO MAKE IT HAPPEN. ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL; THE SEQUENCE COULD HAVE GONE EITHER WAY; AND I CHOSE THE HARD WAY. I ALWAYS TELL MY TRAINEES THAT 'IF YOU VECTOR A GUY ACROSS THE LOC MORE THAN ONCE; YOU MADE A BAD SEQUENCE CALL' AND THOSE WORDS WERE RINGING IN MY EAR THIS WHOLE TIME. STILL; I STUBBORNLY CLUNG TO THE HOPE MY SEQUENCE WOULD WORK. THIRD; THE H/B744 PLT DID NOT SLOW AS ANTICIPATED/INSTRUCTED. HE LATER REFUSED TO CALL HIS TFC IN SIGHT UNTIL MY VERY NEXT XMISSION WAS TO CANCEL HIS APCH AND BREAK HIM OUT. HE WAS COMBATIVE ALL THE WAY IN. FOURTH; WHEN THE H/B777 REQUESTED TO EXTEND ONE MORE MI AND A HALF; I CONSIDERED BUT DID NOT CHANGE THE SEQUENCE THEN. I COULD HAVE EXTENDED HIM OUT TO BE #2 AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A NON-EVENT. I ALSO TRAIN MY TRAINEES THAT 'A STRAIGHT-IN BEATS A BASE; WHICH BEATS A DOWNWIND' WHEN DETERMINING A SEQUENCE ON FINAL. I SHOULD HAVE OBEYED THIS CREDO TOO AND MADE THE H/B744 #1 AND THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A NON-EVENT. FIFTH; I SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED SOONER THAT THE H/B777 WAS FLYING A MUCH SLOWER FINAL APCH SPD INSIDE THE MARKER THAN THE H/B744 COULD AND BROKE #2 OUT INSTEAD OF GIVING HIM TO THE TWR; THINKING THE FIRST GUY WOULD BE OFF THE RWY IN TIME. SIXTH; I HAVE SEEN A SIMILAR SITUATION BEFORE WHEN I FIRST GOT HERE AT THIS FACILITY WHERE AN MD11 AND H/B747 GOT TOO CLOSE ON FINAL AFTER I'D VECTORED TRYING TO GET A DOWNWIND IN AHEAD OF A STRAIGHT IN. I KNEW BETTER THAN TO LET A CRAPPY SEQUENCE PLAY OUT THIS WAY; BUT I WAS NOT 100% AND THOUGH I WASN'T INATTENTIVE (I SAW IT WAS JUST NOT WORKING LIKE I WANTED) I DIDN'T WANT TO ADMIT IT WAS TOO CLOSE AND MAKE #2 FLY ANOTHER 8 OR 10 MI BY BOXING HIM AROUND DUE TO MY BAD CALL. IN THE END; HE HAD TO GO AROUND ANYWAY AND FLY BACK OUT TO A 8 MI FINAL COSTING HIM MORE THAN IT WOULD HAVE IF I'D HAVE JUST BROKE HIM OUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.