Narrative:

Upon contacting cle ground; we received taxi instructions to taxi to runway 24R via the orange route and to hold short of runway 24L. We; therefore; read back the instructions correctly. Since we were both unfamiliar with the new colored route system; we read out loud the memo just issued to us with the flight release and then began to taxi. The orange route reads as follows (juliet; romeo; hold short of runway 24L; bravo; and golf). At that time; we were following another aircraft via the orange route. We were not instructed to follow; but I knew they were taxiing via the orange route as well. While approaching runway 24L at romeo; the aircraft ahead of us continued across runway 24L. As we approached the intersection; for some reason; my thought process was that we were cleared to cross as well. Due to lack of concentration and alertness; that was my error. The first officer was glancing down at the time to review instructions with the impression that I was stopping because he felt the brakes as we approached some bumps. I; therefore; stated clear left; cleared to cross. Following that; I heard the first officer state he did not think we were cleared to cross. Immediately; I stopped the aircraft but just too late. Approximately; the first 1/4 of the aircraft was now ahead of the hold short line which is located on a high speed exit for runway 6R. We contacted ATC to inform them of what we had done. At this time he was already aware of the situation and gave instructions to now cross the runway. There was an aircraft on the runway at the time of the event; but I believe there was no aircraft on the approach phase. Thinking about the event; I realize there was not a lack of communication with ATC or confusion with the new colored route structure. The new colored route possibly was the start of being out of the normal; but not at all an excuse for the event. We as pilots receive new clrncs daily and must adjust to them while staying focused. I think the best explanation behind this event was lack of CRM. Though I followed the SOP of stating clear left -- clear to cross; I stated it too late for the first officer to process and challenge it and have myself or him stop the aircraft. I believe the SOP is sufficient for taxi operations and that it was just lack of concentration on my part. I find myself now much more alert on my taxi operations now and not waiting so long to verify the crossing. Supplemental information from acn 803046: we taxied juliet romeo and slowed down approaching runway 24L. I was under the impression that we were stopping. I looked to review the orange route taxi instructions and heard the captain say 'cleared on the left cleared to cross.' I said 'we don't have clearance to cross.' captain stopped the plane but we had already crossed the hold short line. An aircraft on final was given instruction to go around. I understand that as a first officer that I share in responsibility for this occurrence. I cannot speak for the captain and what his thought process was. I do believe though if we change our thought process to think about stopping before every runway; maybe this would not occur.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 CREW INCURRED CLE RWY 24L WHILE USING THE NEW COLOR DESIGNATED TAXI ROUTES. THE CAPT WAS COMPLACENT; THE FO WAS HEADS DOWN. AN ACFT ON FINAL WAS SENT AROUND.

Narrative: UPON CONTACTING CLE GND; WE RECEIVED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI TO RWY 24R VIA THE ORANGE RTE AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24L. WE; THEREFORE; READ BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY. SINCE WE WERE BOTH UNFAMILIAR WITH THE NEW COLORED RTE SYS; WE READ OUT LOUD THE MEMO JUST ISSUED TO US WITH THE FLT RELEASE AND THEN BEGAN TO TAXI. THE ORANGE RTE READS AS FOLLOWS (JULIET; ROMEO; HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24L; BRAVO; AND GOLF). AT THAT TIME; WE WERE FOLLOWING ANOTHER ACFT VIA THE ORANGE RTE. WE WERE NOT INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW; BUT I KNEW THEY WERE TAXIING VIA THE ORANGE RTE AS WELL. WHILE APCHING RWY 24L AT ROMEO; THE ACFT AHEAD OF US CONTINUED ACROSS RWY 24L. AS WE APCHED THE INTXN; FOR SOME REASON; MY THOUGHT PROCESS WAS THAT WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS AS WELL. DUE TO LACK OF CONCENTRATION AND ALERTNESS; THAT WAS MY ERROR. THE FO WAS GLANCING DOWN AT THE TIME TO REVIEW INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT I WAS STOPPING BECAUSE HE FELT THE BRAKES AS WE APCHED SOME BUMPS. I; THEREFORE; STATED CLR L; CLRED TO CROSS. FOLLOWING THAT; I HEARD THE FO STATE HE DID NOT THINK WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS. IMMEDIATELY; I STOPPED THE ACFT BUT JUST TOO LATE. APPROX; THE FIRST 1/4 OF THE ACFT WAS NOW AHEAD OF THE HOLD SHORT LINE WHICH IS LOCATED ON A HIGH SPD EXIT FOR RWY 6R. WE CONTACTED ATC TO INFORM THEM OF WHAT WE HAD DONE. AT THIS TIME HE WAS ALREADY AWARE OF THE SITUATION AND GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO NOW CROSS THE RWY. THERE WAS AN ACFT ON THE RWY AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT; BUT I BELIEVE THERE WAS NO ACFT ON THE APCH PHASE. THINKING ABOUT THE EVENT; I REALIZE THERE WAS NOT A LACK OF COM WITH ATC OR CONFUSION WITH THE NEW COLORED RTE STRUCTURE. THE NEW COLORED RTE POSSIBLY WAS THE START OF BEING OUT OF THE NORMAL; BUT NOT AT ALL AN EXCUSE FOR THE EVENT. WE AS PLTS RECEIVE NEW CLRNCS DAILY AND MUST ADJUST TO THEM WHILE STAYING FOCUSED. I THINK THE BEST EXPLANATION BEHIND THIS EVENT WAS LACK OF CRM. THOUGH I FOLLOWED THE SOP OF STATING CLR L -- CLR TO CROSS; I STATED IT TOO LATE FOR THE FO TO PROCESS AND CHALLENGE IT AND HAVE MYSELF OR HIM STOP THE ACFT. I BELIEVE THE SOP IS SUFFICIENT FOR TAXI OPS AND THAT IT WAS JUST LACK OF CONCENTRATION ON MY PART. I FIND MYSELF NOW MUCH MORE ALERT ON MY TAXI OPS NOW AND NOT WAITING SO LONG TO VERIFY THE XING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 803046: WE TAXIED JULIET ROMEO AND SLOWED DOWN APCHING RWY 24L. I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE STOPPING. I LOOKED TO REVIEW THE ORANGE RTE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND HEARD THE CAPT SAY 'CLRED ON THE L CLRED TO CROSS.' I SAID 'WE DON'T HAVE CLRNC TO CROSS.' CAPT STOPPED THE PLANE BUT WE HAD ALREADY CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE. AN ACFT ON FINAL WAS GIVEN INSTRUCTION TO GO AROUND. I UNDERSTAND THAT AS A FO THAT I SHARE IN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS OCCURRENCE. I CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE CAPT AND WHAT HIS THOUGHT PROCESS WAS. I DO BELIEVE THOUGH IF WE CHANGE OUR THOUGHT PROCESS TO THINK ABOUT STOPPING BEFORE EVERY RWY; MAYBE THIS WOULD NOT OCCUR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.