Narrative:

Routine work cards with known errors are being issued every night. There is no established procedure to keep track of work cards with known errors. There is no established procedure to know if an engineering change should be issued for these work cards with known errors. These errors range from tooling numbers or cleaning agents being wrong; to downright wrong procedures. Every night it takes several man hours and word of mouth to make sure all the known errors have accompanying engineering changes. Every night there are several calls to planning to get missing engineering changes issued to correct known errors. Why are routine work cards issued that have known errors? Why is it left up to maintenance or inspection individuals to catch these errors each night and make sure engineering changes are issued? Why is there no company wide procedure to keep track of known errors? Every night a different mechanic or inspector may be assigned a different area and the hunt starts all over again to catch these known errors. We are being set up for failure by issuing paperwork with known errors. We are being held responsible for not only the maintenance of the aircraft but also keeping track of known errors on paperwork. Why does it take months for these routine card errors to be corrected? We are doing internal records audits for paperwork errors and holding people accountable for past documentation errors. Yet we are issuing paperwork every night with known errors with no checks and balances in place to make sure the documentation is done correctly before an aircraft departs. Tonight in my inspection area alone; there were 4 routine work cards issued with known errors. Despite my word of mouth notification about these errors; none of the 4 cards were initially documented correctly. After rejecting and reopening these routine work cards; all the proper engineering changes were issued and signoffs were done correctly. I don't know what the fix for this is other than getting all known errors corrected and not issuing a routine work card that has any known errors. Another problem that needs attention is aircraft or component service bulletin status information. Many work cards and amm procedures are based on pre- or post-service bulletin status. I was involved with a work card that was wrong and an engineering change that referenced the amm that had 2 procedures to accomplish a test. The correct procedure to use was based on the status of a particular service bulletin. After noticing the job card procedure was completely wrong and impossible to complete as written. An engineering change was issued to perform the test per the amm. In lieu of job card; this section of the amm has 2 procedures -- one for pre-service bulletin and one for post-service bulletin. The amm lists effectivity for each procedure by aircraft line number and/or tail number. The line number for aircraft was listed in the pre-sbc bulletin section of the amm. To help determine the correct service bulletin status; a phone call was placed to ask if aircraft is pre- or post-service bulletin. The answer given was 'I don't know.' no one knew the procedure to find the status of this service bulletin. The service bulletin changed the part number of the component. A physical inspection of the part installed on the aircraft determined this was a post-service bulletin aircraft. In summary; the job card is wrong. The effectivity shown in the amm is confusing at best. The service bulletin could not be determined without great investigation and piecing together information. If you think reading this is confusing; just think how it is for the mechanic or inspector on the floor trying to complete many other tasks besides this one. The fix for this problem is to identify the procedure for finding the service bulletin status and make sure the information is available to anyone who has to perform work based on service bulletin status. Also; correct known paperwork errors in the shortest time possible and do not issue paperwork with known errors.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRCRAFT INSPECTOR REPORTS ABOUT THE STATUS OF SERVICE BULLETINS AND ROUTINE WORK CARDS WITH KNOWN ERRORS BEING ISSUED EVERY NIGHT; WITH NO CHECKS AND BALANCES IN PLACE; TO MAKE SURE THE DOCUMENTATION IS DONE CORRECTLY BEFORE AIRCRAFT DEPARTS.

Narrative: ROUTINE WORK CARDS WITH KNOWN ERRORS ARE BEING ISSUED EVERY NIGHT. THERE IS NO ESTABLISHED PROC TO KEEP TRACK OF WORK CARDS WITH KNOWN ERRORS. THERE IS NO ESTABLISHED PROC TO KNOW IF AN ENGINEERING CHANGE SHOULD BE ISSUED FOR THESE WORK CARDS WITH KNOWN ERRORS. THESE ERRORS RANGE FROM TOOLING NUMBERS OR CLEANING AGENTS BEING WRONG; TO DOWNRIGHT WRONG PROCS. EVERY NIGHT IT TAKES SEVERAL MAN HRS AND WORD OF MOUTH TO MAKE SURE ALL THE KNOWN ERRORS HAVE ACCOMPANYING ENGINEERING CHANGES. EVERY NIGHT THERE ARE SEVERAL CALLS TO PLANNING TO GET MISSING ENGINEERING CHANGES ISSUED TO CORRECT KNOWN ERRORS. WHY ARE ROUTINE WORK CARDS ISSUED THAT HAVE KNOWN ERRORS? WHY IS IT LEFT UP TO MAINT OR INSPECTION INDIVIDUALS TO CATCH THESE ERRORS EACH NIGHT AND MAKE SURE ENGINEERING CHANGES ARE ISSUED? WHY IS THERE NO COMPANY WIDE PROC TO KEEP TRACK OF KNOWN ERRORS? EVERY NIGHT A DIFFERENT MECH OR INSPECTOR MAY BE ASSIGNED A DIFFERENT AREA AND THE HUNT STARTS ALL OVER AGAIN TO CATCH THESE KNOWN ERRORS. WE ARE BEING SET UP FOR FAILURE BY ISSUING PAPERWORK WITH KNOWN ERRORS. WE ARE BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT ONLY THE MAINT OF THE ACFT BUT ALSO KEEPING TRACK OF KNOWN ERRORS ON PAPERWORK. WHY DOES IT TAKE MONTHS FOR THESE ROUTINE CARD ERRORS TO BE CORRECTED? WE ARE DOING INTERNAL RECORDS AUDITS FOR PAPERWORK ERRORS AND HOLDING PEOPLE ACCOUNTABLE FOR PAST DOCUMENTATION ERRORS. YET WE ARE ISSUING PAPERWORK EVERY NIGHT WITH KNOWN ERRORS WITH NO CHKS AND BALANCES IN PLACE TO MAKE SURE THE DOCUMENTATION IS DONE CORRECTLY BEFORE AN ACFT DEPARTS. TONIGHT IN MY INSPECTION AREA ALONE; THERE WERE 4 ROUTINE WORK CARDS ISSUED WITH KNOWN ERRORS. DESPITE MY WORD OF MOUTH NOTIFICATION ABOUT THESE ERRORS; NONE OF THE 4 CARDS WERE INITIALLY DOCUMENTED CORRECTLY. AFTER REJECTING AND REOPENING THESE ROUTINE WORK CARDS; ALL THE PROPER ENGINEERING CHANGES WERE ISSUED AND SIGNOFFS WERE DONE CORRECTLY. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE FIX FOR THIS IS OTHER THAN GETTING ALL KNOWN ERRORS CORRECTED AND NOT ISSUING A ROUTINE WORK CARD THAT HAS ANY KNOWN ERRORS. ANOTHER PROB THAT NEEDS ATTN IS ACFT OR COMPONENT SVC BULLETIN STATUS INFO. MANY WORK CARDS AND AMM PROCS ARE BASED ON PRE- OR POST-SVC BULLETIN STATUS. I WAS INVOLVED WITH A WORK CARD THAT WAS WRONG AND AN ENGINEERING CHANGE THAT REFERENCED THE AMM THAT HAD 2 PROCS TO ACCOMPLISH A TEST. THE CORRECT PROC TO USE WAS BASED ON THE STATUS OF A PARTICULAR SVC BULLETIN. AFTER NOTICING THE JOB CARD PROC WAS COMPLETELY WRONG AND IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLETE AS WRITTEN. AN ENGINEERING CHANGE WAS ISSUED TO PERFORM THE TEST PER THE AMM. IN LIEU OF JOB CARD; THIS SECTION OF THE AMM HAS 2 PROCS -- ONE FOR PRE-SVC BULLETIN AND ONE FOR POST-SVC BULLETIN. THE AMM LISTS EFFECTIVITY FOR EACH PROC BY ACFT LINE NUMBER AND/OR TAIL NUMBER. THE LINE NUMBER FOR ACFT WAS LISTED IN THE PRE-SBC BULLETIN SECTION OF THE AMM. TO HELP DETERMINE THE CORRECT SVC BULLETIN STATUS; A PHONE CALL WAS PLACED TO ASK IF ACFT IS PRE- OR POST-SVC BULLETIN. THE ANSWER GIVEN WAS 'I DON'T KNOW.' NO ONE KNEW THE PROC TO FIND THE STATUS OF THIS SVC BULLETIN. THE SVC BULLETIN CHANGED THE PART NUMBER OF THE COMPONENT. A PHYSICAL INSPECTION OF THE PART INSTALLED ON THE ACFT DETERMINED THIS WAS A POST-SVC BULLETIN ACFT. IN SUMMARY; THE JOB CARD IS WRONG. THE EFFECTIVITY SHOWN IN THE AMM IS CONFUSING AT BEST. THE SVC BULLETIN COULD NOT BE DETERMINED WITHOUT GREAT INVESTIGATION AND PIECING TOGETHER INFO. IF YOU THINK READING THIS IS CONFUSING; JUST THINK HOW IT IS FOR THE MECH OR INSPECTOR ON THE FLOOR TRYING TO COMPLETE MANY OTHER TASKS BESIDES THIS ONE. THE FIX FOR THIS PROB IS TO IDENT THE PROC FOR FINDING THE SVC BULLETIN STATUS AND MAKE SURE THE INFO IS AVAILABLE TO ANYONE WHO HAS TO PERFORM WORK BASED ON SVC BULLETIN STATUS. ALSO; CORRECT KNOWN PAPERWORK ERRORS IN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE AND DO NOT ISSUE PAPERWORK WITH KNOWN ERRORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.