Narrative:

On takeoff roll; received EICAS message of 'C' hydraulic system electrical (1 or 2 -- both first officer and I were unsure after event which pump it was). Aborted takeoff roll as we were under 80 KTS GS. The light went out immediately. Taxied back and called maintenance control who wanted to troubleshoot the problem. They told us that at the gate nothing would be done differently than us in the pad. We proceeded to start am MEL process to defer the #2 electric hydraulic pump which had my first officer collaring circuit breakers; etc; when we both (first officer and myself) realized we weren't sure which pump it was. When we stated this; maintenance control said there has been a history on the #2 pump; and that it was changed out in aug/08. This gave me more concern because it was becoming obvious this was not a pump problem but possibly an electrical wiring problem. I stated my discomfort with this and told him that we are not mechanics and this should really be accomplished by local maintenance. He continued to push and asked if we would do a run-up to takeoff thrust and see if the light came back on. God knows why I agreed to do this; but in the pad we actually got ground clearance for behind us; and then did a takeoff thrust run-up. I thought the brakes were going to give; and when I pulled the power back I chastised maintenance control and returned to the blocks. I made an announcement to the passenger on the situation and described the pilot pushing; and then told them their safety was more important than getting to ZZZ. They applauded. At the gate a maintenance supervisor proceeded to push the issue. Maintenance agreed with me that a wiring problem may be the issue; but the supervisor told me that the plane was perfectly fine; 'his words;' and that there was no duplication. I stated I am not going out there and abort again with these passenger on board. They started to suggest maintenance taxi the plane around; push up the power; etc; to make us feel comfortable. Then he actually said I can defer the #2 pump; and you can go with that if that makes you feel comfortable. I told him; why would I defer something that isn't broken or you cannot duplicate? Besides that I was unsure which pump it was; and further the history does not support that the pump is bad; it more likely is a wiring problem between the pump and the EICAS warning system. Finally they gave us another aircraft. This airline had the best maintenance group in the industry when I was hired. There has been a shift; in an effort to save money; to put pilots in the corner to accept aircraft for the good of the operation -- kind of the roll the dice theorem. 9 times out of 10 I'm sure the odds are with us; but it is a very dangerous and disturbing game I believe is happening across our country in the airline industry. The FAA should be closely looking at how maintenance is being told to do their jobs; and what triggers they have to pushing pilots. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated his biggest concern was the willingness of the maintenance supervisor to defer an electric hydraulic pump (#2); when no one was sure the pump was the problem or even if the #2 pump was associated with the EICAS and light indication during their takeoff roll that was aborted. The mechanic felt he should do some wire bundle troubleshooting; but the maintenance supervisor stated the plane was 'perfectly fine.' reporter stated the 'pilot pushing' by maintenance supervisors is also having an effect on mechanics who are trying to actually troubleshoot a maintenance issue; but do not seem to have any support from their organization.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PILOT OF A B757-200 ACFT REPORTS GETTING AN EICAS MESSAGE OF 'C' HYD SYS ELEC #1 OR #2 ON TKOF ROLL. ABORTED TKOF. MECHANIC'S TROUBLESHOOTING IS LIMITED BY MAINT SUPERVISOR WHO SAYS THE 'PLANE IS PERFECTLY FINE.'

Narrative: ON TKOF ROLL; RECEIVED EICAS MESSAGE OF 'C' HYD SYS ELECTRICAL (1 OR 2 -- BOTH FO AND I WERE UNSURE AFTER EVENT WHICH PUMP IT WAS). ABORTED TKOF ROLL AS WE WERE UNDER 80 KTS GS. THE LIGHT WENT OUT IMMEDIATELY. TAXIED BACK AND CALLED MAINT CTL WHO WANTED TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB. THEY TOLD US THAT AT THE GATE NOTHING WOULD BE DONE DIFFERENTLY THAN US IN THE PAD. WE PROCEEDED TO START AM MEL PROCESS TO DEFER THE #2 ELECTRIC HYD PUMP WHICH HAD MY FO COLLARING CIRCUIT BREAKERS; ETC; WHEN WE BOTH (FO AND MYSELF) REALIZED WE WEREN'T SURE WHICH PUMP IT WAS. WHEN WE STATED THIS; MAINT CTL SAID THERE HAS BEEN A HISTORY ON THE #2 PUMP; AND THAT IT WAS CHANGED OUT IN AUG/08. THIS GAVE ME MORE CONCERN BECAUSE IT WAS BECOMING OBVIOUS THIS WAS NOT A PUMP PROB BUT POSSIBLY AN ELECTRICAL WIRING PROB. I STATED MY DISCOMFORT WITH THIS AND TOLD HIM THAT WE ARE NOT MECHS AND THIS SHOULD REALLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY LCL MAINT. HE CONTINUED TO PUSH AND ASKED IF WE WOULD DO A RUN-UP TO TKOF THRUST AND SEE IF THE LIGHT CAME BACK ON. GOD KNOWS WHY I AGREED TO DO THIS; BUT IN THE PAD WE ACTUALLY GOT GND CLRNC FOR BEHIND US; AND THEN DID A TKOF THRUST RUN-UP. I THOUGHT THE BRAKES WERE GOING TO GIVE; AND WHEN I PULLED THE PWR BACK I CHASTISED MAINT CTL AND RETURNED TO THE BLOCKS. I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX ON THE SITUATION AND DESCRIBED THE PLT PUSHING; AND THEN TOLD THEM THEIR SAFETY WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN GETTING TO ZZZ. THEY APPLAUDED. AT THE GATE A MAINT SUPVR PROCEEDED TO PUSH THE ISSUE. MAINT AGREED WITH ME THAT A WIRING PROB MAY BE THE ISSUE; BUT THE SUPVR TOLD ME THAT THE PLANE WAS PERFECTLY FINE; 'HIS WORDS;' AND THAT THERE WAS NO DUPLICATION. I STATED I AM NOT GOING OUT THERE AND ABORT AGAIN WITH THESE PAX ON BOARD. THEY STARTED TO SUGGEST MAINT TAXI THE PLANE AROUND; PUSH UP THE PWR; ETC; TO MAKE US FEEL COMFORTABLE. THEN HE ACTUALLY SAID I CAN DEFER THE #2 PUMP; AND YOU CAN GO WITH THAT IF THAT MAKES YOU FEEL COMFORTABLE. I TOLD HIM; WHY WOULD I DEFER SOMETHING THAT ISN'T BROKEN OR YOU CANNOT DUPLICATE? BESIDES THAT I WAS UNSURE WHICH PUMP IT WAS; AND FURTHER THE HISTORY DOES NOT SUPPORT THAT THE PUMP IS BAD; IT MORE LIKELY IS A WIRING PROB BTWN THE PUMP AND THE EICAS WARNING SYS. FINALLY THEY GAVE US ANOTHER ACFT. THIS AIRLINE HAD THE BEST MAINT GROUP IN THE INDUSTRY WHEN I WAS HIRED. THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT; IN AN EFFORT TO SAVE MONEY; TO PUT PLTS IN THE CORNER TO ACCEPT ACFT FOR THE GOOD OF THE OP -- KIND OF THE ROLL THE DICE THEOREM. 9 TIMES OUT OF 10 I'M SURE THE ODDS ARE WITH US; BUT IT IS A VERY DANGEROUS AND DISTURBING GAME I BELIEVE IS HAPPENING ACROSS OUR COUNTRY IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY. THE FAA SHOULD BE CLOSELY LOOKING AT HOW MAINT IS BEING TOLD TO DO THEIR JOBS; AND WHAT TRIGGERS THEY HAVE TO PUSHING PLTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HIS BIGGEST CONCERN WAS THE WILLINGNESS OF THE MAINT SUPERVISOR TO DEFER AN ELECTRIC HYD PUMP (#2); WHEN NO ONE WAS SURE THE PUMP WAS THE PROBLEM OR EVEN IF THE #2 PUMP WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EICAS AND LIGHT INDICATION DURING THEIR TKOF ROLL THAT WAS ABORTED. THE MECHANIC FELT HE SHOULD DO SOME WIRE BUNDLE TROUBLESHOOTING; BUT THE MAINT SUPERVISOR STATED THE PLANE WAS 'PERFECTLY FINE.' REPORTER STATED THE 'PILOT PUSHING' BY MAINT SUPERVISORS IS ALSO HAVING AN EFFECT ON MECHANICS WHO ARE TRYING TO ACTUALLY TROUBLESHOOT A MAINT ISSUE; BUT DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE ANY SUPPORT FROM THEIR ORGANIZATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.