Narrative:

While en route to ZZZZ we were cleared direct to the VOR but to expect the ILS DME VOR runway 9 approach. As the captain programmed the FMC for the descent profile; I noted the captain made the beginning of the D30 mga (not the same designation as the FMC database) segment leg crossing altitude to be the same as the MEA for that segment. This is the second time I have noted this same programming error in as many weeks on the same trip sequence and ATC routing. On the previous flight; I discussed the programming of the descent profile with the captain; and we agreed and concurred on the fix and agreed on the crossing altitude of the beginning segment leg should be the prior segment's MEA. I backed up the descent profile by tuning the VOR; selecting it; and noted the DME as a backup to the FMC programmed descent profile. During the prior 2 days of flying on this flight however; I had learned the captain is intolerant of first officer input. In order to prevent a subsequent lecture/rationalization/unresolved continuing discussion; thereby leaving the approach phase of flight substantially under monitored; I ensured terrain clearance by noting/ensuring we were in radar contact; terrain avoidance was selected; and I had visual ground contact prior to descending below the current segment MEA. I did not tune and select the VOR as a backup because I feared this would provoke the captain into a procedural lecture; or brusk rationalization or just plain rant and distracting me; again leaving the flight for all practical purposes under monitored. I know it is in violation of company policy as stated in part 1; to descend below the MEA; but believed this was the safest most optimum flight profile I could make given the circumstances. This is the most uncomfortable I have ever been in my entire 32 yrs of civil; military and commercial flying. The rest of the approach was relatively uneventful with the exception of 2 events. First; I was the PF and when I informed the captain I had the field in sight while turning base to final; I was rebuked by the captain by stating 'that's not what he want to hear;' what he want to hear is 'established on the localizer.' approach mode failed or was not selected to capture the localizer and VNAV directed the turn to final. The captain reported 'established on the localizer.' I informed the captain: 'we are right of course' 1 DOT. I was already correcting and the captain ordered 'get back on course.' I established the flight on course and GS. Subsequently; a loud impact was heard in the cockpit. Noting no caution or warning lights illuminated and I announced; 'bird strike' the captain responded; 'I hope not; that was your water bottle exploding.' after the parking checklist was completed I showed the captain my water bottle had not exploded. The captain responded: 'see it collapsed.' I proceeded to do a postflt and spotted the bird strike and reported it to the captain. What I should have done is called off the sequence once I realized normal CRM had failed between this captain and myself but didn't because I had on the first day of the trip discussed the descent profile I had experienced on the prior trip and was assured the captain would know how to program the FMC when 'fix crossing altitudes' are absent or differ from published altitudes. I was target fixated on completing this 4-DAY sequence and thought I only had 2 more legs to get through. This captain also routinely ignores company rules and policies; and international communication procedures. First the captain loads the FMC and does not cross-check the route and legs pages with the first officer. Secondly; the captain directs the first officer not to call havana control 10 mins prior to the fir boundary because doing so; 'causes confusion.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FO REPORTS A CAPT'S POOR CRM CAUSED AN UNMONITORED APCH TO A FOREIGN ARPT.

Narrative: WHILE ENRTE TO ZZZZ WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO THE VOR BUT TO EXPECT THE ILS DME VOR RWY 9 APCH. AS THE CAPT PROGRAMMED THE FMC FOR THE DSCNT PROFILE; I NOTED THE CAPT MADE THE BEGINNING OF THE D30 MGA (NOT THE SAME DESIGNATION AS THE FMC DATABASE) SEGMENT LEG XING ALT TO BE THE SAME AS THE MEA FOR THAT SEGMENT. THIS IS THE SECOND TIME I HAVE NOTED THIS SAME PROGRAMMING ERROR IN AS MANY WKS ON THE SAME TRIP SEQUENCE AND ATC ROUTING. ON THE PREVIOUS FLT; I DISCUSSED THE PROGRAMMING OF THE DSCNT PROFILE WITH THE CAPT; AND WE AGREED AND CONCURRED ON THE FIX AND AGREED ON THE XING ALT OF THE BEGINNING SEGMENT LEG SHOULD BE THE PRIOR SEGMENT'S MEA. I BACKED UP THE DSCNT PROFILE BY TUNING THE VOR; SELECTING IT; AND NOTED THE DME AS A BACKUP TO THE FMC PROGRAMMED DSCNT PROFILE. DURING THE PRIOR 2 DAYS OF FLYING ON THIS FLT HOWEVER; I HAD LEARNED THE CAPT IS INTOLERANT OF FO INPUT. IN ORDER TO PREVENT A SUBSEQUENT LECTURE/RATIONALIZATION/UNRESOLVED CONTINUING DISCUSSION; THEREBY LEAVING THE APCH PHASE OF FLT SUBSTANTIALLY UNDER MONITORED; I ENSURED TERRAIN CLRNC BY NOTING/ENSURING WE WERE IN RADAR CONTACT; TERRAIN AVOIDANCE WAS SELECTED; AND I HAD VISUAL GND CONTACT PRIOR TO DSNDING BELOW THE CURRENT SEGMENT MEA. I DID NOT TUNE AND SELECT THE VOR AS A BACKUP BECAUSE I FEARED THIS WOULD PROVOKE THE CAPT INTO A PROCEDURAL LECTURE; OR BRUSK RATIONALIZATION OR JUST PLAIN RANT AND DISTRACTING ME; AGAIN LEAVING THE FLT FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES UNDER MONITORED. I KNOW IT IS IN VIOLATION OF COMPANY POLICY AS STATED IN PART 1; TO DSND BELOW THE MEA; BUT BELIEVED THIS WAS THE SAFEST MOST OPTIMUM FLT PROFILE I COULD MAKE GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS IS THE MOST UNCOMFORTABLE I HAVE EVER BEEN IN MY ENTIRE 32 YRS OF CIVIL; MIL AND COMMERCIAL FLYING. THE REST OF THE APCH WAS RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 2 EVENTS. FIRST; I WAS THE PF AND WHEN I INFORMED THE CAPT I HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT WHILE TURNING BASE TO FINAL; I WAS REBUKED BY THE CAPT BY STATING 'THAT'S NOT WHAT HE WANT TO HEAR;' WHAT HE WANT TO HEAR IS 'ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC.' APCH MODE FAILED OR WAS NOT SELECTED TO CAPTURE THE LOC AND VNAV DIRECTED THE TURN TO FINAL. THE CAPT RPTED 'ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC.' I INFORMED THE CAPT: 'WE ARE R OF COURSE' 1 DOT. I WAS ALREADY CORRECTING AND THE CAPT ORDERED 'GET BACK ON COURSE.' I ESTABLISHED THE FLT ON COURSE AND GS. SUBSEQUENTLY; A LOUD IMPACT WAS HEARD IN THE COCKPIT. NOTING NO CAUTION OR WARNING LIGHTS ILLUMINATED AND I ANNOUNCED; 'BIRD STRIKE' THE CAPT RESPONDED; 'I HOPE NOT; THAT WAS YOUR WATER BOTTLE EXPLODING.' AFTER THE PARKING CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED I SHOWED THE CAPT MY WATER BOTTLE HAD NOT EXPLODED. THE CAPT RESPONDED: 'SEE IT COLLAPSED.' I PROCEEDED TO DO A POSTFLT AND SPOTTED THE BIRD STRIKE AND RPTED IT TO THE CAPT. WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE IS CALLED OFF THE SEQUENCE ONCE I REALIZED NORMAL CRM HAD FAILED BTWN THIS CAPT AND MYSELF BUT DIDN'T BECAUSE I HAD ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE TRIP DISCUSSED THE DSCNT PROFILE I HAD EXPERIENCED ON THE PRIOR TRIP AND WAS ASSURED THE CAPT WOULD KNOW HOW TO PROGRAM THE FMC WHEN 'FIX XING ALTS' ARE ABSENT OR DIFFER FROM PUBLISHED ALTS. I WAS TARGET FIXATED ON COMPLETING THIS 4-DAY SEQUENCE AND THOUGHT I ONLY HAD 2 MORE LEGS TO GET THROUGH. THIS CAPT ALSO ROUTINELY IGNORES COMPANY RULES AND POLICIES; AND INTL COM PROCS. FIRST THE CAPT LOADS THE FMC AND DOES NOT CROSS-CHK THE RTE AND LEGS PAGES WITH THE FO. SECONDLY; THE CAPT DIRECTS THE FO NOT TO CALL HAVANA CTL 10 MINS PRIOR TO THE FIR BOUNDARY BECAUSE DOING SO; 'CAUSES CONFUSION.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.