Narrative:

Instrument takeoff on runway 35L at den stapleton, weather appeared to be worse than what was published on ATIS ie, 9x1/2 5 33 26 040 8986. I used the flight director (collins) in the heading mode. Even though this is contrary to company policy, because of the superior reference it provides for controling the aircraft in case of an engine failure or other problem. Shortly after takeoff the aircraft pitched up and rolled violently to the left. I applied corrective action of pushing forward very hard and rolling level. During this action the stick shaker went off for about 3 seconds. Speed was about V2 plus 10 knots; flaps were 5 degree. Trim was correctly set. After this event I called for gear up and we continued the climb out and flew the trip on to geg. The first officer and I discussed this event on the way to geg and came to the conclusion that it was caused by a vortex from an aircraft landing on 35R. While holding in position on 35L for takeoff I did see the dim of an aircraft go by on final for 35R. The landing traffic is on a different frequency than takeoff traffic. After experiencing this, there is no doubt in my mind what caused the crash of the medium large transport in denver which was almost the exact same circumstances. Later that evening I made another takeoff on the same runway. Again with the exact same conditions, except the weather was a little worse, RVR 2000. When I asked the tower, after I was cleared for takeoff, if there were aircraft landing on 35R I was reluctantly told yes. It took another query to find out if anybody was touching down. I was told there was an aircraft rolling out. I made an uneventful takeoff. This attitude by denver tower and approach control is consistent with their past performance. They seem to be only concerned with maximizing aircraft movements. Their concern for safety is negligible. They try, also, to coerce crews into identifying aircraft visually in order to clear them for a visual approach under threat of being 'sent around'. Under some conditions it is almost impossible to see another aircraft, ie, looking for them against the city lights at night. Back to this incident. We very well could have lost this aircraft. I feel the 'flight director' aided significantly in the recovery.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG ENCOUNTERED VORTEX FROM LNDG ACFT ON ADJACENT ACFT CAUSING MOMENTARY LOSS OF CONTROL.

Narrative: INSTRUMENT TKOF ON RWY 35L AT DEN STAPLETON, WEATHER APPEARED TO BE WORSE THAN WHAT WAS PUBLISHED ON ATIS IE, 9X1/2 5 33 26 040 8986. I USED THE FLT DIRECTOR (COLLINS) IN THE HEADING MODE. EVEN THOUGH THIS IS CONTRARY TO COMPANY POLICY, BECAUSE OF THE SUPERIOR REFERENCE IT PROVIDES FOR CTLING THE ACFT IN CASE OF AN ENGINE FAILURE OR OTHER PROBLEM. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF THE ACFT PITCHED UP AND ROLLED VIOLENTLY TO THE L. I APPLIED CORRECTIVE ACTION OF PUSHING FORWARD VERY HARD AND ROLLING LEVEL. DURING THIS ACTION THE STICK SHAKER WENT OFF FOR ABOUT 3 SECONDS. SPEED WAS ABOUT V2 PLUS 10 KNOTS; FLAPS WERE 5 DEG. TRIM WAS CORRECTLY SET. AFTER THIS EVENT I CALLED FOR GEAR UP AND WE CONTINUED THE CLIMB OUT AND FLEW THE TRIP ON TO GEG. THE FIRST OFFICER AND I DISCUSSED THIS EVENT ON THE WAY TO GEG AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY A VORTEX FROM AN ACFT LNDG ON 35R. WHILE HOLDING IN POSITION ON 35L FOR TKOF I DID SEE THE DIM OF AN ACFT GO BY ON FINAL FOR 35R. THE LNDG TFC IS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ THAN TKOF TFC. AFTER EXPERIENCING THIS, THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND WHAT CAUSED THE CRASH OF THE MLG IN DENVER WHICH WAS ALMOST THE EXACT SAME CIRCUMSTANCES. LATER THAT EVENING I MADE ANOTHER TKOF ON THE SAME RWY. AGAIN WITH THE EXACT SAME CONDITIONS, EXCEPT THE WEATHER WAS A LITTLE WORSE, RVR 2000. WHEN I ASKED THE TWR, AFTER I WAS CLRED FOR TKOF, IF THERE WERE ACFT LNDG ON 35R I WAS RELUCTANTLY TOLD YES. IT TOOK ANOTHER QUERY TO FIND OUT IF ANYBODY WAS TOUCHING DOWN. I WAS TOLD THERE WAS AN ACFT ROLLING OUT. I MADE AN UNEVENTFUL TKOF. THIS ATTITUDE BY DENVER TWR AND APCH CTL IS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR PAST PERFORMANCE. THEY SEEM TO BE ONLY CONCERNED WITH MAXIMIZING ACFT MOVEMENTS. THEIR CONCERN FOR SAFETY IS NEGLIGIBLE. THEY TRY, ALSO, TO COERCE CREWS INTO IDENTIFYING ACFT VISUALLY IN ORDER TO CLEAR THEM FOR A VISUAL APCH UNDER THREAT OF BEING 'SENT AROUND'. UNDER SOME CONDITIONS IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE ANOTHER ACFT, IE, LOOKING FOR THEM AGAINST THE CITY LIGHTS AT NIGHT. BACK TO THIS INCIDENT. WE VERY WELL COULD HAVE LOST THIS ACFT. I FEEL THE 'FLIGHT DIRECTOR' AIDED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE RECOVERY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.