Narrative:

We were utilizing an unusual runway configuration due to line painting on runway 10/28; which was closed. The advertised departure runways were 24L and 24R; with ground control selecting the best runway based on arrival demand to 24L; the only available landing runway. I was the controller in charge; and was preparing to begin a position relief briefing as the event unfolded. I became aware of the developing situation when the local controller called out to me; at which point I observed an E145 on departure roll on 24L; with another E145 flaring for landing on short final. At first glance it immediately became apparent to me that if allowed to land; the second E145 would be less than 6;000 ft from the departing aircraft. The local controller seemed to be soliciting my opinion on whether to allow the arrival aircraft to land; which while resulting in a loss of separation; might theoretically be safer than issuing a go-around. My snap decision was that the safest decision was to send the arrival around; which I vocalized immediately to the local controller. The instruction was delayed due to another aircraft checking in; but as soon as he was able; the local controller issued the go-around. The local controller stated; 'E145; go around; right side.' the phraseology was unfamiliar to me; and I presumed it would be unfamiliar to the pilot as well. I told the local controller to assign a heading to the go-around aircraft; which was now climbing with the departure aircraft just ahead of him. I am not entirely sure where the resulting confusion came from; whether it was a mixed up call sign or simply the wrong aircraft taking the turn; but the departure aircraft began a turn to the right; which is what the local controller intended for the trailing aircraft to do. The local controller stopped the first aircraft's turn; and then turned the trailing aircraft right to a northwesterly heading; established divergence and switched both aircraft to departure. During this sequence; the amass had triggered an alarm. I was aware of the situation before the amass alert sounded; and was quite intently focused on the events outside the tower window; to the point that I did not consciously note the amass alert and had to be told later that it had in fact; sounded an alert. I believed the go around was issued before the second aircraft crossed the threshold; thus preventing a loss of separation; but after 'reconstructing' the event some time later; I am no longer certain that separation was not lost. In any case it was not a desirable operation. Having only been made aware of the situation after it was well underway; I can only speculate on the causes; but a few causes seem obvious. 1. The local controller's decision to attempt to launch a departure between two arrival aircraft which were ultimately too close together to allow a same-runway departure between them. 2. The local controller's hesitation to issue mitigating instructions (a request for south turns or more timely go-around instructions) 3. The ground controller's decision to taxi the departure aircraft to the lone arrival runway at a time when arrival demand was starting to increase. Also contributing were the local controller's relatively low currency in the tower; and the fact that I did not recognize the developing situation due to being 'heads down' at the cru-art station; looking at the staffing situation and being relatively unaware of the traffic situation. Recommendation; at the time of the incident; I was the most senior and experienced controller in the tower. If I could do it over again; I would have paid closer attention to what the front line was doing; and had I been watching more closely; I'm certain I would have noted the fact that a departure was taxiing for the arrival runway as arrivals were coming in; and I would have seen that all the arrivals were closely spaced with no natural gap for a departure. Having said that; it is virtually impossible; as controller in charge; to fulfill all duties while maintaining constant vigilance over the operation. Inevitably there will be times when the controller in charge's attention will be focused on other tasks; as mine was when the event occurred. In my humble opinion; the best thing to prevent a re-occurrence of this event would be the mere fact that the event occurred to begin with; drawing the collective attention of the facility's controllers to the factors that led up to the event. To many controllers with more experience than myself; today's event is not surprising at all. To many with less experience; there is much to be learned. Lack of proficiency is epidemic at a facility; we have too many developmentals; not enough trainers and even fewer airplanes. Any given day; you could be called upon to work a position that you haven't seen any complexity or volume on in weeks if not months; and any given day; something unusual or unlikely can happen that will expose the controller's lack of proficiency. Some days; that exposure leads to a loss of separation or a bad/unsafe operation. I see no obvious solution to the issue. We all just try to get by.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower CIC described a go-around event resulting from the Local Controller's questionable spacing judgment between an arrival and departing aircraft.

Narrative: We were utilizing an unusual runway configuration due to line painting on Runway 10/28; which was closed. The advertised departure runways were 24L and 24R; with GC selecting the best runway based on arrival demand to 24L; the only available landing runway. I was the CIC; and was preparing to begin a position relief briefing as the event unfolded. I became aware of the developing situation when the Local Controller called out to me; at which point I observed an E145 on departure roll on 24L; with another E145 flaring for landing on short final. At first glance it immediately became apparent to me that if allowed to land; the second E145 would be less than 6;000 FT from the departing aircraft. The Local Controller seemed to be soliciting my opinion on whether to allow the arrival aircraft to land; which while resulting in a loss of separation; might theoretically be safer than issuing a go-around. My snap decision was that the safest decision was to send the arrival around; which I vocalized immediately to the Local Controller. The instruction was delayed due to another aircraft checking in; but as soon as he was able; the Local Controller issued the go-around. The Local Controller stated; 'E145; go around; right side.' The phraseology was unfamiliar to me; and I presumed it would be unfamiliar to the pilot as well. I told the Local Controller to assign a heading to the go-around aircraft; which was now climbing with the departure aircraft just ahead of him. I am not entirely sure where the resulting confusion came from; whether it was a mixed up call sign or simply the wrong aircraft taking the turn; but the departure aircraft began a turn to the right; which is what the Local Controller intended for the trailing aircraft to do. The Local Controller stopped the first aircraft's turn; and then turned the trailing aircraft right to a northwesterly heading; established divergence and switched both aircraft to departure. During this sequence; the AMASS had triggered an alarm. I was aware of the situation before the AMASS alert sounded; and was quite intently focused on the events outside the Tower window; to the point that I did not consciously note the AMASS alert and had to be told later that it had in fact; sounded an alert. I believed the go around was issued before the second aircraft crossed the threshold; thus preventing a loss of separation; but after 'reconstructing' the event some time later; I am no longer certain that separation was not lost. In any case it was not a desirable operation. Having only been made aware of the situation after it was well underway; I can only speculate on the causes; but a few causes seem obvious. 1. The Local Controller's decision to attempt to launch a departure between two arrival aircraft which were ultimately too close together to allow a same-runway departure between them. 2. The Local Controller's hesitation to issue mitigating instructions (a request for S turns or more timely go-around instructions) 3. The Ground Controller's decision to taxi the departure aircraft to the lone arrival runway at a time when arrival demand was starting to increase. Also contributing were the Local Controller's relatively low currency in the Tower; and the fact that I did not recognize the developing situation due to being 'heads down' at the CRU-Art station; looking at the staffing situation and being relatively unaware of the traffic situation. Recommendation; at the time of the incident; I was the most senior and experienced Controller in the Tower. If I could do it over again; I would have paid closer attention to what the front line was doing; and had I been watching more closely; I'm certain I would have noted the fact that a departure was taxiing for the arrival runway as arrivals were coming in; and I would have seen that all the arrivals were closely spaced with no natural gap for a departure. Having said that; it is virtually impossible; as CIC; to fulfill all duties while maintaining constant vigilance over the operation. Inevitably there will be times when the CIC's attention will be focused on other tasks; as mine was when the event occurred. In my humble opinion; the best thing to prevent a re-occurrence of this event would be the mere fact that the event occurred to begin with; drawing the collective attention of the facility's controllers to the factors that led up to the event. To many controllers with more experience than myself; today's event is not surprising at all. To many with less experience; there is much to be learned. Lack of proficiency is epidemic at a facility; we have too many developmentals; not enough trainers and even fewer airplanes. Any given day; you could be called upon to work a position that you haven't seen any complexity or volume on in weeks if not months; and any given day; something unusual or unlikely can happen that will expose the controller's lack of proficiency. Some days; that exposure leads to a loss of separation or a bad/unsafe operation. I see no obvious solution to the issue. We all just try to get by.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.