Narrative:

At XA05 notified by co-worker that the lead wanted aircraft X to be moved prior to breaking for lunch. I helped moving equipment from vicinity of aircraft; noted position of aircraft X in hangar and its location relative to aircraft Y. Retrieved tug and tow bar and hooked tow bar to aircraft X. Co-worker assumed the position of brake rider in cockpit; technician 3 was wing walking the r-hand wingtip that was closest to the east hangar wall. Technician 4 was in progress opening the west hangar door. Anticipating the aircraft was clear and that the wing walker was watching the aircraft from his perspective from the r-hand wingtip and there was adequate clearance on the l-hand side. I slowly started in reverse to extract the aircraft from the hangar; aircraft moved approximately 20 ft when I heard various loud shouts from bystanders at the c-chk east bunker to stop. This was at the same time a loud noise created when aircraft X vertical stabilizer and rudders came in contact with aircraft Y l-hand vertical stabilizer tip. The supervisor was notified of the incident immediately by someone; even before I was aware the incident had happened! I stopped the tug and secured the aircraft with chocks and had the brake set by the brake rider; before I went back and realized what had happened. It was noticed by many bystanders after or during the contact of the aircraft. Supervisor followed the aircraft damage procedures. Damage to the aircraft was documented. Aircraft were separated and moved. Maintenance/cause: 1) lack of teamwork: there was not enough personnel assigned to the task of moving the aircraft. 2) norms: we just move the aircraft; oftentimes without as many wing walkers as specified in procedures manual. 3) assertiveness: I didn't want to be a problem by waiting for; or wanting to have the adequate wing walkers. 4) I assumed with all the people hanging out at the area of the tails of aircraft X and Y that someone was keeping an eye on things. Do not put aircraft in hangar nose first; do not stack aircraft with tails overlapping. Do not position aircraft in situations that damage an easily occur. Always have the adequate number of personnel assigned to the aircraft when towing. Have the working culture developed at the airline that the procedures manual is based on; depending on.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MECHANIC REPORTS ABOUT TAIL DAMAGE CAUSED; WHEN THE VERTICAL STAB AND RUDDER CAME IN CONTACT WITH THE LEFT HAND VERTICAL STAB OF ANOTHER DHC-8-400. NOT FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WHEN MOVING AIRCRAFT IN THE HANGAR CITED AS CAUSE.

Narrative: AT XA05 NOTIFIED BY CO-WORKER THAT THE LEAD WANTED ACFT X TO BE MOVED PRIOR TO BREAKING FOR LUNCH. I HELPED MOVING EQUIP FROM VICINITY OF ACFT; NOTED POS OF ACFT X IN HANGAR AND ITS LOCATION RELATIVE TO ACFT Y. RETRIEVED TUG AND TOW BAR AND HOOKED TOW BAR TO ACFT X. CO-WORKER ASSUMED THE POS OF BRAKE RIDER IN COCKPIT; TECHNICIAN 3 WAS WING WALKING THE R-HAND WINGTIP THAT WAS CLOSEST TO THE E HANGAR WALL. TECHNICIAN 4 WAS IN PROGRESS OPENING THE W HANGAR DOOR. ANTICIPATING THE ACFT WAS CLEAR AND THAT THE WING WALKER WAS WATCHING THE ACFT FROM HIS PERSPECTIVE FROM THE R-HAND WINGTIP AND THERE WAS ADEQUATE CLRNC ON THE L-HAND SIDE. I SLOWLY STARTED IN REVERSE TO EXTRACT THE ACFT FROM THE HANGAR; ACFT MOVED APPROX 20 FT WHEN I HEARD VARIOUS LOUD SHOUTS FROM BYSTANDERS AT THE C-CHK E BUNKER TO STOP. THIS WAS AT THE SAME TIME A LOUD NOISE CREATED WHEN ACFT X VERT STABILIZER AND RUDDERS CAME IN CONTACT WITH ACFT Y L-HAND VERT STABILIZER TIP. THE SUPVR WAS NOTIFIED OF THE INCIDENT IMMEDIATELY BY SOMEONE; EVEN BEFORE I WAS AWARE THE INCIDENT HAD HAPPENED! I STOPPED THE TUG AND SECURED THE ACFT WITH CHOCKS AND HAD THE BRAKE SET BY THE BRAKE RIDER; BEFORE I WENT BACK AND REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. IT WAS NOTICED BY MANY BYSTANDERS AFTER OR DURING THE CONTACT OF THE ACFT. SUPVR FOLLOWED THE ACFT DAMAGE PROCS. DAMAGE TO THE ACFT WAS DOCUMENTED. ACFT WERE SEPARATED AND MOVED. MAINT/CAUSE: 1) LACK OF TEAMWORK: THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE TASK OF MOVING THE ACFT. 2) NORMS: WE JUST MOVE THE ACFT; OFTENTIMES WITHOUT AS MANY WING WALKERS AS SPECIFIED IN PROCEDURES MANUAL. 3) ASSERTIVENESS: I DIDN'T WANT TO BE A PROB BY WAITING FOR; OR WANTING TO HAVE THE ADEQUATE WING WALKERS. 4) I ASSUMED WITH ALL THE PEOPLE HANGING OUT AT THE AREA OF THE TAILS OF ACFT X AND Y THAT SOMEONE WAS KEEPING AN EYE ON THINGS. DO NOT PUT ACFT IN HANGAR NOSE FIRST; DO NOT STACK ACFT WITH TAILS OVERLAPPING. DO NOT POSITION ACFT IN SITUATIONS THAT DAMAGE AN EASILY OCCUR. ALWAYS HAVE THE ADEQUATE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE ACFT WHEN TOWING. HAVE THE WORKING CULTURE DEVELOPED AT THE AIRLINE THAT THE PROCEDURES MANUAL IS BASED ON; DEPENDING ON.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.