Narrative:

During landing rollout; tower controller was giving us multiple exit instructions that we were unable to safely comply with; impatiently and emphatically telling us we needed to exit the runway and report clear because traffic was on a 1/2 mi final. In the rush to get off the runway expeditiously; captain exited into an area outside the defined movement area rather than on the intended taxiway. We immediately realized we were not on the taxiway and stopped the aircraft to properly assess our location/situation. We informed the tower that we had cleared the runway into a non movement area; and ultimately that we would need to re-enter the runway in order to properly clear the non movement area. We then waited for assistance from the port authority/authorized to verify no damage and then moved under their direction back onto the runway and proceeded from there via assigned taxi instructions to the gate. Upon arrival at the gate; we made a logbook entry as per fom and refused to move the airplane off the gate until the required inspection could be completed. We needed to not allow ATC to distract or pressure us into rushing to exit the runway. If ATC had informed us earlier that they needed us to exit quickly; we might have been able to comply with a lot less confusion. Regardless; the proximity of the aircraft following us should not have been made our concern as long as we were making an effort to clear the runway as soon as safely possible. It is distracting to be given multiple exit instructions while in the rollout phase of landing when attention needs to be focused on safely controling and slowing the aircraft. It's also often difficult to hear the instructions properly over the sound of the reversers. I felt that a factor contributing to this event was that we received the clearance for the 'expressway visual' approach to runway 31 very late and had minimal time to brief and plan the approach (we had briefed runway 22 approach earlier) particularly since it's a very challenging approach unfamiliar for both pilots. We had a difficult time visually acquiring the required landmarks and landing runway. As a result; we somewhat overshot the turn to final. Although the aircraft was on speed; on VASI; fully configured; and landed in the touchdown zone; this contributed to the incident by adding to the overall stress of the situation and/or feeling of being rushed. Better familiarity with this approach and/or more time to plan it would have been extremely helpful. The approach itself would be a lot easier and safer to execute if an intersection and suggested altitude was established as a backup to the visual cues at the suggested turning point to intercept the final. In the future; I would ask ATC for more assistance or vectoring.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 FLIGHT CREW AFTER LANDING TAXIED OFF THE RUNWAY INTO A NON-MOVEMENT AREA.

Narrative: DURING LNDG ROLLOUT; TWR CTLR WAS GIVING US MULTIPLE EXIT INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO SAFELY COMPLY WITH; IMPATIENTLY AND EMPHATICALLY TELLING US WE NEEDED TO EXIT THE RWY AND RPT CLEAR BECAUSE TFC WAS ON A 1/2 MI FINAL. IN THE RUSH TO GET OFF THE RWY EXPEDITIOUSLY; CAPT EXITED INTO AN AREA OUTSIDE THE DEFINED MOVEMENT AREA RATHER THAN ON THE INTENDED TXWY. WE IMMEDIATELY REALIZED WE WERE NOT ON THE TXWY AND STOPPED THE ACFT TO PROPERLY ASSESS OUR LOCATION/SITUATION. WE INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE HAD CLRED THE RWY INTO A NON MOVEMENT AREA; AND ULTIMATELY THAT WE WOULD NEED TO RE-ENTER THE RWY IN ORDER TO PROPERLY CLEAR THE NON MOVEMENT AREA. WE THEN WAITED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE PORT AUTH TO VERIFY NO DAMAGE AND THEN MOVED UNDER THEIR DIRECTION BACK ONTO THE RWY AND PROCEEDED FROM THERE VIA ASSIGNED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GATE. UPON ARR AT THE GATE; WE MADE A LOGBOOK ENTRY AS PER FOM AND REFUSED TO MOVE THE AIRPLANE OFF THE GATE UNTIL THE REQUIRED INSPECTION COULD BE COMPLETED. WE NEEDED TO NOT ALLOW ATC TO DISTRACT OR PRESSURE US INTO RUSHING TO EXIT THE RWY. IF ATC HAD INFORMED US EARLIER THAT THEY NEEDED US TO EXIT QUICKLY; WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COMPLY WITH A LOT LESS CONFUSION. REGARDLESS; THE PROX OF THE ACFT FOLLOWING US SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE OUR CONCERN AS LONG AS WE WERE MAKING AN EFFORT TO CLR THE RWY AS SOON AS SAFELY POSSIBLE. IT IS DISTRACTING TO BE GIVEN MULTIPLE EXIT INSTRUCTIONS WHILE IN THE ROLLOUT PHASE OF LNDG WHEN ATTN NEEDS TO BE FOCUSED ON SAFELY CTLING AND SLOWING THE ACFT. IT'S ALSO OFTEN DIFFICULT TO HEAR THE INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY OVER THE SOUND OF THE REVERSERS. I FELT THAT A FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS EVENT WAS THAT WE RECEIVED THE CLRNC FOR THE 'EXPRESSWAY VISUAL' APCH TO RWY 31 VERY LATE AND HAD MINIMAL TIME TO BRIEF AND PLAN THE APCH (WE HAD BRIEFED RWY 22 APCH EARLIER) PARTICULARLY SINCE IT'S A VERY CHALLENGING APCH UNFAMILIAR FOR BOTH PLTS. WE HAD A DIFFICULT TIME VISUALLY ACQUIRING THE REQUIRED LANDMARKS AND LNDG RWY. AS A RESULT; WE SOMEWHAT OVERSHOT THE TURN TO FINAL. ALTHOUGH THE ACFT WAS ON SPD; ON VASI; FULLY CONFIGURED; AND LANDED IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE; THIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT BY ADDING TO THE OVERALL STRESS OF THE SITUATION AND/OR FEELING OF BEING RUSHED. BETTER FAMILIARITY WITH THIS APCH AND/OR MORE TIME TO PLAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL. THE APCH ITSELF WOULD BE A LOT EASIER AND SAFER TO EXECUTE IF AN INTXN AND SUGGESTED ALT WAS ESTABLISHED AS A BACKUP TO THE VISUAL CUES AT THE SUGGESTED TURNING POINT TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL. IN THE FUTURE; I WOULD ASK ATC FOR MORE ASSISTANCE OR VECTORING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.