Narrative:

While at cruise at 17000 ft MSL; we received a master caution with an associated amber flaps illumination on the cwp. The indicator was on for a few seconds and the captain noted that the green test 1 panel light also illuminated. I noticed a small split between flaps according to the flaps position indicator (the right flap indicator was a few degrees below the left indicator). The captain consulted the QRH and we followed the procedures per the QRH. Later while in level flight at 11000 ft MSL and just south of the ZZZ VOR; we received another master caution with the flaps illumination on the cwp. The captain pointed out an even larger split between the flap position indicators (about 5 degrees). The cwp flaps illumination remained on seconds longer than the first time before it was extinguished. Again the captain consulted the QRH; and he decided to contact dispatch. I continued to be the PF; and I communicated with ATC while the captain attempted to communication with dispatch. Communication with dispatch was unsuccessful. It was determined that it could be unsafe to use flaps during landing since we were unsure of the nature of the flight deck warnings. Because a zero flaps landing was to be done; and due to the small margin of remaining runway we would have at our scheduled destination airport based on adjusted landing distance computation; we decided that a landing at ZZZ was a more prudent alternative. ZZZ has longer runways; has better facilities; and is controled. Also; since we were unable to contact dispatch; we did not know whether we had the legal and safe amount of fuel to divert elsewhere. After the decision was made to divert to ZZZ; the captain became the PF; and I became the pilot monitoring. We declared an emergency and ATC gave us vectors to ZZZ where a safe; flaps-up landing was accomplished. The decision to divert to ZZZ instead of landing at the planned destination or elsewhere was the result of many factors. The multiple indications of a possible flap malfunction lead us to decide that a no-flap landing was in order. The fact that the longer adjusted required landing distance due to no flaps and a faster reference/approach speed left us to determine that an uncomfortable margin of remaining runway would be available had we landed at the planned destination. The inability to communication with dispatch or maintenance to advise us of options lead us to decide to divert to ZZZ; which we had just overflown.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SF340 FLT CREW DIVERTS TO A DIFFERENT ARPT WHEN FLAP ANOMALIES PRECLUDE LNDG AT THEIR ORIGINAL DES. ARE UNABLE TO CONTACT COMPANY DISPATCH/MAINT FOR ASSISTANCE.

Narrative: WHILE AT CRUISE AT 17000 FT MSL; WE RECEIVED A MASTER CAUTION WITH AN ASSOCIATED AMBER FLAPS ILLUMINATION ON THE CWP. THE INDICATOR WAS ON FOR A FEW SECONDS AND THE CAPT NOTED THAT THE GREEN TEST 1 PANEL LIGHT ALSO ILLUMINATED. I NOTICED A SMALL SPLIT BTWN FLAPS ACCORDING TO THE FLAPS POS INDICATOR (THE R FLAP INDICATOR WAS A FEW DEGS BELOW THE L INDICATOR). THE CAPT CONSULTED THE QRH AND WE FOLLOWED THE PROCS PER THE QRH. LATER WHILE IN LEVEL FLT AT 11000 FT MSL AND JUST S OF THE ZZZ VOR; WE RECEIVED ANOTHER MASTER CAUTION WITH THE FLAPS ILLUMINATION ON THE CWP. THE CAPT POINTED OUT AN EVEN LARGER SPLIT BTWN THE FLAP POS INDICATORS (ABOUT 5 DEGS). THE CWP FLAPS ILLUMINATION REMAINED ON SECONDS LONGER THAN THE FIRST TIME BEFORE IT WAS EXTINGUISHED. AGAIN THE CAPT CONSULTED THE QRH; AND HE DECIDED TO CONTACT DISPATCH. I CONTINUED TO BE THE PF; AND I COMMUNICATED WITH ATC WHILE THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO COM WITH DISPATCH. COM WITH DISPATCH WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT IT COULD BE UNSAFE TO USE FLAPS DURING LNDG SINCE WE WERE UNSURE OF THE NATURE OF THE FLT DECK WARNINGS. BECAUSE A ZERO FLAPS LNDG WAS TO BE DONE; AND DUE TO THE SMALL MARGIN OF REMAINING RWY WE WOULD HAVE AT OUR SCHEDULED DEST ARPT BASED ON ADJUSTED LNDG DISTANCE COMPUTATION; WE DECIDED THAT A LNDG AT ZZZ WAS A MORE PRUDENT ALTERNATIVE. ZZZ HAS LONGER RWYS; HAS BETTER FACILITIES; AND IS CTLED. ALSO; SINCE WE WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT DISPATCH; WE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER WE HAD THE LEGAL AND SAFE AMOUNT OF FUEL TO DIVERT ELSEWHERE. AFTER THE DECISION WAS MADE TO DIVERT TO ZZZ; THE CAPT BECAME THE PF; AND I BECAME THE PLT MONITORING. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND ATC GAVE US VECTORS TO ZZZ WHERE A SAFE; FLAPS-UP LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE DECISION TO DIVERT TO ZZZ INSTEAD OF LNDG AT THE PLANNED DEST OR ELSEWHERE WAS THE RESULT OF MANY FACTORS. THE MULTIPLE INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE FLAP MALFUNCTION LEAD US TO DECIDE THAT A NO-FLAP LNDG WAS IN ORDER. THE FACT THAT THE LONGER ADJUSTED REQUIRED LNDG DISTANCE DUE TO NO FLAPS AND A FASTER REF/APCH SPD LEFT US TO DETERMINE THAT AN UNCOMFORTABLE MARGIN OF REMAINING RWY WOULD BE AVAILABLE HAD WE LANDED AT THE PLANNED DEST. THE INABILITY TO COM WITH DISPATCH OR MAINT TO ADVISE US OF OPTIONS LEAD US TO DECIDE TO DIVERT TO ZZZ; WHICH WE HAD JUST OVERFLOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.