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Attributes | |
ACN | 810433 |
Time | |
Date | 200811 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | CRJ 900 (all) Canadair Regional Jet 900 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Person 2 | |
ASRS Report | 810433 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ground encounters : vehicle |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Ground marshaller guided the aircraft to its designated stopping point (line) on the ramp. While paying attention to her stop point she failed to notice that she had brought the aircraft into contact with a push tractor that was prepositioned on the ramp resulting in light contact with the radome of the aircraft. Ground marshaller was concentrating on the stop line and failed to get an overall view of the environment that she was moving the aircraft in. This fixation resulted in the preventable contact with the tug. Another contributing factor was the prepositioning of the tug for the outbound push. Its close proximity contributed to the event as the marshaller only has a few inches to work with while bringing an inbound aircraft in to the gate. This small area to work with is not visible to the flight crew as the aircraft is marshalled into these final feet of movement. The captain can only rely on the signals being sent to him by the wands. From the flight deck perspective we as a crew can stop the aircraft and refuse to move it the minute that any personnel or equipment disappears from any point of our view. I feel that the ground personnel should stop the practice of prepositioning equipment for the outbound push until the inbound aircraft has been stopped and shutdown completely.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB190 FIRST OFFICER REPORTS CONTACT WITH TUG WHILE BEING MARSHALED INTO GATE. MARSHALLER WAS PAYING ATTENTION TO STOP LINE AND NOT TO PROXIMITY OF TUG; WHICH HAD BEEN POSITIONED FOR OUTBOUND PUSH.
Narrative: GND MARSHALLER GUIDED THE ACFT TO ITS DESIGNATED STOPPING POINT (LINE) ON THE RAMP. WHILE PAYING ATTN TO HER STOP POINT SHE FAILED TO NOTICE THAT SHE HAD BROUGHT THE ACFT INTO CONTACT WITH A PUSH TRACTOR THAT WAS PREPOSITIONED ON THE RAMP RESULTING IN LIGHT CONTACT WITH THE RADOME OF THE ACFT. GND MARSHALLER WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE STOP LINE AND FAILED TO GET AN OVERALL VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT THAT SHE WAS MOVING THE ACFT IN. THIS FIXATION RESULTED IN THE PREVENTABLE CONTACT WITH THE TUG. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE PREPOSITIONING OF THE TUG FOR THE OUTBOUND PUSH. ITS CLOSE PROX CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT AS THE MARSHALLER ONLY HAS A FEW INCHES TO WORK WITH WHILE BRINGING AN INBOUND ACFT IN TO THE GATE. THIS SMALL AREA TO WORK WITH IS NOT VISIBLE TO THE FLT CREW AS THE ACFT IS MARSHALLED INTO THESE FINAL FEET OF MOVEMENT. THE CAPT CAN ONLY RELY ON THE SIGNALS BEING SENT TO HIM BY THE WANDS. FROM THE FLT DECK PERSPECTIVE WE AS A CREW CAN STOP THE ACFT AND REFUSE TO MOVE IT THE MINUTE THAT ANY PERSONNEL OR EQUIP DISAPPEARS FROM ANY POINT OF OUR VIEW. I FEEL THAT THE GND PERSONNEL SHOULD STOP THE PRACTICE OF PREPOSITIONING EQUIP FOR THE OUTBOUND PUSH UNTIL THE INBOUND ACFT HAS BEEN STOPPED AND SHUTDOWN COMPLETELY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.