An A320 crew failed to close the APU bleed valve prior to deicing and the aircraft cabin filled with...

Narrative:

In preparations for deicing; aircraft confign was not properly set resulting in the ingestion of deicing fluid to the air conditioning system and smoke/fumes in the cabin. Aircraft had been pushed back a few ft from the jetway and the APU was running. During preparations for the deicing we; as a crew; failed to turn off the APU bleed switch. Predictably; the cabin filled with fumes soon after the ground crew started to spray the aircraft. Seeing the smoke we realized our mistake and immediately turned off the bleed switch. The cabin quickly cleared of smoke and fumes. The deicing procedure continued; was completed; and the aircraft was configured for a continued pushback; taxi and departure. No further problems or deviations. The pre-deicing checklist was run; but due to distrs and inattn the item directing that the APU bleed switch be turned off was either not read (first officer's thought) or was missed by me. When we became aware of the problem we were able to quickly resolve the situation . Contributing to the situation : 1) deicing procedures at ZZZ call for a pushback from the gate; no engines started and the ground personnel in contact with the crew via headset (interphone). On most deicings we have the engines running with the APU shutdown and are talking to the ground people via communication radio. During this event; ground was trying to communicate via 2 hand-held radios. We had difficulty communicating. This helped cause a distraction in the cockpit. We finally were communicating through the operations personnel to the deicing supervisor. It was frustrating and certainly impacted our cockpit prep performance. 2) my first officer thinks he did not say the step requiring the bleed switch to be off. That is either the case or I missed it due to my attention being drawn to things outside of the checklist. 3) we were both tired. This was the first leg of the day following a long comfortable hotel stay; however; we were starting the day at nearly XA00 and not to be finished until after XG00 that night. We had completed 2 days of the trip with wake up times at around XI00 and XK00 for both of us. Neither of us were able to 'sleep in' on this day. We had already been up for 12 hours before we started our duty. Review the deicing procedures at ZZZ with particular attention to communications. This is not the first time I have had problems with them. Reinforce the need to xchk each other during the use of the deice checklist. This is not a checklist with which we are absolutely comfortable because we do not deice very often. This was only the second time this yr for me. Commend the flight attendants for their quick response to the situation and coordinating with the cockpit. They did not panic in the face of an out of the normal circumstance. Rethink the wisdom of scheduling trips with late starts to the west coast and arrs out there on the back side of the body clock for east coast crews; after duty periods where the operations call for early morning get ups. The transition adds to overall crew fatigue and a degradation of performance.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW FAILED TO CLOSE THE APU BLEED VALVE PRIOR TO DEICING AND THE AIRCRAFT CABIN FILLED WITH SMOKE. THE STATION DE-ICE PROCEDURE AND FATIGUE WERE BOTH ISSUES.

Narrative: IN PREPARATIONS FOR DEICING; ACFT CONFIGN WAS NOT PROPERLY SET RESULTING IN THE INGESTION OF DEICING FLUID TO THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS AND SMOKE/FUMES IN THE CABIN. ACFT HAD BEEN PUSHED BACK A FEW FT FROM THE JETWAY AND THE APU WAS RUNNING. DURING PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEICING WE; AS A CREW; FAILED TO TURN OFF THE APU BLEED SWITCH. PREDICTABLY; THE CABIN FILLED WITH FUMES SOON AFTER THE GND CREW STARTED TO SPRAY THE ACFT. SEEING THE SMOKE WE REALIZED OUR MISTAKE AND IMMEDIATELY TURNED OFF THE BLEED SWITCH. THE CABIN QUICKLY CLRED OF SMOKE AND FUMES. THE DEICING PROC CONTINUED; WAS COMPLETED; AND THE ACFT WAS CONFIGURED FOR A CONTINUED PUSHBACK; TAXI AND DEP. NO FURTHER PROBS OR DEVS. THE PRE-DEICING CHKLIST WAS RUN; BUT DUE TO DISTRS AND INATTN THE ITEM DIRECTING THAT THE APU BLEED SWITCH BE TURNED OFF WAS EITHER NOT READ (FO'S THOUGHT) OR WAS MISSED BY ME. WHEN WE BECAME AWARE OF THE PROB WE WERE ABLE TO QUICKLY RESOLVE THE SITUATION . CONTRIBUTING TO THE SITUATION : 1) DEICING PROCS AT ZZZ CALL FOR A PUSHBACK FROM THE GATE; NO ENGS STARTED AND THE GND PERSONNEL IN CONTACT WITH THE CREW VIA HEADSET (INTERPHONE). ON MOST DEICINGS WE HAVE THE ENGS RUNNING WITH THE APU SHUTDOWN AND ARE TALKING TO THE GND PEOPLE VIA COM RADIO. DURING THIS EVENT; GND WAS TRYING TO COMMUNICATE VIA 2 HAND-HELD RADIOS. WE HAD DIFFICULTY COMMUNICATING. THIS HELPED CAUSE A DISTR IN THE COCKPIT. WE FINALLY WERE COMMUNICATING THROUGH THE OPS PERSONNEL TO THE DEICING SUPVR. IT WAS FRUSTRATING AND CERTAINLY IMPACTED OUR COCKPIT PREP PERFORMANCE. 2) MY FO THINKS HE DID NOT SAY THE STEP REQUIRING THE BLEED SWITCH TO BE OFF. THAT IS EITHER THE CASE OR I MISSED IT DUE TO MY ATTN BEING DRAWN TO THINGS OUTSIDE OF THE CHKLIST. 3) WE WERE BOTH TIRED. THIS WAS THE FIRST LEG OF THE DAY FOLLOWING A LONG COMFORTABLE HOTEL STAY; HOWEVER; WE WERE STARTING THE DAY AT NEARLY XA00 AND NOT TO BE FINISHED UNTIL AFTER XG00 THAT NIGHT. WE HAD COMPLETED 2 DAYS OF THE TRIP WITH WAKE UP TIMES AT AROUND XI00 AND XK00 FOR BOTH OF US. NEITHER OF US WERE ABLE TO 'SLEEP IN' ON THIS DAY. WE HAD ALREADY BEEN UP FOR 12 HRS BEFORE WE STARTED OUR DUTY. REVIEW THE DEICING PROCS AT ZZZ WITH PARTICULAR ATTN TO COMS. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME I HAVE HAD PROBS WITH THEM. REINFORCE THE NEED TO XCHK EACH OTHER DURING THE USE OF THE DEICE CHKLIST. THIS IS NOT A CHKLIST WITH WHICH WE ARE ABSOLUTELY COMFORTABLE BECAUSE WE DO NOT DEICE VERY OFTEN. THIS WAS ONLY THE SECOND TIME THIS YR FOR ME. COMMEND THE FLT ATTENDANTS FOR THEIR QUICK RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION AND COORDINATING WITH THE COCKPIT. THEY DID NOT PANIC IN THE FACE OF AN OUT OF THE NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCE. RETHINK THE WISDOM OF SCHEDULING TRIPS WITH LATE STARTS TO THE WEST COAST AND ARRS OUT THERE ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE BODY CLOCK FOR EAST COAST CREWS; AFTER DUTY PERIODS WHERE THE OPS CALL FOR EARLY MORNING GET UPS. THE TRANSITION ADDS TO OVERALL CREW FATIGUE AND A DEGRADATION OF PERFORMANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	815102
Time
Date	200812
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Weather Elements	other
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	A320
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
ASRS Report	815102
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far non adherence : company policies other anomaly
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	flight crew : became reoriented other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Weather Company Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

An A320 crew failed to close the APU bleed valve prior to deicing and the aircraft cabin filled with smoke. The station de-ice procedure and fatigue were both issues.