Narrative:

Off ATCT had at least one heavy K35 in the VFR traffic pattern and requested radar west to put aircraft X; a PA28; on a 13 mile final; apparently to make room for a K35 to be based in front of him. There was not room to put aircraft X on that long of final; however the radar west controller allowed aircraft X to fly through final far enough to give the tower the same distance that the 13 mile final would have given. Radar west then turned aircraft X back to final; issued an ILS approach clearance and shortly after switched aircraft X to off ATCT. I was monitoring four positions and switched my attention to the radar final at oma. When I looked back at the off final I could see that a K35 was on a base that would lead to a final that could put less than 5/6 miles between the K35 and aircraft X. Off ATCT called on the land line and stated that they were breaking aircraft X out; however I did not observe aircraft X turning off the final. Shortly after that off ATCT asked us to try switching aircraft X again. By this time the K35 was no longer observed on radar (landed on runway 30) when the radar west controller instructed aircraft X to contact off ATCT; aircraft X responded; apparently he had not taken the first switch. I felt off ATCT made a bad call by turning the K35 in front of aircraft X who was established on the ILS final; other options were available that would not have put the heavy in front of the PA28. We did not have a point out on the K35 and were not responsible for the sequence; however we would have; or could have; broken aircraft X out had we known that the K35 was going to be taken out so far and put in front of aircraft X. Recommendation; better coordination and be clear about the sequence. The radar west controller was not given the full picture by off ATCT. Off ATCT could have instructed radar west to follow the K35 thereby removing the assumptions/guessing. Off ATCT also had several options to make the sequence work including spinning the KC35 on downwind or extending down wind to follow aircraft X. The option chosen put separation at risk.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: R90 Controller described questionable wake separation event when OFF Tower Controller elected to change RADAR Controller's sequence; noting failed coordination between the two facilities.

Narrative: OFF ATCT had at least one Heavy K35 in the VFR traffic pattern and requested Radar West to put Aircraft X; a PA28; on a 13 mile final; apparently to make room for a K35 to be based in front of him. There was not room to put Aircraft X on that long of final; however the Radar West Controller allowed Aircraft X to fly through final far enough to give the tower the same distance that the 13 mile final would have given. Radar West then turned Aircraft X back to final; issued an ILS approach clearance and shortly after switched Aircraft X to OFF ATCT. I was monitoring four positions and switched my attention to the Radar final at OMA. When I looked back at the OFF final I could see that a K35 was on a base that would lead to a final that could put less than 5/6 miles between the K35 and Aircraft X. OFF ATCT called on the land line and stated that they were breaking Aircraft X out; however I did not observe Aircraft X turning off the final. Shortly after that OFF ATCT asked us to try switching Aircraft X again. By this time the K35 was no longer observed on Radar (landed on Runway 30) When the Radar West Controller instructed Aircraft X to contact OFF ATCT; Aircraft X responded; apparently he had not taken the first switch. I felt OFF ATCT made a bad call by turning the K35 in front of Aircraft X who was established on the ILS final; other options were available that would not have put the heavy in front of the PA28. We did not have a point out on the K35 and were not responsible for the sequence; however we would have; or could have; broken Aircraft X out had we known that the K35 was going to be taken out so far and put in front of Aircraft X. Recommendation; better coordination and be clear about the sequence. The Radar West Controller was not given the full picture by OFF ATCT. OFF ATCT could have instructed Radar West to follow the K35 thereby removing the assumptions/guessing. OFF ATCT also had several options to make the sequence work including spinning the KC35 on downwind or extending down wind to follow Aircraft X. The option chosen put separation at risk.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.