Narrative:

On preflight inspection we discovered the left inboard main landing gear (#2 brake) wheel brake wear pins were not visible and worn to the limit. Closer inspection revealed the aft wear pin worn below the guard and the forward pin barely protruding past the guard. Maintenance control was contacted via phone in ZZZ station operations around XA40 for a planned XB17 departure. Maintenance control confirmed that we would not be legal to depart if either wear pin was worn below the limit without maintenance action. (My question was if we could legally depart with 1 of 2 pins above the limit.) ZZZ station was advised of this issue as well. Maintenance control dispatched contract mechanic to evaluate break wear pin measurement. Mechanic advised the cockpit the brakes were 'ok.' pilots were not convinced mechanic truly measured the wear pins and direct questions were asked of the mechanic to include 'did you actually measure the amount of brake pin showing' and 'what did you use to measure the pin.' we were unable to get a clear; concise; and/or straight answer after asking the questions multiple times. We were told that the forward pin was not protruding but the aft pin was 'plus.' per our visual inspection this was opposite our observations and captain returned to #2 brake with mechanic to verify his findings. As this occurred; a maintenance release came across the printer stating that the brake pins were measured at 1/32 measurement and ok to carry forward which infers that the mechanic had already contacted maintenance control and told them the pin was legal. Upon viewing the brake pins with the captain; the mechanic agreed that aft pin was in fact below guard and beyond limit and that forward pin was barely protruding as verified with a straight edge (the captain's identify badge). Captain and mechanic called maintenance control and advised findings/evaluation. Brake deactivation; removal or replacement were the only options per maintenance control with aft pin worn beyond limit. Forward pin would remain as a carried forward at 1/32 due to its already having been logged. Pilots reviewed weight penalty and field conditions and agreed to take aircraft with #2 brake deactivated and deferred. The autobrakes were then also deferred due MEL for brake deactivation. Mechanic deactivated #2 brake and tested hydraulics per maintenance control instructions. Dispatch confirmed performance calculations which required a runway 7L departure due 3 KT tailwind on runway 25R which was departing runway at the time. ZZZ ATC accommodated 7L departure request. Landing performance for ZZZ1 arrival also calculated to be within limits. Please note that the contract mechanic who evaluated the brakes in ZZZ did not appear to measure the brake wear pin with any instrument whatsoever. The pilots advocated further inspection after the mechanic told us observations in reverse of visually observed pin wear which was seen at below limits. An attempt to administrate the concern was not accepted as a legal dispatch with an obvious pin worn below limits which according to maintenance control was a 'no-go item.' the maintenance release which appeared after the initial inspection from the contract mechanics stated specifically that the pins were measured at 1/32. This was untrue and when asked to verify those findings with the captain the story changed. Inaccurate or false information was given to clear the maintenance release for our aircraft. This is not safe nor acceptable. Additionally; someone from the ZZZ station called over a company mechanic from elsewhere on the airport where he was working on a widebody transport which had diverted into the station after an engine failure in the day or two prior to our flight. This mechanic was called over to our gate long after the deferral and deactivation work was underway to; as he put it; 'get us out of town.' as a pilot; safety is my first and paramount concern. Being given an airworthy and legal aircraft is a requirement in the daily operation of our work. When a mechanical issue challenges that need; it must be dealt with honestly and with integrity for us to operate safely and legally. Operational coordination note: en route to ZZZ1; dispatch asked if captain would accept aircraft in present conditions for second leg to ZZZ2. Captain advised aircraft would be refused for second leg due to tropical storm WX in ZZZ2 with high xwinds and rain which could exceed the MEL restrs for the brake deactivation. This refusal was over 2 hours 20 mins prior to arrival at ZZZ1. When we arrived there was no maintenance action done until the crew began asking around for it to occur. The gate agent was not aware there would be any inbound issue or delay and operations also was out of the loop. The aircraft #2 brake was replaced at ZZZ1 prior to second leg to ZZZ2. Lack of flight operations coordination with ZZZ1 maintenance prior to our inbound arrival resulted in 2 hour 17 min delay. Someone should look into how the process failed from the point of dispatch entering the refusal. Our process isn't working.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW REPORTS DISCOVERING BRAKE WEAR PINS ON PREFLIGHT THAT INDICATE BRAKES WORN BEYOND LIMITS. CONTRACT MAINTENANCE AND COMPANY ATTEMPT TO FUDGE THE SIGNOFF AND MAINTENANCE RELEASE.

Narrative: ON PREFLT INSPECTION WE DISCOVERED THE L INBOARD MAIN LNDG GEAR (#2 BRAKE) WHEEL BRAKE WEAR PINS WERE NOT VISIBLE AND WORN TO THE LIMIT. CLOSER INSPECTION REVEALED THE AFT WEAR PIN WORN BELOW THE GUARD AND THE FORWARD PIN BARELY PROTRUDING PAST THE GUARD. MAINT CTL WAS CONTACTED VIA PHONE IN ZZZ STATION OPS AROUND XA40 FOR A PLANNED XB17 DEP. MAINT CTL CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE LEGAL TO DEPART IF EITHER WEAR PIN WAS WORN BELOW THE LIMIT WITHOUT MAINT ACTION. (MY QUESTION WAS IF WE COULD LEGALLY DEPART WITH 1 OF 2 PINS ABOVE THE LIMIT.) ZZZ STATION WAS ADVISED OF THIS ISSUE AS WELL. MAINT CTL DISPATCHED CONTRACT MECH TO EVALUATE BREAK WEAR PIN MEASUREMENT. MECH ADVISED THE COCKPIT THE BRAKES WERE 'OK.' PLTS WERE NOT CONVINCED MECH TRULY MEASURED THE WEAR PINS AND DIRECT QUESTIONS WERE ASKED OF THE MECH TO INCLUDE 'DID YOU ACTUALLY MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF BRAKE PIN SHOWING' AND 'WHAT DID YOU USE TO MEASURE THE PIN.' WE WERE UNABLE TO GET A CLEAR; CONCISE; AND/OR STRAIGHT ANSWER AFTER ASKING THE QUESTIONS MULTIPLE TIMES. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE FORWARD PIN WAS NOT PROTRUDING BUT THE AFT PIN WAS 'PLUS.' PER OUR VISUAL INSPECTION THIS WAS OPPOSITE OUR OBSERVATIONS AND CAPT RETURNED TO #2 BRAKE WITH MECH TO VERIFY HIS FINDINGS. AS THIS OCCURRED; A MAINT RELEASE CAME ACROSS THE PRINTER STATING THAT THE BRAKE PINS WERE MEASURED AT 1/32 MEASUREMENT AND OK TO CARRY FORWARD WHICH INFERS THAT THE MECH HAD ALREADY CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND TOLD THEM THE PIN WAS LEGAL. UPON VIEWING THE BRAKE PINS WITH THE CAPT; THE MECH AGREED THAT AFT PIN WAS IN FACT BELOW GUARD AND BEYOND LIMIT AND THAT FORWARD PIN WAS BARELY PROTRUDING AS VERIFIED WITH A STRAIGHT EDGE (THE CAPT'S IDENT BADGE). CAPT AND MECH CALLED MAINT CTL AND ADVISED FINDINGS/EVALUATION. BRAKE DEACTIVATION; REMOVAL OR REPLACEMENT WERE THE ONLY OPTIONS PER MAINT CTL WITH AFT PIN WORN BEYOND LIMIT. FORWARD PIN WOULD REMAIN AS A CARRIED FORWARD AT 1/32 DUE TO ITS ALREADY HAVING BEEN LOGGED. PLTS REVIEWED WT PENALTY AND FIELD CONDITIONS AND AGREED TO TAKE ACFT WITH #2 BRAKE DEACTIVATED AND DEFERRED. THE AUTOBRAKES WERE THEN ALSO DEFERRED DUE MEL FOR BRAKE DEACTIVATION. MECH DEACTIVATED #2 BRAKE AND TESTED HYDS PER MAINT CTL INSTRUCTIONS. DISPATCH CONFIRMED PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS WHICH REQUIRED A RWY 7L DEP DUE 3 KT TAILWIND ON RWY 25R WHICH WAS DEPARTING RWY AT THE TIME. ZZZ ATC ACCOMMODATED 7L DEP REQUEST. LNDG PERFORMANCE FOR ZZZ1 ARR ALSO CALCULATED TO BE WITHIN LIMITS. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE CONTRACT MECH WHO EVALUATED THE BRAKES IN ZZZ DID NOT APPEAR TO MEASURE THE BRAKE WEAR PIN WITH ANY INST WHATSOEVER. THE PLTS ADVOCATED FURTHER INSPECTION AFTER THE MECH TOLD US OBSERVATIONS IN REVERSE OF VISUALLY OBSERVED PIN WEAR WHICH WAS SEEN AT BELOW LIMITS. AN ATTEMPT TO ADMINISTRATE THE CONCERN WAS NOT ACCEPTED AS A LEGAL DISPATCH WITH AN OBVIOUS PIN WORN BELOW LIMITS WHICH ACCORDING TO MAINT CTL WAS A 'NO-GO ITEM.' THE MAINT RELEASE WHICH APPEARED AFTER THE INITIAL INSPECTION FROM THE CONTRACT MECHS STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE PINS WERE MEASURED AT 1/32. THIS WAS UNTRUE AND WHEN ASKED TO VERIFY THOSE FINDINGS WITH THE CAPT THE STORY CHANGED. INACCURATE OR FALSE INFO WAS GIVEN TO CLEAR THE MAINT RELEASE FOR OUR ACFT. THIS IS NOT SAFE NOR ACCEPTABLE. ADDITIONALLY; SOMEONE FROM THE ZZZ STATION CALLED OVER A COMPANY MECH FROM ELSEWHERE ON THE ARPT WHERE HE WAS WORKING ON A WDB WHICH HAD DIVERTED INTO THE STATION AFTER AN ENG FAILURE IN THE DAY OR TWO PRIOR TO OUR FLT. THIS MECH WAS CALLED OVER TO OUR GATE LONG AFTER THE DEFERRAL AND DEACTIVATION WORK WAS UNDERWAY TO; AS HE PUT IT; 'GET US OUT OF TOWN.' AS A PLT; SAFETY IS MY FIRST AND PARAMOUNT CONCERN. BEING GIVEN AN AIRWORTHY AND LEGAL ACFT IS A REQUIREMENT IN THE DAILY OP OF OUR WORK. WHEN A MECHANICAL ISSUE CHALLENGES THAT NEED; IT MUST BE DEALT WITH HONESTLY AND WITH INTEGRITY FOR US TO OPERATE SAFELY AND LEGALLY. OPERATIONAL COORD NOTE: ENRTE TO ZZZ1; DISPATCH ASKED IF CAPT WOULD ACCEPT ACFT IN PRESENT CONDITIONS FOR SECOND LEG TO ZZZ2. CAPT ADVISED ACFT WOULD BE REFUSED FOR SECOND LEG DUE TO TROPICAL STORM WX IN ZZZ2 WITH HIGH XWINDS AND RAIN WHICH COULD EXCEED THE MEL RESTRS FOR THE BRAKE DEACTIVATION. THIS REFUSAL WAS OVER 2 HRS 20 MINS PRIOR TO ARR AT ZZZ1. WHEN WE ARRIVED THERE WAS NO MAINT ACTION DONE UNTIL THE CREW BEGAN ASKING AROUND FOR IT TO OCCUR. THE GATE AGENT WAS NOT AWARE THERE WOULD BE ANY INBOUND ISSUE OR DELAY AND OPS ALSO WAS OUT OF THE LOOP. THE ACFT #2 BRAKE WAS REPLACED AT ZZZ1 PRIOR TO SECOND LEG TO ZZZ2. LACK OF FLT OPS COORD WITH ZZZ1 MAINT PRIOR TO OUR INBOUND ARR RESULTED IN 2 HR 17 MIN DELAY. SOMEONE SHOULD LOOK INTO HOW THE PROCESS FAILED FROM THE POINT OF DISPATCH ENTERING THE REFUSAL. OUR PROCESS ISN'T WORKING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.