Narrative:

While descending to ZZZ; we noticed that the blue hydraulic system had an anomaly. The pump was showing green but with no pressure. We also noted that the green system quantity was low. We were assigned runway 23 and continued the approach. We discussed the hydraulic system anomaly and were cleared for the approach. Just prior to about 1500 ft AGL; I checked the hydraulic page once again and noted that the green system had fallen to just above the amber line. We discussed quickly and decided to land on a longer runway. We requested runway 18C but were given runway 18L instead. Since we were so close and severe clear; we felt that the extra length afforded by runway 18L would be sufficient; even in the event of a hydraulic failure. The PNF turned to a heading to runway 18L and we were cleared for a visual for runway 18L. I went heads down to re-string the approach and check the hydraulic page. We had a confign change and I looked up and saw that the PNF had entered into an oblique angle to the runway. I thought it was a little odd but continued to re-string the approach and looked for the checklist to finish the landing portion of the checklist. I looked up and the tower called at the same time to see if we really saw the runway. I saw that we were below the GS/VASI and told the PNF to climb and/or level immediately. I had various thoughts at this time. A go around was possible but I thought that with the green system heading to nothing; we would exacerbate our problems. I thought of taking control and realigning but at that second the PNF saw the runway and started to properly align the aircraft. We finished the checklist rather hurriedly and continued; crossing the threshold in confign but slightly left of centerline. We landed in the first 1500 ft of the runway and exited normally. Upon arrival at the gate; the aircraft was removed from service due to a severe leak in the green engine driven pump. The blue hydraulic system anomaly was written up and I do not know what happened with that write-up. A classic case of allowing 1 problem to fixate at least 1 pilot and take him out of the loop. I should have paid far more attention to the approach than looking for the checklist and re-string the approach. I did not realize until later that the PNF had become disoriented and had lost the runway due to all the lights and not being familiar with the sight picture needed to land on runway 18L. Taking control of the aircraft; at least momentarily; would have allowed the PNF to reorient himself and properly align the aircraft. The PNF and I had flown a lot together and he is an experienced pilot with a great deal of airbus time. Anyone can get disoriented and I/we allowed our other problems to break down the lines of communication as to the proper alignment of the aircraft. Even though we landed safely on the runway it was not the ideal way to finish this flight. Constantly monitor all aspects of flight and do not presume that your flying partner; regardless of experience or seat position; could not be task loaded or disoriented.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CAPTAIN DESCRIBES A CREW REQUESTED LATE RUNWAY CHANGE BECAUSE OF A BLUE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ANOMALY. WHILE MANEUVERING FOR NIGHT TIME VFR LANDING THE FIRST OFFICER BECAME DISORIENTED. THE GREEN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM QUANTITY AND PRESSURE WERE ALSO FALLING.

Narrative: WHILE DSNDING TO ZZZ; WE NOTICED THAT THE BLUE HYD SYSTEM HAD AN ANOMALY. THE PUMP WAS SHOWING GREEN BUT WITH NO PRESSURE. WE ALSO NOTED THAT THE GREEN SYSTEM QUANTITY WAS LOW. WE WERE ASSIGNED RWY 23 AND CONTINUED THE APCH. WE DISCUSSED THE HYD SYSTEM ANOMALY AND WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. JUST PRIOR TO ABOUT 1500 FT AGL; I CHKED THE HYD PAGE ONCE AGAIN AND NOTED THAT THE GREEN SYSTEM HAD FALLEN TO JUST ABOVE THE AMBER LINE. WE DISCUSSED QUICKLY AND DECIDED TO LAND ON A LONGER RWY. WE REQUESTED RWY 18C BUT WERE GIVEN RWY 18L INSTEAD. SINCE WE WERE SO CLOSE AND SEVERE CLEAR; WE FELT THAT THE EXTRA LENGTH AFFORDED BY RWY 18L WOULD BE SUFFICIENT; EVEN IN THE EVENT OF A HYD FAILURE. THE PNF TURNED TO A HDG TO RWY 18L AND WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL FOR RWY 18L. I WENT HEADS DOWN TO RE-STRING THE APCH AND CHK THE HYD PAGE. WE HAD A CONFIGN CHANGE AND I LOOKED UP AND SAW THAT THE PNF HAD ENTERED INTO AN OBLIQUE ANGLE TO THE RWY. I THOUGHT IT WAS A LITTLE ODD BUT CONTINUED TO RE-STRING THE APCH AND LOOKED FOR THE CHKLIST TO FINISH THE LNDG PORTION OF THE CHKLIST. I LOOKED UP AND THE TWR CALLED AT THE SAME TIME TO SEE IF WE REALLY SAW THE RWY. I SAW THAT WE WERE BELOW THE GS/VASI AND TOLD THE PNF TO CLB AND/OR LEVEL IMMEDIATELY. I HAD VARIOUS THOUGHTS AT THIS TIME. A GAR WAS POSSIBLE BUT I THOUGHT THAT WITH THE GREEN SYSTEM HEADING TO NOTHING; WE WOULD EXACERBATE OUR PROBS. I THOUGHT OF TAKING CTL AND REALIGNING BUT AT THAT SECOND THE PNF SAW THE RWY AND STARTED TO PROPERLY ALIGN THE ACFT. WE FINISHED THE CHKLIST RATHER HURRIEDLY AND CONTINUED; XING THE THRESHOLD IN CONFIGN BUT SLIGHTLY L OF CTRLINE. WE LANDED IN THE FIRST 1500 FT OF THE RWY AND EXITED NORMALLY. UPON ARR AT THE GATE; THE ACFT WAS REMOVED FROM SVC DUE TO A SEVERE LEAK IN THE GREEN ENG DRIVEN PUMP. THE BLUE HYD SYSTEM ANOMALY WAS WRITTEN UP AND I DO NOT KNOW WHAT HAPPENED WITH THAT WRITE-UP. A CLASSIC CASE OF ALLOWING 1 PROB TO FIXATE AT LEAST 1 PLT AND TAKE HIM OUT OF THE LOOP. I SHOULD HAVE PAID FAR MORE ATTN TO THE APCH THAN LOOKING FOR THE CHKLIST AND RE-STRING THE APCH. I DID NOT REALIZE UNTIL LATER THAT THE PNF HAD BECOME DISORIENTED AND HAD LOST THE RWY DUE TO ALL THE LIGHTS AND NOT BEING FAMILIAR WITH THE SIGHT PICTURE NEEDED TO LAND ON RWY 18L. TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT; AT LEAST MOMENTARILY; WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE PNF TO REORIENT HIMSELF AND PROPERLY ALIGN THE ACFT. THE PNF AND I HAD FLOWN A LOT TOGETHER AND HE IS AN EXPERIENCED PLT WITH A GREAT DEAL OF AIRBUS TIME. ANYONE CAN GET DISORIENTED AND I/WE ALLOWED OUR OTHER PROBS TO BREAK DOWN THE LINES OF COM AS TO THE PROPER ALIGNMENT OF THE ACFT. EVEN THOUGH WE LANDED SAFELY ON THE RWY IT WAS NOT THE IDEAL WAY TO FINISH THIS FLT. CONSTANTLY MONITOR ALL ASPECTS OF FLT AND DO NOT PRESUME THAT YOUR FLYING PARTNER; REGARDLESS OF EXPERIENCE OR SEAT POSITION; COULD NOT BE TASK LOADED OR DISORIENTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.