Narrative:

During cruise; all 3 pilots were involved in the approach and landing pre-briefing during which QFE altimeter procedures were discussed. This briefing included a review of the QFE procedures in the g-v quick reference handbook. During the brief; I noted that; per the notes on both the STAR and approach plates; qnh was available on request. I also noted that on other flights to russia (moscow and st. Petersburg) I requested and was given qnh settings. We reviewed the procedures for QFE and agreed there was 'no mystery' to using QFE settings. At this time the third pilot; the most junior of the crew; made a statement to the effect; 'when in russia; do like the russians.' however; we did agree we would ask for qnh and if given; would fly qnh. ATIS indicated cavok with a QFE altimeter setting of 764 mm (995 hpa). When we checked in with approach control; we acknowledged the ATIS and requested a qnh altimeter setting and were given the qnh setting of 1020 hpa. While being vectored for the ILS to runway 24; we were given a descent to maintain 600m from above the transition level. Upon passing the transition altitude 3970 ft; we set 1020 hpa on our altimeters. Approaching '600 meters' approach control commanded us to climb and maintain 600 meters. We stated we were leveling at 600m. Again; he told us to climb to 600 meters and confirm our altimeter was set to 995 hpa. We began a slow climb; stated we requested qnh from a previous controller; were given and were flying 1020 hpa. He came back and stated they 'were still using QFE procedures.' there was no other communication from the controller regarding altitude or altimeter settings. There was confusion on the flight deck as to what indicated altitude we should stop the climb. As we were now on a left downwind in day/VMC with the field having been in sight since prior to descent below transition altitude; we flew what appeared to be about 1500-2000 ft AGL. An uneventful landing was carried out. No other traffic was ever sighted. The crew debriefed the incident once on the ground. We agreed the situation was very serious (potential traffic; terrain; and obstruction conflicts). It was stated that; had we been in IMC when advised to climb to 600 meters; we would have asked for a climb above the transition altitude of 3970 ft until we were able to resolve the discrepancy. Further; in retrospect; although we thought we were making things more familiar to us by flying qnh; we should have stayed with the briefed QFE altimeter setting. We never asked ourselves the question; 'any reason we shouldn't ask for qnh?' had we done so; we may have uncovered the possibility of mixing 'apples and oranges' which is what I believe happened. I believe we're descending to an indicated altitude of 1970 ft on the qnh setting of 1029 hpa which would have ultimately put us about 680 ft low. (See the accompanying approach plate.) or; we may have decided to go ahead with flying a qnh setting but acknowledging that there could be some confusion and; therefore; we should back ourselves up with corroborating evidence that we were at the correct altitude. Because the terrain was relatively smooth; we could have agreed to use the radar altimeter as backup. Thus; when it showed a descent below 1970 ft we may have stopped the descent until we figured out the discrepancy. Unfortunately; we did not do this and as a result did not include the radar altimeter in our scan. Continuing the analysis on my own; I have uncovered more information which could have impacted the situation had we brought it to bear. First I must say that my complacency was an issue. I had been there before and did not have a problem. Also; I prided myself on knowing and complying with our company international procedures. I believe we flew qnh but my memory may fail me. In any event; had I conducted my usual review of the appropriate data supplied by our company; the event would not have happened. The QFE procedural guidance is very explicit. I willconduct a follow-up debrief with the crew in light of my new 'discoveries.' also; I will recommit myself to the ongoing fight against complacency. Although very embarrassed at present; maybe this renewed commitment will decrease the chance of future incidents/accidents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GV flight crew discovers that they are not familiar with QNH procedures while being vectored for approach at UUWW. Crew gets 700 feet low when instructed to descend to 600 meters.

Narrative: During cruise; all 3 pilots were involved in the approach and landing pre-briefing during which QFE altimeter procedures were discussed. This briefing included a review of the QFE procedures in the G-V Quick Reference Handbook. During the brief; I noted that; per the notes on both the STAR and Approach Plates; QNH was available on request. I also noted that on other flights to Russia (Moscow and St. Petersburg) I requested and was given QNH settings. We reviewed the procedures for QFE and agreed there was 'no mystery' to using QFE settings. At this time the third pilot; the most junior of the crew; made a statement to the effect; 'When in Russia; do like the Russians.' However; we did agree we would ask for QNH and if given; would fly QNH. ATIS indicated CAVOK with a QFE altimeter setting of 764 mm (995 hpa). When we checked in with Approach Control; we acknowledged the ATIS and requested a QNH altimeter setting and were given the QNH setting of 1020 hpa. While being vectored for the ILS to Runway 24; we were given a descent to maintain 600m from above the Transition Level. Upon passing the Transition Altitude 3970 FT; we set 1020 hpa on our altimeters. Approaching '600 meters' Approach Control commanded us to climb and maintain 600 meters. We stated we were leveling at 600m. Again; he told us to climb to 600 meters and confirm our altimeter was set to 995 hpa. We began a slow climb; stated we requested QNH from a previous Controller; were given and were flying 1020 hpa. He came back and stated they 'were still using QFE procedures.' There was no other communication from the Controller regarding altitude or altimeter settings. There was confusion on the flight deck as to what indicated altitude we should stop the climb. As we were now on a left downwind in day/VMC with the field having been in sight since prior to descent below Transition Altitude; we flew what appeared to be about 1500-2000 FT AGL. An uneventful landing was carried out. No other traffic was ever sighted. The crew debriefed the incident once on the ground. We agreed the situation was very serious (potential traffic; terrain; and obstruction conflicts). It was stated that; had we been in IMC when advised to climb to 600 meters; we would have asked for a climb above the Transition Altitude of 3970 FT until we were able to resolve the discrepancy. Further; in retrospect; although we thought we were making things more familiar to us by flying QNH; we should have stayed with the briefed QFE altimeter setting. We never asked ourselves the question; 'any reason we shouldn't ask for QNH?' Had we done so; we may have uncovered the possibility of mixing 'apples and oranges' which is what I believe happened. I believe we're descending to an indicated altitude of 1970 FT on the QNH setting of 1029 hpa which would have ultimately put us about 680 FT low. (See the accompanying approach plate.) Or; we may have decided to go ahead with flying a QNH setting but acknowledging that there could be some confusion and; therefore; we should back ourselves up with corroborating evidence that we were at the correct altitude. Because the terrain was relatively smooth; we could have agreed to use the radar altimeter as backup. Thus; when it showed a descent below 1970 FT we may have stopped the descent until we figured out the discrepancy. Unfortunately; we did not do this and as a result did not include the radar altimeter in our scan. Continuing the analysis on my own; I have uncovered more information which could have impacted the situation had we brought it to bear. First I must say that my complacency was an issue. I had been there before and did not have a problem. Also; I prided myself on knowing and complying with our company international procedures. I believe we flew QNH but my memory may fail me. In any event; had I conducted my usual review of the appropriate data supplied by our company; the event would not have happened. The QFE procedural guidance is very explicit. I willconduct a follow-up debrief with the crew in light of my new 'discoveries.' Also; I will recommit myself to the ongoing fight against complacency. Although very embarrassed at present; maybe this renewed commitment will decrease the chance of future incidents/accidents.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.