Narrative:

I performed a complete preflight of the aircraft using the checklist; including visual and tactile inspection of fuel tanks and visual inspection of fuel from the gascolator. I detected no abnormalities. The aircraft does not have carburetor heat. I started the aircraft following the checklist steps. I taxied to runway 31 at ZZZ. I performed a pre takeoff test of each ignition system following the checklist. I checked all gauges; following the checklist steps. The ignition system performed properly on each individual magneto. The gauges were all in the normal range. All gauges were working properly. I then departed from runway xx at ZZZ1. After reaching 800 ft; I retracted takeoff flaps and turned towards the southeast towards my destination. I continued to climb until I reached 5500 ft MSL. I then leveled off at 5500 ft MSL. Within 1 min or so of leveling off; approximately 5 mins into the flight; the engine abruptly stopped. The propeller stopped and did not windmill. I also noticed that the radio was dark; indicating to me an electrical failure as well. I immediately obtained best glide speed and checked both fuel switches; which were both still in the 'on' position. I was too far from ZZZ1 to return to the field. I chose a suitable field to land in if necessary and began maneuvering to set up for an upwind landing on that field. I verified that both ignition switches were on. I attempted to activate the emergency fuel pump; but the characteristic noise was not present when the switch was turned to the 'on' position. I turned the master switch to 'start;' but the starter did not engage. I turned the key to the 'off' position; and then again turned the master switch to 'start.' again there was no engagement of the starter. Subsequent multiple attempts to restart also failed. I attempted to deploy flaps a minimal amount to check for any electrical function. The flaps did not work either. I was without engine or electrical power. I had no radio; so I was not able to announce an emergency. I maintained best glide speed while descending to make the field I had chosen. I turned the master switch to the 'off' position; I turned off the ignition switches. I turned off all other electrical component switches. I turned off the fuel valves. I unlocked and opened both doors. I removed all loose items in the front area of the cockpit and placed them behind the seat to minimize their danger as projectiles. I retrieved my sarsat plb and attempted to activate it. My heavy gloves apparently prevented me from successfully activating the plb. I believed I had activated the plb. As I was descending towards the field; I was a little high; so I slipped to lose altitude. I made a successful upwind landing in the field. The aircraft came to a complete stop remaining on the landing gear. The landing was much like any landing on a rough grass field; but with a lot more adrenaline flowing in the pilot. The plane appeared to have no damage from the landing whatsoever. Later; the FBO representatives stated that the wheel pants weren't even scuffed on the aircraft. My touchdown speed was approximately 55 KTS per hour. I egressed the aircraft. It was clear that there were no fuel leaks or other problems; so I policed up my gear; secured the plane; and received aid from the property owner; who came to see why someone was landing an airplane dead-stick in his field. The property owner brought me to his house. I contacted the FBO; advised them of what had happened; and asked them to look up the air force rescue coordination center (afrcc). The FBO gave me the number for the afrcc. I contacted the afrcc to let them know I had activated my plb but no emergency response was needed. The afrcc indicated that they were not showing a signal. I feel that once the in-flight emergency occurred; I did everything right. I performed the checklist flow from memory and covered each of the items in the proper sequence. This is due to the amount of time I spent memorizing the emergency procedures and the follow-up time I have spent reviewing them. It is clear to me that once such an emergency occurs at lower altitudes; a pilot does not have much; if any; time to pull out and consult a checklist and attempt to follow the action steps; which are usually in a very small print. A pilot must know by heart the emergency procedures in order to cover all the steps.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE PILOT OF AN EXPERIMENTAL HOME BUILT AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED ENGINE AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEM FAILURE AT 5;500 FT. NO RESTART WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE ELECTRICAL FAILURE; SO HE LANDED SAFELY IN A FIELD.

Narrative: I PERFORMED A COMPLETE PREFLT OF THE ACFT USING THE CHKLIST; INCLUDING VISUAL AND TACTILE INSPECTION OF FUEL TANKS AND VISUAL INSPECTION OF FUEL FROM THE GASCOLATOR. I DETECTED NO ABNORMALITIES. THE ACFT DOES NOT HAVE CARB HEAT. I STARTED THE ACFT FOLLOWING THE CHKLIST STEPS. I TAXIED TO RWY 31 AT ZZZ. I PERFORMED A PRE TKOF TEST OF EACH IGNITION SYSTEM FOLLOWING THE CHKLIST. I CHKED ALL GAUGES; FOLLOWING THE CHKLIST STEPS. THE IGNITION SYSTEM PERFORMED PROPERLY ON EACH INDIVIDUAL MAGNETO. THE GAUGES WERE ALL IN THE NORMAL RANGE. ALL GAUGES WERE WORKING PROPERLY. I THEN DEPARTED FROM RWY XX AT ZZZ1. AFTER REACHING 800 FT; I RETRACTED TKOF FLAPS AND TURNED TOWARDS THE SE TOWARDS MY DEST. I CONTINUED TO CLB UNTIL I REACHED 5500 FT MSL. I THEN LEVELED OFF AT 5500 FT MSL. WITHIN 1 MIN OR SO OF LEVELING OFF; APPROX 5 MINS INTO THE FLT; THE ENG ABRUPTLY STOPPED. THE PROP STOPPED AND DID NOT WINDMILL. I ALSO NOTICED THAT THE RADIO WAS DARK; INDICATING TO ME AN ELECTRICAL FAILURE AS WELL. I IMMEDIATELY OBTAINED BEST GLIDE SPD AND CHKED BOTH FUEL SWITCHES; WHICH WERE BOTH STILL IN THE 'ON' POSITION. I WAS TOO FAR FROM ZZZ1 TO RETURN TO THE FIELD. I CHOSE A SUITABLE FIELD TO LAND IN IF NECESSARY AND BEGAN MANEUVERING TO SET UP FOR AN UPWIND LNDG ON THAT FIELD. I VERIFIED THAT BOTH IGNITION SWITCHES WERE ON. I ATTEMPTED TO ACTIVATE THE EMER FUEL PUMP; BUT THE CHARACTERISTIC NOISE WAS NOT PRESENT WHEN THE SWITCH WAS TURNED TO THE 'ON' POSITION. I TURNED THE MASTER SWITCH TO 'START;' BUT THE STARTER DID NOT ENGAGE. I TURNED THE KEY TO THE 'OFF' POSITION; AND THEN AGAIN TURNED THE MASTER SWITCH TO 'START.' AGAIN THERE WAS NO ENGAGEMENT OF THE STARTER. SUBSEQUENT MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS TO RESTART ALSO FAILED. I ATTEMPTED TO DEPLOY FLAPS A MINIMAL AMOUNT TO CHK FOR ANY ELECTRICAL FUNCTION. THE FLAPS DID NOT WORK EITHER. I WAS WITHOUT ENG OR ELECTRICAL PWR. I HAD NO RADIO; SO I WAS NOT ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AN EMER. I MAINTAINED BEST GLIDE SPD WHILE DSNDING TO MAKE THE FIELD I HAD CHOSEN. I TURNED THE MASTER SWITCH TO THE 'OFF' POSITION; I TURNED OFF THE IGNITION SWITCHES. I TURNED OFF ALL OTHER ELECTRICAL COMPONENT SWITCHES. I TURNED OFF THE FUEL VALVES. I UNLOCKED AND OPENED BOTH DOORS. I REMOVED ALL LOOSE ITEMS IN THE FRONT AREA OF THE COCKPIT AND PLACED THEM BEHIND THE SEAT TO MINIMIZE THEIR DANGER AS PROJECTILES. I RETRIEVED MY SARSAT PLB AND ATTEMPTED TO ACTIVATE IT. MY HVY GLOVES APPARENTLY PREVENTED ME FROM SUCCESSFULLY ACTIVATING THE PLB. I BELIEVED I HAD ACTIVATED THE PLB. AS I WAS DSNDING TOWARDS THE FIELD; I WAS A LITTLE HIGH; SO I SLIPPED TO LOSE ALT. I MADE A SUCCESSFUL UPWIND LNDG IN THE FIELD. THE ACFT CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP REMAINING ON THE LNDG GEAR. THE LNDG WAS MUCH LIKE ANY LNDG ON A ROUGH GRASS FIELD; BUT WITH A LOT MORE ADRENALINE FLOWING IN THE PLT. THE PLANE APPEARED TO HAVE NO DAMAGE FROM THE LNDG WHATSOEVER. LATER; THE FBO REPRESENTATIVES STATED THAT THE WHEEL PANTS WEREN'T EVEN SCUFFED ON THE ACFT. MY TOUCHDOWN SPD WAS APPROX 55 KTS PER HR. I EGRESSED THE ACFT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WERE NO FUEL LEAKS OR OTHER PROBS; SO I POLICED UP MY GEAR; SECURED THE PLANE; AND RECEIVED AID FROM THE PROPERTY OWNER; WHO CAME TO SEE WHY SOMEONE WAS LNDG AN AIRPLANE DEAD-STICK IN HIS FIELD. THE PROPERTY OWNER BROUGHT ME TO HIS HOUSE. I CONTACTED THE FBO; ADVISED THEM OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED; AND ASKED THEM TO LOOK UP THE AIR FORCE RESCUE COORD CTR (AFRCC). THE FBO GAVE ME THE NUMBER FOR THE AFRCC. I CONTACTED THE AFRCC TO LET THEM KNOW I HAD ACTIVATED MY PLB BUT NO EMER RESPONSE WAS NEEDED. THE AFRCC INDICATED THAT THEY WERE NOT SHOWING A SIGNAL. I FEEL THAT ONCE THE INFLT EMER OCCURRED; I DID EVERYTHING RIGHT. I PERFORMED THE CHKLIST FLOW FROM MEMORY AND COVERED EACH OF THE ITEMS IN THE PROPER SEQUENCE. THIS IS DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF TIME I SPENT MEMORIZING THE EMER PROCS AND THE FOLLOW-UP TIME I HAVE SPENT REVIEWING THEM. IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT ONCE SUCH AN EMER OCCURS AT LOWER ALTS; A PLT DOES NOT HAVE MUCH; IF ANY; TIME TO PULL OUT AND CONSULT A CHKLIST AND ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW THE ACTION STEPS; WHICH ARE USUALLY IN A VERY SMALL PRINT. A PLT MUST KNOW BY HEART THE EMER PROCS IN ORDER TO COVER ALL THE STEPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.