Narrative:

I was scheduled to fly from ZZZ to ZZZ1. When reviewing the flight papers; I noted the following: deferred left inboard landing light inoperative. Deferred right outboard landing light inoperative. Deferred right runway turnoff light inoperative. The aircraft had arrived several hours earlier and the inbound crew wrote up the lights as being inoperative. Maintenance made no attempt to fix the inoperative exterior lights. Maintenance simply deferred the lights; as they must not realize the safety benefit gained by having operating landing and runway turnoff lights especially when operating in periods of darkness. Our B737 flight manual states 'when the airplane is in any runway environment; 'runway turnoff switches -- on.' when takeoff clearance is received; 'inboard landing lights -- on.' outboard landing lights --'as required.' why would absolutely no attempt be made to have the lights fixed prior to the next flight? The reason; and I do not make this statement lightly; is because the safety culture at air carrier has eroded to the point where this type occurrence is the norm. Air carrier is putting the burden on the flight crews; forcing them to refuse to fly the jet in order to have any items fixed. Yrs ago; any defect that was reported by a crew was either fixed or physically addressed. Now items are deferred without even looking at them. Did anyone look to see if there was damage to the landing lights before deferring them. Was there any consideration as to whether having the lights fixed may be prudent prior to the next flight? I urge that pilot be involved in the decision-making process prior to maintenance deferring any items that relate to safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MAINT DECISION ALLOWED A B737 TO FLY DURING DARK CONDITIONS WITH BOTH LNDG LIGHTS AND ONE RWY TURN OFF LIGHT INOP.

Narrative: I WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1. WHEN REVIEWING THE FLT PAPERS; I NOTED THE FOLLOWING: DEFERRED L INBOARD LNDG LIGHT INOP. DEFERRED R OUTBOARD LNDG LIGHT INOP. DEFERRED R RWY TURNOFF LIGHT INOP. THE ACFT HAD ARRIVED SEVERAL HRS EARLIER AND THE INBOUND CREW WROTE UP THE LIGHTS AS BEING INOP. MAINT MADE NO ATTEMPT TO FIX THE INOP EXTERIOR LIGHTS. MAINT SIMPLY DEFERRED THE LIGHTS; AS THEY MUST NOT REALIZE THE SAFETY BENEFIT GAINED BY HAVING OPERATING LNDG AND RWY TURNOFF LIGHTS ESPECIALLY WHEN OPERATING IN PERIODS OF DARKNESS. OUR B737 FLT MANUAL STATES 'WHEN THE AIRPLANE IS IN ANY RWY ENVIRONMENT; 'RWY TURNOFF SWITCHES -- ON.' WHEN TKOF CLRNC IS RECEIVED; 'INBOARD LNDG LIGHTS -- ON.' OUTBOARD LNDG LIGHTS --'AS REQUIRED.' WHY WOULD ABSOLUTELY NO ATTEMPT BE MADE TO HAVE THE LIGHTS FIXED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLT? THE REASON; AND I DO NOT MAKE THIS STATEMENT LIGHTLY; IS BECAUSE THE SAFETY CULTURE AT ACR HAS ERODED TO THE POINT WHERE THIS TYPE OCCURRENCE IS THE NORM. ACR IS PUTTING THE BURDEN ON THE FLT CREWS; FORCING THEM TO REFUSE TO FLY THE JET IN ORDER TO HAVE ANY ITEMS FIXED. YRS AGO; ANY DEFECT THAT WAS RPTED BY A CREW WAS EITHER FIXED OR PHYSICALLY ADDRESSED. NOW ITEMS ARE DEFERRED WITHOUT EVEN LOOKING AT THEM. DID ANYONE LOOK TO SEE IF THERE WAS DAMAGE TO THE LNDG LIGHTS BEFORE DEFERRING THEM. WAS THERE ANY CONSIDERATION AS TO WHETHER HAVING THE LIGHTS FIXED MAY BE PRUDENT PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLT? I URGE THAT PLT BE INVOLVED IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS PRIOR TO MAINT DEFERRING ANY ITEMS THAT RELATE TO SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.