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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 819950 |
Time | |
Date | 200901 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Cockpit Door |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200 Flight Crew Total 11000 Flight Crew Type 6500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Other / Unknown Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
This report concerns a serious airborne security situation and the questionable assistance of dispatch and the flight duty manager. Enroute we set up for a restroom break about 1 hour. Into the flight. During the movements at the cockpit door; the door became jammed and wouldn't close. This occurred as the ride conditions were deteriorating; and it was questionable whether the flight attendant should remain up guarding the door. Both flight attendants posting duty were aware of the situation at the door; and both the captain and purser worked diligently at getting the door closed in marginal ride conditions. After a few minutes; the door was secured with the captain outside. Communication was established between the flight deck and forward flight attendant station. The problem of the door threshold blocking the closure of the door was discussed; and it was determined that the door could be closed by pushing down on the threshold from the outside. It was decided to continue with restroom breaks and perhaps continue to effect temporary repairs to the door. On the second attempt; the door again jammed open by hitting against the threshold. It was obvious the screws holding down the threshold were loose; and since we do not have screwdrivers; we could not tighten up these screws. The first officer worked on repairs; and the captain contacted dispatch; who answered the situation with 'copy.' after bending the threshold back with an ice mallet; we were able to secure the door; with all personnel in the right locations. We eventually established contact with dispatch. We got an ACARS call; and had difficulty establishing contact; except we knew maintenance control was on the line. Dispatch had said nothing to this point; except 'copy;' and maintenance control had told us to do whatever we needed to fix the door. This was our 'outside help.' once the door was secure; the flight duty manager got on the line; and we consulted with him about what to do for the remainder of the flight; with the door questionable to open without jamming again. He stated there did not appear to be a need to divert; nor was there a security issue; but that I could do what I felt was necessary. He also stated that he would send me the necessary paperwork over the printer to authorize opening the door; and possibly landing with the door jammed open. He noted that ultimately; it was up to the captain. With all this 'help;' we pressed the flight duty manager to send verification of his 'authorization;' and noted which sections of the fom and security we would be violating. The flight duty manager took over 90 minutes to tell us any opening of the door would require use of the captain's emergency authority; something which we had suggested to him in the first place. Our resources in this instance were useless; and in the case of the flight duty manager; worse. His suggestion that diversion wasn't necessary and that there wasn't a security issue was ridiculous. And suggesting that he could authorize the need for a deviation was likewise. I don't even know if the flight duty mfr can do any more than advise. Dispatch never spoke with us; except to relay messages. For all outside parties involved; there was an expectation of assistance. What we got was the equivalent to the movie line from 'airplane;' 'I just want you to know; we're all counting on you.' I wondered if we just had not moved beyond this. Perhaps dispatch providing nothing besides being an operator; and the flight duty manager being a slow hindrance was all that could be done; but the coordination was extremely poor and misleading. After a lengthy period of time; I was left hanging; with what I knew in the first five minutes. To use the lavatory or get fed; we needed to do so by using captain emergency authority. I did not feel these items were justified; and continued the flight to ZZZ. Diversion was discussed; but in light of the flight duty manager direction; did not believe the company would back this decision. Upon landing; a security debriefing was conducted with the fl
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN A320'S COCKPIT DOOR HINGES WERE LOOSE; ALLOWING THE DOOR BOTTOM TO CONTACT THE THRESHOLD. THE DOOR WAS DIFFICULT TO CLOSE; THUS COMPROMISING FLIGHT STATION SECURITY.
Narrative: THIS REPORT CONCERNS A SERIOUS AIRBORNE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE QUESTIONABLE ASSISTANCE OF DISPATCH AND THE FLT DUTY MGR. ENROUTE WE SET UP FOR A RESTROOM BREAK ABOUT 1 HR. INTO THE FLIGHT. DURING THE MOVEMENTS AT THE COCKPIT DOOR; THE DOOR BECAME JAMMED AND WOULDN'T CLOSE. THIS OCCURRED AS THE RIDE CONDITIONS WERE DETERIORATING; AND IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE FLIGHT ATTENDANT SHOULD REMAIN UP GUARDING THE DOOR. BOTH FLIGHT ATTENDANTS POSTING DUTY WERE AWARE OF THE SITUATION AT THE DOOR; AND BOTH THE CAPTAIN AND PURSER WORKED DILIGENTLY AT GETTING THE DOOR CLOSED IN MARGINAL RIDE CONDITIONS. AFTER A FEW MINUTES; THE DOOR WAS SECURED WITH THE CAPTAIN OUTSIDE. COMMUNICATION WAS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE FLIGHT DECK AND FORWARD FLIGHT ATTENDANT STATION. THE PROBLEM OF THE DOOR THRESHOLD BLOCKING THE CLOSURE OF THE DOOR WAS DISCUSSED; AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE DOOR COULD BE CLOSED BY PUSHING DOWN ON THE THRESHOLD FROM THE OUTSIDE. IT WAS DECIDED TO CONTINUE WITH RESTROOM BREAKS AND PERHAPS CONTINUE TO EFFECT TEMPORARY REPAIRS TO THE DOOR. ON THE SECOND ATTEMPT; THE DOOR AGAIN JAMMED OPEN BY HITTING AGAINST THE THRESHOLD. IT WAS OBVIOUS THE SCREWS HOLDING DOWN THE THRESHOLD WERE LOOSE; AND SINCE WE DO NOT HAVE SCREWDRIVERS; WE COULD NOT TIGHTEN UP THESE SCREWS. THE FIRST OFFICER WORKED ON REPAIRS; AND THE CAPTAIN CONTACTED DISPATCH; WHO ANSWERED THE SITUATION WITH 'COPY.' AFTER BENDING THE THRESHOLD BACK WITH AN ICE MALLET; WE WERE ABLE TO SECURE THE DOOR; WITH ALL PERSONNEL IN THE RIGHT LOCATIONS. WE EVENTUALLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH DISPATCH. WE GOT AN ACARS CALL; AND HAD DIFFICULTY ESTABLISHING CONTACT; EXCEPT WE KNEW MAINT CTL WAS ON THE LINE. DISPATCH HAD SAID NOTHING TO THIS POINT; EXCEPT 'COPY;' AND MAINT CTL HAD TOLD US TO DO WHATEVER WE NEEDED TO FIX THE DOOR. THIS WAS OUR 'OUTSIDE HELP.' ONCE THE DOOR WAS SECURE; THE FLT DUTY MGR GOT ON THE LINE; AND WE CONSULTED WITH HIM ABOUT WHAT TO DO FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLIGHT; WITH THE DOOR QUESTIONABLE TO OPEN WITHOUT JAMMING AGAIN. HE STATED THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE A NEED TO DIVERT; NOR WAS THERE A SECURITY ISSUE; BUT THAT I COULD DO WHAT I FELT WAS NECESSARY. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE WOULD SEND ME THE NECESSARY PAPERWORK OVER THE PRINTER TO AUTHORIZE OPENING THE DOOR; AND POSSIBLY LANDING WITH THE DOOR JAMMED OPEN. HE NOTED THAT ULTIMATELY; IT WAS UP TO THE CAPTAIN. WITH ALL THIS 'HELP;' WE PRESSED THE FLT DUTY MGR TO SEND VERIFICATION OF HIS 'AUTHORIZATION;' AND NOTED WHICH SECTIONS OF THE FOM AND SECURITY WE WOULD BE VIOLATING. THE FLT DUTY MGR TOOK OVER 90 MINUTES TO TELL US ANY OPENING OF THE DOOR WOULD REQUIRE USE OF THE CAPTAIN'S EMERGENCY AUTHORITY; SOMETHING WHICH WE HAD SUGGESTED TO HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE. OUR RESOURCES IN THIS INSTANCE WERE USELESS; AND IN THE CASE OF THE FLT DUTY MGR; WORSE. HIS SUGGESTION THAT DIVERSION WASN'T NECESSARY AND THAT THERE WASN'T A SECURITY ISSUE WAS RIDICULOUS. AND SUGGESTING THAT HE COULD AUTHORIZE THE NEED FOR A DEVIATION WAS LIKEWISE. I DON'T EVEN KNOW IF THE FLT DUTY MFR CAN DO ANY MORE THAN ADVISE. DISPATCH NEVER SPOKE WITH US; EXCEPT TO RELAY MESSAGES. FOR ALL OUTSIDE PARTIES INVOLVED; THERE WAS AN EXPECTATION OF ASSISTANCE. WHAT WE GOT WAS THE EQUIVALENT TO THE MOVIE LINE FROM 'AIRPLANE;' 'I JUST WANT YOU TO KNOW; WE'RE ALL COUNTING ON YOU.' I WONDERED IF WE JUST HAD NOT MOVED BEYOND THIS. PERHAPS DISPATCH PROVIDING NOTHING BESIDES BEING AN OPERATOR; AND THE FLT DUTY MGR BEING A SLOW HINDRANCE WAS ALL THAT COULD BE DONE; BUT THE COORDINATION WAS EXTREMELY POOR AND MISLEADING. AFTER A LENGTHY PERIOD OF TIME; I WAS LEFT HANGING; WITH WHAT I KNEW IN THE FIRST FIVE MINUTES. TO USE THE LAVATORY OR GET FED; WE NEEDED TO DO SO BY USING CAPTAIN EMERGENCY AUTHORITY. I DID NOT FEEL THESE ITEMS WERE JUSTIFIED; AND CONTINUED THE FLIGHT TO ZZZ. DIVERSION WAS DISCUSSED; BUT IN LIGHT OF THE FLT DUTY MGR DIRECTION; DID NOT BELIEVE THE COMPANY WOULD BACK THIS DECISION. UPON LANDING; A SECURITY DEBRIEFING WAS CONDUCTED WITH THE FL
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.