Narrative:

At approximately XA45 on jan/xa/09; the inspector and I departed from ZZZ1 headed toward ZZZ2. At roughly 1;900 ft MSL over ZZZ; a simulated engine failure was initiated by the examiner. I immediately pulled the carburetor heat on; pitched for best glide; and started a right turn to circle land on runway 36 at ZZZ. While circling to land; I went through the engine troubleshooting procedures and made a simulated emergency call over the ZZZ CTAF. At this point; we were on final. The aircraft was high; so I put in full flaps and initiated a forward slip to dissipate altitude. Aircraft landed long with the gear up. As soon as I realized the gear was not down; I secured the engine (mixture=idle cutoff; fuel selector=off; master=off; ignition switch=off). The inspector and I exited the aircraft and met at the tail. At no point during the maneuver did I hear any indication from the inspector that the gear was not down or that I should initiate a go around. I believe that causal factors in this incident were nervousness/stress associated with the practical examination as well as a poorly executed power-off approach resulting in distraction on final. A number of actions on my part could have prevented this incident. The most obvious and sure method of prevention would have been to put the gear down immediately after the simulated engine failure. This would have solved the problem at its root. Additionally; during the course of the maneuver; a number of factors/actions led to my inability to recognize that the gear was not down. I failed to completed a gump check (gas on fullest tank; gear down; mixture full rich; propeller full forward) on final. Additionally; better execution of the power-off approach would have allowed adequate time and altitude to utilize the checklist. Since we were high on final; my concentration was on getting the aircraft down (using full flaps and a forward slip) rather than verifying that aircraft was configured for landing. Additionally; it is my opinion that nerves/stress associated with the practical examination led to my inability to recognize the gear warning horn. Finally; I should have initiated a go around maneuver as soon as I realized that we were going to land long (runway was snow covered).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A pilot receiving a CFI practical check ride was given a simulated engine failure that led to a simulated emergency approach to a nearby airport. While correcting a high final approach altitude; the Reporter failed to lower the landing gear.

Narrative: At approximately XA45 on Jan/XA/09; the Inspector and I departed from ZZZ1 headed toward ZZZ2. At roughly 1;900 FT MSL over ZZZ; a simulated engine failure was initiated by the Examiner. I immediately pulled the carburetor heat on; pitched for best glide; and started a right turn to circle land on Runway 36 at ZZZ. While circling to land; I went through the engine troubleshooting procedures and made a simulated emergency call over the ZZZ CTAF. At this point; we were on final. The aircraft was high; so I put in full flaps and initiated a forward slip to dissipate altitude. Aircraft landed long with the gear up. As soon as I realized the gear was not down; I secured the engine (mixture=idle cutoff; fuel selector=off; master=off; ignition switch=off). The Inspector and I exited the aircraft and met at the tail. At no point during the maneuver did I hear any indication from the Inspector that the gear was not down or that I should initiate a go around. I believe that causal factors in this incident were nervousness/stress associated with the practical examination as well as a poorly executed power-off approach resulting in distraction on final. A number of actions on my part could have prevented this incident. The most obvious and sure method of prevention would have been to put the gear down immediately after the simulated engine failure. This would have solved the problem at its root. Additionally; during the course of the maneuver; a number of factors/actions led to my inability to recognize that the gear was not down. I failed to completed a GUMP check (gas on fullest tank; gear down; mixture full rich; PROP full forward) on final. Additionally; better execution of the power-off approach would have allowed adequate time and altitude to utilize the checklist. Since we were high on final; my concentration was on getting the aircraft down (using full flaps and a forward slip) rather than verifying that aircraft was configured for landing. Additionally; it is my opinion that nerves/stress associated with the practical examination led to my inability to recognize the gear warning horn. Finally; I should have initiated a go around maneuver as soon as I realized that we were going to land long (runway was snow covered).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.