Narrative:

Attempted takeoff on runway 17 at ZZZ. The first officer was at the controls. He had been observing a bird soar above the right side of the runway far ahead during most of the takeoff roll. It became apparent when it began to turn left; toward the runway; that it might become a factor to us as we approached the critical takeoff speed arena. V1 was computed at 137 KTS. Before the bird dove; I remember being about 10 KTS less than V1. There was enough time; which in hindsight seems like 1/2 a min; to change thoughts from 'it will stay above us;' to 'uh oh; now what is plainly a large bird just passed by on our right;' to 'it looks like we missed it;' to observing the aircraft shake; begin to yaw; and seeing engine instruments confirm a power loss on the right engine. I recall calling out 'abort;' then accomplished the maneuver automatically just as we train in the simulator. I do not specifically recall verbalizing 'I have the aircraft;' but I do know that we both reverted to the roles as we train; first officer immediately called out 'spoilers up;' and all was well until we approached taxi speed where I thought I had kicked off the autobrakes and attempted to smoothly transition to taxi speed; but the aircraft continued to slow aggressively and lurched abruptly as; I suspect; we slowed below 10 KTS and possibly skidded to a halt before I could disarm the autobrakes. First officer was right on the PA explaining the uncomfortable stop to calm the passenger as he asked them to stay seated just like we briefed when we began the rotation. We notified tower about the bird; let them know that we had probable engine damage; verified that the passenger remained seated; checked with the flight attendants; and exited the runway. I called for an immediate right engine shutdown; expecting that it sustained damage. After asking tower if they saw anything unusual on our right engine (I think I asked about smoke specifically; and got a negative response); I elected to continue to taxi back as far as crossing runway 16L before contacting maintenance for their desires concerning hot brakes. After coordinating with maintenance and operations; we returned to the terminal as ground crews prepared to handle the hot brakes and probably impending flat tires. The lead flight attendant also made several passenger-calming announcements as we taxied in. No one was hurt. There was visible damage to at least 3 fan blades on the right engine. Shortly after parking; all mains did go flat. During our crew debrief; the flight attendant who had been sitting in the aft cabin described what sounded like repeated compressor stalls during the abort. Points to consider after the fact and lessons learned: 1) it is amazing how quickly the mind works as one considered options. Just after the point where I had decided it would be ok; we will go under the bird; it dove down. 2) the bird diving grabbed my attention right at the decision point of the takeoff. 3) I do not know positively; due to attention to the bird; what our precise speed was when the engine lost power; but suspect below V1. 4) we coordinated via radio several mins prior to parking; with maintenance and the ground crew; through ramp control; concerning the hot brakes prior to approaching the gate area. However; I was unable to stop a ramp worker from approaching the left main with a set of chocks as we parked. I expected them to have only chocked the nose tire in this case. I do not know whether they were; in fact; informed of the possible danger before we arrived. I do not know what the procedure is for ground crews in dealing with hot brakes; but after this experience would not approach the gate without some positive confirmation that the ground crew has been notified to stay away from the main gear area. 5) my concerns were both for the safety of the ground crew and the likely possibility of being stranded far from the terminal when the fuse plugs melted; but did not want to rely on the fuse plugs working properly for everyone's safety. In hindsight; it would have been more prudent to have parked away from the terminal. It would have been less convenient for everyone involved; but erring on the side of caution never hurts. I do not know the odds of fuse plugsnot working as designed; but trusting them to work is a bit like trusting the safety on an armed weapon. 6) during debrief; between maintenance; crew tracking; duty pilot; chief pilot support center; FAA; call to tower; and others; I neglected to pull the cvr circuit breaker. First officer realized this as I was filling out reports much later and he referenced our fom. By this time; I think 2 hours had passed so I did not attempt to pull it. It sounded like the fdr and possibly cvr were being pulled already in case the FAA wanted an investigation due to the high speed nature of this abort.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CAPTAIN PROVIDED A DETAILED REPORT REGARDING A HIGH SPEED ABORT CAUSED BY A BIRD STRIKE; LISTING; SHAKING; YAW AND ENGINE POWER LOSS PRIOR TO THE ABORT.

Narrative: ATTEMPTED TKOF ON RWY 17 AT ZZZ. THE FO WAS AT THE CTLS. HE HAD BEEN OBSERVING A BIRD SOAR ABOVE THE R SIDE OF THE RWY FAR AHEAD DURING MOST OF THE TKOF ROLL. IT BECAME APPARENT WHEN IT BEGAN TO TURN L; TOWARD THE RWY; THAT IT MIGHT BECOME A FACTOR TO US AS WE APCHED THE CRITICAL TKOF SPD ARENA. V1 WAS COMPUTED AT 137 KTS. BEFORE THE BIRD DOVE; I REMEMBER BEING ABOUT 10 KTS LESS THAN V1. THERE WAS ENOUGH TIME; WHICH IN HINDSIGHT SEEMS LIKE 1/2 A MIN; TO CHANGE THOUGHTS FROM 'IT WILL STAY ABOVE US;' TO 'UH OH; NOW WHAT IS PLAINLY A LARGE BIRD JUST PASSED BY ON OUR R;' TO 'IT LOOKS LIKE WE MISSED IT;' TO OBSERVING THE ACFT SHAKE; BEGIN TO YAW; AND SEEING ENG INSTS CONFIRM A PWR LOSS ON THE R ENG. I RECALL CALLING OUT 'ABORT;' THEN ACCOMPLISHED THE MANEUVER AUTOMATICALLY JUST AS WE TRAIN IN THE SIMULATOR. I DO NOT SPECIFICALLY RECALL VERBALIZING 'I HAVE THE ACFT;' BUT I DO KNOW THAT WE BOTH REVERTED TO THE ROLES AS WE TRAIN; FO IMMEDIATELY CALLED OUT 'SPOILERS UP;' AND ALL WAS WELL UNTIL WE APCHED TAXI SPD WHERE I THOUGHT I HAD KICKED OFF THE AUTOBRAKES AND ATTEMPTED TO SMOOTHLY TRANSITION TO TAXI SPD; BUT THE ACFT CONTINUED TO SLOW AGGRESSIVELY AND LURCHED ABRUPTLY AS; I SUSPECT; WE SLOWED BELOW 10 KTS AND POSSIBLY SKIDDED TO A HALT BEFORE I COULD DISARM THE AUTOBRAKES. FO WAS RIGHT ON THE PA EXPLAINING THE UNCOMFORTABLE STOP TO CALM THE PAX AS HE ASKED THEM TO STAY SEATED JUST LIKE WE BRIEFED WHEN WE BEGAN THE ROTATION. WE NOTIFIED TWR ABOUT THE BIRD; LET THEM KNOW THAT WE HAD PROBABLE ENG DAMAGE; VERIFIED THAT THE PAX REMAINED SEATED; CHKED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS; AND EXITED THE RWY. I CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE R ENG SHUTDOWN; EXPECTING THAT IT SUSTAINED DAMAGE. AFTER ASKING TWR IF THEY SAW ANYTHING UNUSUAL ON OUR R ENG (I THINK I ASKED ABOUT SMOKE SPECIFICALLY; AND GOT A NEGATIVE RESPONSE); I ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO TAXI BACK AS FAR AS XING RWY 16L BEFORE CONTACTING MAINT FOR THEIR DESIRES CONCERNING HOT BRAKES. AFTER COORDINATING WITH MAINT AND OPS; WE RETURNED TO THE TERMINAL AS GND CREWS PREPARED TO HANDLE THE HOT BRAKES AND PROBABLY IMPENDING FLAT TIRES. THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT ALSO MADE SEVERAL PAX-CALMING ANNOUNCEMENTS AS WE TAXIED IN. NO ONE WAS HURT. THERE WAS VISIBLE DAMAGE TO AT LEAST 3 FAN BLADES ON THE R ENG. SHORTLY AFTER PARKING; ALL MAINS DID GO FLAT. DURING OUR CREW DEBRIEF; THE FLT ATTENDANT WHO HAD BEEN SITTING IN THE AFT CABIN DESCRIBED WHAT SOUNDED LIKE REPEATED COMPRESSOR STALLS DURING THE ABORT. POINTS TO CONSIDER AFTER THE FACT AND LESSONS LEARNED: 1) IT IS AMAZING HOW QUICKLY THE MIND WORKS AS ONE CONSIDERED OPTIONS. JUST AFTER THE POINT WHERE I HAD DECIDED IT WOULD BE OK; WE WILL GO UNDER THE BIRD; IT DOVE DOWN. 2) THE BIRD DIVING GRABBED MY ATTN RIGHT AT THE DECISION POINT OF THE TKOF. 3) I DO NOT KNOW POSITIVELY; DUE TO ATTN TO THE BIRD; WHAT OUR PRECISE SPD WAS WHEN THE ENG LOST PWR; BUT SUSPECT BELOW V1. 4) WE COORDINATED VIA RADIO SEVERAL MINS PRIOR TO PARKING; WITH MAINT AND THE GND CREW; THROUGH RAMP CTL; CONCERNING THE HOT BRAKES PRIOR TO APCHING THE GATE AREA. HOWEVER; I WAS UNABLE TO STOP A RAMP WORKER FROM APCHING THE L MAIN WITH A SET OF CHOCKS AS WE PARKED. I EXPECTED THEM TO HAVE ONLY CHOCKED THE NOSE TIRE IN THIS CASE. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY WERE; IN FACT; INFORMED OF THE POSSIBLE DANGER BEFORE WE ARRIVED. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE PROC IS FOR GND CREWS IN DEALING WITH HOT BRAKES; BUT AFTER THIS EXPERIENCE WOULD NOT APCH THE GATE WITHOUT SOME POSITIVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE GND CREW HAS BEEN NOTIFIED TO STAY AWAY FROM THE MAIN GEAR AREA. 5) MY CONCERNS WERE BOTH FOR THE SAFETY OF THE GND CREW AND THE LIKELY POSSIBILITY OF BEING STRANDED FAR FROM THE TERMINAL WHEN THE FUSE PLUGS MELTED; BUT DID NOT WANT TO RELY ON THE FUSE PLUGS WORKING PROPERLY FOR EVERYONE'S SAFETY. IN HINDSIGHT; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRUDENT TO HAVE PARKED AWAY FROM THE TERMINAL. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS CONVENIENT FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED; BUT ERRING ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION NEVER HURTS. I DO NOT KNOW THE ODDS OF FUSE PLUGSNOT WORKING AS DESIGNED; BUT TRUSTING THEM TO WORK IS A BIT LIKE TRUSTING THE SAFETY ON AN ARMED WEAPON. 6) DURING DEBRIEF; BTWN MAINT; CREW TRACKING; DUTY PLT; CHIEF PLT SUPPORT CTR; FAA; CALL TO TWR; AND OTHERS; I NEGLECTED TO PULL THE CVR CIRCUIT BREAKER. FO REALIZED THIS AS I WAS FILLING OUT RPTS MUCH LATER AND HE REFED OUR FOM. BY THIS TIME; I THINK 2 HRS HAD PASSED SO I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO PULL IT. IT SOUNDED LIKE THE FDR AND POSSIBLY CVR WERE BEING PULLED ALREADY IN CASE THE FAA WANTED AN INVESTIGATION DUE TO THE HIGH SPD NATURE OF THIS ABORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.